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ABSTRACT  
The subject of this thesis is a group of emergent leading firms in developing countries 
pursuing a ‘dual frontier’, achieving technology supremacy and establishing market 
autonomy, and entering a newly emerging market in the context of the latter half of the 
20th century. Whilst the previous literature on catching-up and transition generally 
centres on the area of technological development of latecomer firms, this thesis extends 
the scope of analysis to a broader issue of technological development and marketing 
strategies of latecomer firms in transition. The thesis builds upon two different streams 
of literature: first the catching-up process in latecomer firms for the theoretical and 
empirical rationales, and second the boundaries of a firm and inter-firm coordination in 
technological frontier firms for the theoretical guidance to a systematic analysis. 
 
Using industry case studies of the Korean mobile handset manufacturers Samsung and 
LG Electronics, the thesis first shows that there could be windows of opportunity 
available for international technology transfer to emergent leading firms in the emerging 
stage of a new industry from competition to achieve a dominant compatibility standard 
among technology leaders. However, the research stresses that the characteristic of these 
technologies is cutting-edge but technologically incomplete and commercially unproven, 
which highlights the importance of previous experience and capacity for successful 
commercialisation. 
ii 
 
 
 
 
Moreover, the thesis shows that Korean firms pursuing a dual frontier overcame their 
uneven development between technological and marketing capabilities through 
intensive inter-firm collaborations with intermediary users, that is Mobile Network 
Operators (MNOs). In the thesis, it is stressed that Korean firms competed against 
technology leaders like Nokia in export markets by complementing weak marketing 
capabilities based on continuous collaborations with MNOs, evolving from von 
Hippelian to Teecean inter-firm relationships.  
 
Lastly, the thesis introduces to the literature on industry organisation a new form of an 
outsourcing organisation, termed a ‘contract developer’ (CD), which has been identified 
as a group of firms that is unilaterally specialised in, and that carries out development 
outsourcing projects for, mobile handset Own Brand Manufacturers (OBMs). The thesis 
reveals that CDs emerged from the industry shake-out and the co-specialised structure 
between mobile handset OBMs and MNOs in the industry and served as one of main 
mechanisms that supported the successful globalisation of the Korean firms.  
 
Therefore, the thesis argues that the key strategy that Korean emergent leading firms 
adopted to compete at the world frontier can be described as a ‘quasi’ extension of firm 
boundaries in terms of development resources (the CDs) and in terms of downstream 
capabilities (the MNOs).  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Research issues and research questions  
The subject of this thesis is the firms in developing countries that are approaching the 
technology frontier and entering a newly emerging market, especially in the context of 
the latter half of the 20th century. For the past several decades, the issue of ‘catching-up’, 
especially as it has occurred in East Asia, has been of interest to academic researchers 
(Amsden 2001; Ernst 2002; Hobday et al. 2004; Kim 1997a; Lee & Lim 2001). 
 
From a historical perspective, the phenomenon of catching-up is not uncommon: since 
the Industrial Revolution in the United Kingdom (UK), some important instances 
include the United States of America (US) and several European countries like Germany 
with respect to the UK in the second half of the 19th century, and Japan with respect to 
the US in the post-World War II era (Abramovitz 1986; Gerschenkron 1962; Rosenberg 
1970). Unlike the early industrialisations, however, the catching-up in the second half of 
the 20th century has occurred under new technical and market environments. Firstly, 
technologies have become highly science-based (Rosenberg 1970) and ever more 
complex and systemic with the emergence of information and communication 
technologies (Steinmueller 2001). Product markets have grown most rapidly for 
technologies with a high science content – this does not discount the continuing 
importance of more traditional industries, but points to the more rapid growth 
opportunities associated with science-based industries. Secondly, a series of successful 
General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) rounds has resulted in a sustained 
period of trade liberalisation which has been governed by the World Trade Organisation 
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(WTO) and accompanied by considerable reductions in the barriers to international 
investment, creating the conditions for a more globalised financial and product market 
(Radosevic 1999). 
 
Under the circumstances, one of the distinctive characteristics in the catching-up 
experienced in East Asian countries has been their export-led growth in the electronics 
industry, which mainly occurred through foreign direct investments and Original 
Equipment Manufacturer/Original Design Manufacturer (OEM/ODM) arrangements 
with multi-national corporations (Amsden & Chu 2003; Hobday 1995b; Kim 1997a). 
Although the roles of multi-national corporations and local firms differ across East 
Asian countries (Hobday 1995b), such arrangements have been core mechanisms for 
access to advanced foreign technologies and international markets in the region. In 
addition, firms in East Asian countries generally began to accumulate their capabilities 
by taking mature products as models or targets for development of the capabilities 
necessary to produce them (Kim 1997a). 
 
As some firms in these countries approached the international technology frontier, they 
began to capture the attention of researchers; for example, there are studies of 
Taiwanese electronics firms (Chu 2009; Kuo 2009) and large Korean firms (Hobday et 
al. 2004; Lee & Lim 2001; Lee et al. 2005), and the rarer case of a Latin American firm 
(Dutrénit 2000). The rationale for these studies is that firms from developing countries 
face a different set of technical and managerial challenges at the point where they are 
close to the frontier. One such challenge is the so-called ‘strategic dilemma’ (which at 
the level of the country is sometimes described as the ‘middle income trap’) (Hobday et 
al. 2004). This dilemma poses the alternatives of whether the firm should continue to 
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intensify its competition by employing the capabilities it developed during the catching-
up process – perhaps building in-house R&D and its own brands – or diversify into new 
and emerging industries (nanotechnology, biotechnology, or as other industries not yet 
fully visualised).  
 
In retrospect, though not covered in the literature1, latecomer firms facing this strategic 
dilemma have developed several pathways. Some have specialised in their current 
business by increasing scale and pursuing a cost advantage strategy2. Others have begun 
to compete with their own brands on the basis of in-house R&D, which implies that 
they have to be a ‘dual frontier’, namely attaining technology supremacy and 
establishing market autonomy. ‘Technology supremacy’ in this instance means the 
technological competitiveness of a firm to achieve parity with, or surpass, its forerunner 
rivals, and ‘market autonomy’ is defined as the ability of a firm to introduce products of 
its own design and manufacture while retaining control of upstream and downstream 
parts of the production and marketing chain. The concern of previous studies in regard 
to a dual frontier, which is the focus of this thesis, is that these new types of leading 
firms in developing countries would confront serious managerial challenges, and have 
to organise their own R&D to substitute for previous technology licensing and reverse 
engineering which would increasingly be subject to litigation over trade disputes (Chu 
2009; Hobday et al. 2004). For example, in the mobile phone industry which is 
examined in this thesis, BenQ lost its ODM contract with Motorola as soon as it 
launched its Own Brand Manufacturer (OBM) handset business (Kuo 2009). Earlier 
                                           
1 One exception is Lee and Lim (2001) who categorised different catching-up trajectories based on the 
nature of particular markets in which the cycle time between models or versions of the technology is an 
important variable.  
2 Such examples include Foxconn in contract manufacturing services and TSMC in foundry business. 
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studies also point out that these firms struggle to overcome uneven development not 
only within technologies that they have (Dutrénit 2000; Hobday et al. 2004) but also 
between technology and marketing stages within an organisation (Hobday 1995b). It is 
difficult for firms from developing countries not only to develop a cutting-edge product, 
but also to adjust their organisational routines and customise their products to specific 
demands across different markets, the process of which is a prerequisite to compete at 
the top level but not an easy task with high-technology product markets like mobile 
phones that the thesis studied. 
 
After raising some interesting questions, however, the existing literature does not 
proceed further and therefore, does not provide explanations of how these firms have 
managed to overcome the aforementioned challenges in order to compete at the 
technological frontier. If these firms are pursuing a dual frontier, as explained above, do 
they simply have to invest in their in-house R&D and own brand and distribution 
channels, taking high risks and bearing high costs? In addition, how do firms pursuing a 
dual frontier manage to cope with technical and managerial issues such as uneven 
development within technologies and between technology and marketing stages within 
an organisation, which are the main concerns of earlier studies? Furthermore, 
considering that these firms have largely caught up with frontier firms, might there be 
available windows of opportunity for these firms if they enter newly emerging markets 
rather than those that are mature? If so, how do windows of opportunity arise at this 
nascent stage and how do these firms in developing countries manage to cope with such 
highly uncertain technological and market environments? Even technology forerunners 
often fail to overcome these uncertainties in an emerging market (Christensen 1997). 
This is what the literature on the contemporary catching-up process is missing and it is 
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this area which is the focus of this thesis. 
 
Another limitation of earlier research is that it is focused solely on internal issues within 
firm organisations during their adjustment process, neglecting the role of external 
counterparts such as upstream suppliers and downstream users for interactive learning 
(Jensen et al. 2007; Lundvall 1988; Malerba 1992; von Tunzelmann & Wang 2007). 
Firms pursuing a dual frontier may need to compensate for the deficiencies from 
external complementary asset holders (Teece 1986). Even technology leaders heavily 
depend on active interactions with their external partners (Foxall & Johnston 1987; 
Lundvall 1988; von Hippel 1998; von Tunzelmann & Wang 2007) to sustain their 
competitiveness and accordingly, firms’ competitive advantages sometimes come from 
beyond their boundaries (Asanuma 1989; Dyer & Singh 1998; Jap 2001; Teece 1986). 
This shift of attention towards inter-firm relationships requires consideration of an 
additional literature stream, one dealing with the boundaries of the firm and inter-firm 
coordination, and which is the hybrid mode of coordination between market 
transactions and firm organisations. This stream of literature explains how firms set 
their boundaries and where firms’ competitive advantages come from in relation to other 
parties (Brusoni et al. 2001). By including external partners within the scope of the 
analysis, a new theoretical perspective is provided on understanding the pursuit of a 
dual frontier by latecomer firms.   
 
Some countries have been successful so far in catching up with levels of income and 
other measures of performance of countries that had industrialised earlier (Fagerberg & 
Srholec 2005), and Korea is one of those countries. In the Korean context, as in the 
earlier experience of Japan, the catching-up process is strongly related to the evolution 
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of business organisations, particularly to local large firms so-called ‘chaebols’ (Amsden 
1989). Since the focus of attention in this thesis is an industry in which advanced 
technological capabilities are of central importance, the thesis employs the terminology 
of ‘forerunner firms’ for firms that first developed and commercialised particular 
advanced technologies, and ‘emergent leading firms’3 for firms in developing countries 
pursuing a dual frontier. The principal focus in this thesis is the nature of technological 
and marketing strategy adopted by these emergent leading firms in their efforts to 
achieve parity with or surpass their forerunner rivals. This contest is most clearly 
apparent in the industry chosen for this thesis – the mobile handset industry. 
 
The mobile handset industry encompasses some unique features with regard to the 
competition (catching-up) of Korean mobile handset manufacturers against their 
technology forerunners such as Nokia and Motorola. Firstly, the Korean mobile handset 
manufacturers entered the market at a very early (embryonic) stage of the second 
generation of mobile phone networks4. Although the Korean makers commenced the 
development of Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) technologies slightly later 
than Motorola and Lucent, they were the first movers with Qualcomm in the CDMA 
handset market when Korea commercialised a CDMA network for the first time in the 
world in 1996 (Song 1999). Secondly, the mobile handset industry has been 
characterised by a very short product life cycle (Lee & Lim 2001) featuring frequent 
technical changes, a condition which poses significant technical and managerial 
                                           
3 In this sense, firms in the catching-up process become emergent leading firms as they get to pursue a 
dual frontier. 
4 The technical bases of the first generation (analogue) and the second generation (digital) in the mobile 
communications were fundamentally different. Also, Korean emergent leading firms focused on CDMA 
technologies because the opportunity for licensing Global System for Mobile communications (GSM) or 
US-Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) technologies were unavailable. See detailed explanations in 
Chapters 4 and 5. 
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challenges for industry participants and yet also provides the motivation for 
understanding how emergent leading firms overcome these uncertainties. Lastly, mobile 
handsets have become more and more multi-component and multi-technology products 
on the basis of functional convergences pushed forward by Mobile Network Operators 
(MNOs) (Whang 2009). This phenomenon in handsets pushes handset manufacturers 
towards system integration and also leads to the division of innovative labour in handset 
production going beyond the boundaries of a firm organisation (Prencipe et al. 2004). It 
gives emergent leading firms strong motives to collaborate with external partners, which 
in turn brings more managerial challenges to such emergent leading firms.  
 
Motivated by the broad issues of strategies available to catching-up economies and 
emergent leading firms, and the specific conditions of the mobile handset industry, this 
thesis addresses the following set of questions. 
 
(1) When emergent leading firms in latecomer economies pursue a ‘dual frontier’ of 
technology supremacy and market autonomy, how do they reconcile uneven 
development within technologies and between technology and marketing stages 
within an organisation? 
(2) How does the fact that emergent leading firms enter the newly emerging market 
rather than mature markets affect their pursuit of a dual frontier? In addition, 
what is the role of inter-firm collaboration in their pursuit of a dual frontier 
under these market conditions? 
 
1.2 Thesis structure 
The rest of the thesis is constructed as follows.  
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Chapter 2 explores the literature that offers a theoretical background to help us 
understand the issue of the transition process of one candidate for latecomer firms 
approaching the world frontier. The thesis combines two distant streams of literature: 
latecomer firms and technological frontier firms. More specifically, it draws upon the 
literature on catching-up in latecomer firms and, as noted above, the literature on 
boundaries of a firm and inter-firm coordination for technological frontier firms. In 
doing so, it identifies a theoretical gap in the existing literature related to what will be 
called the ‘dual frontier’ (meaning the meeting of managerial and technological 
challenges simultaneously), and establishes a theoretical guideline for the thesis, which 
also aims to illuminate a wider range of issues than the ‘dual frontier’ problem. Based 
on the literature review on the catching-up of latecomer firms and their ‘transition 
process’, the chapter presents the rationale for differentiating the transition process of 
latecomer firms from their catching-up process and identifies an array of transition paths 
of latecomer firms, including the ‘dual frontier’ possibility. It then turns to the literature 
on technological frontier firms with respect to the issues of firm boundaries and inter-
firm coordination in order to carry out a systematic analysis of the dynamic definition of 
the boundaries of latecomer firms during their transition process in which the ‘dual 
frontier’ problem is addressed. It attempts to draw the implications of theories on firm 
boundaries and inter-firm coordination towards latecomer firms’ transition based on the 
resource-based view of a firm.  
 
Chapter 3 introduces research methodologies adopted in the thesis. It explains the 
implementation of this study as in a single industry with a focused case study as a unit 
of analysis, and the choice of the transition success (at least in terms of market share) of 
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the Korean mobile handset industry with two particular Korean latecomer firms, 
Samsung Electronics and LG Electronics5. It further identifies interesting features from 
the case of the mobile handset industry and the Korean handset manufacturers’ 
catching-up effort, and outlines the details of two rounds of fieldwork with respect to 
data gathering through secondary documents and in-depth interviews.  
 
The aim of Chapter 4 is to present readers with some basic knowledge of the mobile 
handset industry so they can understand its fundamental characteristics. The chapter 
begins with the history of mobile telecommunication technologies and the evolution of 
corresponding mobile handsets and mobile network services. It then identifies core 
actors in a given industry structure, which are baseband chip suppliers, handset 
manufacturers and MNOs. While the chapter tracks the unbundling and specialisation of 
handset manufacturers in collaboration with upstream baseband chip suppliers, it also 
illuminates the bundling of mobile handsets and services led by handset manufacturers 
and network operators under the given technology and market evolution.  
 
Having provided some basic information on the evolution of the industry, the thesis 
proceeds to three empirical chapters (5 to 7) that provide the practical foundation for 
answering the research questions. These three chapters are roughly chronological but 
not entirely as there are causal relations intertwined between Chapters 6 and 7.  
 
Chapter 5 investigates the window of opportunity for Korean handset manufacturers in 
regard to the international technology transfer of new technologies. It starts from the 
time when the Korean government and Qualcomm, the pioneer of CDMA technologies, 
                                           
5 Hereafter, the thesis uses shortened versions of the names of the two companies (Samsung and LG). 
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agreed to jointly develop CDMA telecommunication technologies. It identifies the 
rationale for the decisions by both the Korean government and Qualcomm to pursue the 
project and traces how the Korean side successfully implemented the project, resulting 
in the world’s first commercialisation of a CDMA network with the support of 
Qualcomm. The chapter concludes that windows of opportunity are available for 
emergent leading firms at an early stage of a new industry.  
 
Chapter 6 focuses on the collaboration of Korean handset manufacturers with their 
downstream distributors, the MNOs (especially in foreign markets), which is 
undertaken to compensate for the handset manufacturers’ lack of marketing assets. It 
begins by showing how Korean handset manufacturers became dominant in the 
domestic CDMA handset market based on their first-mover advantage in CDMA 
handsets. It then examines the way in which Korean handset manufacturers forayed into 
advanced foreign markets like the US CDMA handset market. It describes how they 
were confronted by the barriers of complementary assets in the market that differed 
from the control they were able to exert in their domestic market. These disadvantages 
in foreign markets included low brand awareness and lack of distribution channels. The 
chapter directs attention to the role of collaboration between Korean handset 
manufacturers and foreign MNOs in solving these problems. A typical example of co-
specialisation between them is illustrated by the case of the world’s first Digital Video 
Broadcasting-Handheld (DVB-H) mobile TV service by 3 Italia. The chapter concludes 
by arguing that this was a key mechanism behind the Korean handset manufacturers’ 
transition process as it required the delivery of more sophisticated network services 
through customised handsets.  
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Chapter 7 deals with the issue of how the Korean handset manufacturers have expanded 
their global market shares while coping with the burden of co-specialisation with their 
downstream partners. It shows that Korean handset manufacturers utilised a new 
business organisation of ‘contract developer’ (See Chapter 7 for its definition) in 
connection with a global platform strategy. By using one of LG’ global platform models 
(the Shine Phone series) as an example, the chapter identifies the mechanism of how 
Korean companies implemented their platform strategies and utilised their contract 
developers over time in order to meet the demands of highly customised handsets from 
various MNOs globally.  
 
Chapter 8 recapitulates the main findings from the three empirical chapters and draws 
out the implications of these findings for theories on the issue of the transition process 
of latecomer firms. In addition, it suggests implications of the thesis for management 
practioners of developing countries. It concludes with some of limitations of the thesis 
originating from a case study approach and therefore makes some suggestions for 
further research.   
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2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The main objective of this chapter is to articulate the transition process of emergent 
leading firms and to derive theoretical guidelines from a literature review for the 
analyses in the following empirical chapters. In order to do so, the thesis builds upon 
two different streams of literature: first the catching-up process in latecomer firms and 
second the boundaries of a firm and inter-firm coordination in technological frontier 
firms. From the first strand of literature, the chapter identifies theoretical and empirical 
gaps that the previous literature has not covered as a rationale for the thesis. Using the 
second strand of literature as a theoretical guide, a systematic analyses of the transition 
process of emergent leading firms is then carried out. This combination permits in a 
complementary manner the analysis of the transition process of latecomer high-
technology firms. 
 
This chapter is composed as follows. Section 2.2 identifies the motivation for studying 
the transition process of emergent leading firms. Starting with a definition of the 
latecomer firm, the section identifies the nature and distinctiveness of the contemporary 
catching-up process in comparison with those of earlier industrialisations6. Based on the 
literature review of the contemporary catching-up process and particularly its final stage, 
the section identifies the theoretical limitations and gaps, and uses this analysis to 
describe the rationale behind the research for the thesis. Section 2.3 then examines the 
                                           
6 The term ‘late industrialisation’ is used in many studies for a macro level approach to catching-up 
(Amsden 2003; Gerschenkron 1962), whereas ‘late late industrialisation’ is used for catching up by East 
Asian countries to differentiate this phenomenon from earlier catching-up processes (Shin 1996). 
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literature on boundaries of a firm and inter-firm coordination with regard to 
technological frontier firms as a way of building up the theoretical guidelines for 
subsequent empirical chapters. The review on boundaries of a firm compares transaction 
cost theories and capabilities view and highlights the differences and their 
complementarities in relation to emergent leading firms. In particular, drawing on multi-
dimensional, dynamic and relational perspectives on firm boundaries, the issue of inter-
firm coordination is employed to discuss the processes by which emergent leading firms 
compete against their frontier competitors in relation to their external suppliers and 
users. The chapter concludes with a summary of the features and implications of the 
transition process of emergent leading firms by linking these two (distant) streams of 
literature.  
 
2.2 Catching up, latecomer firms and their transition to world frontiers 
This section reviews the literature on latecomer firms and their catching-up process. The 
thesis first differentiates latecomer firms from firms representing different stages of 
entry in the context of the previously industrialised economies; these latter firms are 
typified as forerunners, followers and late entrants.  
 
2.2.1 Forerunners, followers, late entrants and latecomers  
First of all, what differentiates forerunners, followers and late entrants? By definition, 
there is a difference of time element between them. Forerunners are the first to arrive in 
a market and have to pioneer their own way without reference to other experience that 
can be observed. They face the problem of non-existent markets to varying degrees. In 
return, they are able to secure ‘supernormal profits’ if their attempts are successful (Shin 
1996). In some cases, their ‘forerunner’ technology must compete against incumbent 
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technologies – e.g. the motor car with the horse and carriage – and sometimes overcome 
uncertainty over the scale of the market for the new technology. In other cases, the 
forerunner firm is unable to match the performance of fast seconds (followers) that 
imitate or adapt the initial technology in commercially fruitful ways – e.g. the CT 
scanner or personal computers prior to the IBM PC (Teece 1986). 
 
In contrast, followers and late entrants have a point of reference in being able to observe 
some of what forerunners have gone through in terms of technology and market 
developments. They can learn from the experience of forerunners, both of success and 
failure. However, they also have to compete against forerunners as well as with other 
followers and late entrants. Therefore, the existence of forerunners is both advantageous 
and disadvantageous to them (Lieberman & Montgomery 1988). In this vein, the 
difference between forerunners, followers and late entrants comes down to the ‘order of 
entry’ into the market, and both forerunners and followers and even late entrants can be 
considered as leaders. Hereafter, the thesis uses the term ‘leaders’ collectively for 
forerunners, followers and late entrants in advanced countries. 
 
Latecomer firms look similar to late entrants in that they enter target markets at a later 
stage of industry life cycle in terms of their order of entry. However, latecomers have 
innate ‘negative externalities’ from their developing economy context (Radosevic 1999). 
Hobday (1995b, p.34) distinguished the term ‘latecomer firms’ from technology leaders 
in acknowledging two distinctive disadvantages: they are cut off ‘from the main 
international sources of technology and R&D’ and ‘from international markets and 
demanding users’. Drawing on the resource-based view of a firm (Penrose 1959), 
Mathews (2002) similarly acknowledged a latecomer firm’s poor endowment of 
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resources and technology and market access. In this regard, the catching-up process of a 
latecomer firm can be understood as the process by which it incorporates mechanisms to 
compensate for those negative externalities. 
 
2.2.2 Unique aspects of the contemporary catching-up process  
The history of modern economic development provides us with a series of catching-up 
examples. These include the US and some European countries like Germany taking over 
from the UK in the second half of the 19th century, Japan taking over from the West 
after the Second World War, with the most recent example being East Asian countries 
taking over from the West and Japan from the second half of the 20th century onwards.  
 
Early successful instances of catching-up share important similarities. Developing 
countries have benefited from the exploitation of ‘borrowed technologies’ from 
advanced countries despite newly imposed Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) and other 
forerunner advantages (Gerschenkron 1962; Rosenberg 1970). At the same time, efforts 
of ‘internal technology capability building’ for borrowed technologies (Bell & Pavitt 
1993) have been vigorously made in these instances. Rosenberg (1982, p.271–272) 
stated: 
  
The most distinctive single factor determining the success of technology transfer 
is the early emergence of an indigenous technological capacity. In the absence of 
such a capacity, foreign technologies have not usually flourished…the transfer of 
technology must not be conceived of as a once-and-for-all affair. It is not 
something that happens at a single point in time. It is, rather, an ongoing activity. 
Any perspective that ignores this fact is likely to distort the essential issues in 
technology transfer. 
 
Odagiri and Goto (1996) showed that the Japanese textile and steel industries failed to 
１６ 
 
 
 
utilise the imported British technologies and succeeded only through subsequent 
adaptation efforts by local engineers during early Japanese industrialisation. Bell and 
Pavitt (1993) also emphasised that there is no room for the simple innovation–diffusion 
models. They concluded that latecomers are required to build capabilities not only to 
modify, adapt and even improve foreign technologies according to local needs but also 
to make the right decision in the first place among a variety of candidate foreign 
technologies. Firms without such knowledge and technological capacity will lag behind.  
 
The catching-up process in the second half of the 20th century, as had occurred mainly 
in East Asia, bears some distinctiveness in technical and market environments compared 
to earlier instances. Firstly, technologies have become more and more science-based 
(Rosenberg 1982) and systemic and complex with the emergence of information and 
communication technologies (Radosevic 1999; Steinmueller 2001). Some have argued 
that the science-based nature of borrowed technologies has increased the size of 
backwardness that latecomers had to cope with (Amsden 1989; Shin 1996). Rosenberg 
(1982) also contended that latecomer firms in East Asian countries would struggle to 
imitate and adapt foreign advanced technologies without proper absorptive capacity 
(Cohen & Levinthal 1990) in the 20th century due to the nature of contemporary 
technologies. 
 
Market environments in the second half of the 20th century can be characterised by trade 
liberalisation among countries and globalisation of production by multi-national 
corporations (Radosevic 1999). The former neutralised an array of previous policy 
measures that ‘a developmental state’ (Amsden 1989; Evans 1995) adopted to promote 
its infant industries, and the capacity of a state to control its finance, trade, banking 
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system and production has significantly decreased (Chang 2002). On the other hand, the 
latter resulted in the hike of foreign direct investment flow from multi-national 
corporations towards developing countries, and multi-national corporations gradually 
took the centre stage in the contemporary catching-up process (Ernst 2002). The less 
prominent role of a state and more conspicuous role of multi-national corporations in 
the contemporary catching-up process fundamentally changed the mechanisms and 
channels of international technology transfer. 
 
However, the new technical and market environments have also created new channels 
for, and mechanisms of, a catching-up process. While efforts to catch up in heavy 
industries continued across developing countries, many firms in East Asia began their 
catching-up with competitive advantages based on cheap labour focusing on consumer 
goods in the latter half of the 20th century (Amsden 1989; Amsden & Chu 2003; Hobday 
1995b); in particular, a unique and important feature arose in the electronics industry 
that offered relatively high value added to assembly on the basis of cheap labour 
without demanding heavy investment in capital equipment like other heavy industries. 
The export-led growth in East Asian countries was also an important feature in that it 
could generate economies of scale sufficient to attain sustainable growth in terms of 
quantity and introduce the sophisticated demands of advanced markets to keep pressure 
in terms of quality in spite of small and underdeveloped domestic markets (Amsden 
1989).  
 
For example, South Korea has succeeded in catching up from having been considerably 
behind in the second half of the 20th century. The process was initiated by the 
advantages of cheap labour in industries like the textile industry (although heavy 
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industries did become important by the 1970s). In addition, Korea’s breakthrough in 
electronics involved moving from being an assembler to being a system designer and 
component producer, a move which made it possible to become a world-leading frontier. 
 
In summary, this section has explained that, despite sharing some similarities, the 
catching-up process in East Asia in the latter half of the 20th century occurred in the 
different contexts of technical and market environments and bears some unique features 
compared to earlier catching-up. This illustrates the necessity of research into the 
contemporary catching-up process on its own and, so far, the knowledge accumulated 
on this issue is considerable. More recently, observations from across different countries 
and industries have shown that a group of latecomer firms in newly industrialising 
economies, albeit few in number, have successfully cleared the final hurdle in the 
catching-up process and have begun to compete with forerunner firms. Despite some 
early studies, the existing literature does not reveal enough about how this ‘final stage’ 
in the catching-up process was achieved. It is this final triumph in the catching-up 
process that the thesis tries to examine. The next two subsections examine how this 
contemporary catching-up process and the final stage at the level of the firm occurred.  
 
2.2.3 The contemporary catching-up process 
This section describes the stylised model of the contemporary catching-up process and 
the mechanisms of technology transfer carried out by firms in East Asian countries.  
 
Technology capability building by latecomer firms in East Asia 
Rather than provide a general review of the literature on technology capability building 
within the contemporary catching-up process, this section introduces two influential 
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studies by Kim (1997a) and Hobday (1995b) on latecomer firms in East Asia and uses 
them as the basis for a discussion on transition processes by emergent leading firms. 
 
Based on Utterback and Abernathy’s innovation model (1975) and Lee et al.’s model 
(1988), Kim (1997a) describes the catching-up process of Korean latecomer firms as 
occurring in three different stages: introduction, internalisation, and generation. In the 
first introduction stage, the dominant innovation activity is the acquisition of matured 
foreign technologies from developed countries, especially process technologies by 
assembling. In the second internalisation stage, the assimilation of adopted technologies 
occurs along with the development of the product design capabilities. In the last 
generation stage, latecomer firms finally acquire new product-development capabilities. 
Starting from process and moving to product innovation, this is exactly the reverse 
direction of the typical leadership innovation process.  
 
Hobday (1995b), on the other hand, explains the catching-up process from the global 
production network perspective as a stepwise advancement from OEM through ODM, 
to OBM. Latecomer electronic firms in Korea and Taiwan started their catching-up 
phase as OEM assemblers of simple products based on cheap labour costs. Based on the 
accumulated capabilities by ‘learning the art of assembly’, they advanced to the second 
phase of ODM with some design capabilities to meet customers’ requirements. Finally, 
they moved to OBM with their own brands, as well as in-house R&D. 
 
Kim (1997a) and Hobday (1995b) captured much of the dynamics of the late 1980s and 
early 1990s in East Asia and both models are very useful in terms of their clarity and 
simplicity. However, subsequent developments in the field have shown that the last 
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stage of both models seems to be problematical because the models suggest, at best, a 
deterministic single pattern; one of main rationales for this thesis is to examine the 
problems arising out of these two models. The models assume that latecomer firms in 
the final stage compete on the basis of technological supremacy and marketing 
autonomy; but recent developments of East Asian firms manifest several different paths, 
as will be discussed further in Section 2.2.4. What is emphasised here is that the status 
of OBM in latecomer firms is neither a necessary condition nor a sufficient condition 
for achieving a technological frontier level and should not be directly related to 
attainment of the technological frontiers. OBM is rather the consequence of reaching the 
frontier in marketing capabilities7 where the producer is able to bring its product to the 
customer without the intervention of a firm with stronger brand recognition (and with 
which it has to share revenues).  
 
Mechanisms of technology transfer from technology leaders to latecomer firms in 
East Asia 
International technology transfer is mutually beneficial between latecomer firms and 
technology leaders. Through international technology transfer to latecomer firms, a 
technology leader in a developed country is able ‘(1) to prolong the life cycle of 
products that are becoming obsolete in the home market, (2) to find new, growing 
markets, and (3) to ensure its own survival by relocating production segments to 
developing countries where labour costs are lower’ (Kim 1997a, p.223). Drawing on 
Fransman (1985), Kim (1991) provided a systematic categorisation of technology 
transfer mechanisms between technology leaders and latecomer firms with respect to 
                                           
7 In the marketing literature, marketing capabilities consist of market-sensing capabilities, (customer and 
competitor) relational capabilities, and brand management capabilities (Day 1994; Morgan et al. 2009; 
Smirnova et al. 2011) 
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market mediation and the role of foreign suppliers as shown in Table 2.1.  
 
The mode in Cell 2 is transfer of technologies embodied in goods as a commodity such 
as capital goods (standard machinery) and components. It is clearly mediated by the 
market but the role of foreign suppliers is limited because the transfer of knowledge 
occurs as a form of commodity trade where there are competitive sources of supply. 
Therefore, foreign suppliers have limited control over the process. Cell 3 includes 
various forms of informal imitation mechanisms such as reverse engineering, 
observation, trade and technical journals. It is not mediated by the market and nor is it 
involved with foreign suppliers. Kim (1991) stresses that absorptive capacity (Cohen & 
Levinthal 1990) of the recipients really matters in determining how much they can 
materialise the potential of technology transfer in both Cells 2 and 3.  
 
Table 2.1 Modes of foreign technology transfer 
Market mediation 
The role of foreign suppliers 
Active Passive 
Market mediated 
Formal mechanisms 
(Foreign direct investment, foreign 
licensing, turnkey plants, 
consultancies) 
Cell 1 
Commodity trade 
(Standard machinery 
transfer) 
 
Cell 2 
Non-market mediated 
Informal mechanisms 
(Technical assistance of foreign 
buyers and vendors through OEM, 
ODM contracts) 
Cell 4 
Informal mechanisms 
(Reverse engineering, 
observation, trade and 
technical journals, etc.) 
Cell 3 
Source: Originally introduced by Fransman (1985) and modified by Kim (1991, p.224). 
 
The mode in Cell 1 denotes formal forms of international technology transfer such as 
foreign direct investment, foreign licensing, technical consultancy and made-to-order 
machinery. In this mode, the process is mediated by the market, and foreign suppliers 
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play an active role in negotiating terms and conditions of technology transfer8. Lastly, 
technology transfer in Cell 4 comes from OEM/ODM arrangements between latecomer 
firms and foreign buyers. In this mode, foreign buyers deliberately provide latecomer 
firms with technical know-how and assistance to meet product specifications. Therefore, 
the mode in Cell 4 occurs with the relatively active role of foreign buyers without a 
formal market transaction.  
 
In summary, international technology transfer between latecomer firms and technology 
leaders occurs via a variety of formal and informal mechanisms. Concerns may arise 
over ‘boomerang’ effects of international technology transfer, the contention being that 
technology leaders should stop transferring technologies to latecomer firms. In what 
follows, the thesis considers whether this argument is plausible. 
 
Can technology leaders stop technology transfer to latecomer firms? 
With respect to the possibility of hindering technology transfer to a latecomer firm, 
Rosenberg (1982, p.270) contended: 
 
The transfer of industrial technology to less developed countries is inevitable. 
Indeed, as we have seen, the process has already been going on for about a 
century and a half, and there is no compelling reason to believe that it will 
stop. Not only is industrialisation elsewhere inevitable, but so is some 
alteration in the relative positions of the industrial countries…Thus, a 
historical perspective suggests that the central questions are not whether 
industrial technologies will be transferred, but rather when it will happen, 
where it will happen, which technologies will be transferred, how they will be 
modified in the process, and how rapidly this process will occur. 
 
                                           
8 Countries like China which have a big domestic market may coerce foreign firms into technology 
licensing in return for access to the market, the mechanism of so-called ‘trading market for technology’ 
(Mu & Lee 2005). 
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Moreover, there have been numerous historical examples of such attempts to prevent 
technology transfer from developed countries to developing countries. In the early days 
of industrialisation, for instance, Britain prohibited the export of its industrial 
technologies such as the emigration of British artisans until 1825 and the export of new 
machinery until 1842. Yet around two thousand British artisans had emigrated to the 
Continent by 1825, and the adoption of the modern British spinning factory (first 
established in 1771) across the Continent had taken place by the end of the century 
(Clark 1987).  
 
In the context of the contemporary catching-up process, Kim (1991) has provided 
explanations in a more systematic way based on Table 2.1. Firstly, he contends that 
Cells 2 and 3 leave no measures for technology leaders to stop technology transfer by 
definition of their passive role. As a pure market transaction of commodity trade, 
stopping the mode in Cell 2 may hurt the growth of capital goods/components producers 
in developed countries, particularly when producers in these countries face rivalry from 
other advanced country producers. The transfer mode in Cell 3, which includes 
mechanisms such as reverse engineering and information gathering, solely depends on 
latecomer firms’ absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal 1990).   
 
In Cells 1 and 4 where the role of technology leaders is active, the situation needs more 
complex explanation. In case of the transfer mode in Cell 1, Kim (1991) argues that the 
restriction on foreign licensing will shorten the life cycle of technology leaders’ 
technologies or products and that on foreign direct investments will harm technology 
leaders due to competition with other multi-national corporations. Moreover, latecomer 
firms may actively turn to other multi-national corporations for alternative sources or 
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sometimes take the risks of moving to other technology transfer modes such as Cell 3. 
In case of Cell 4, Kim contends that technology leaders themselves do not want to break 
OEM or ODM arrangements with latecomer firms as the former need to keep their 
international price competitiveness through the mode.  
 
Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that the collaboration between technology 
leaders and latecomer firms will continue as a form of technology transfer. Subsection 
2.2.4 below discusses this issue in more detail in consideration of windows of 
opportunity in the context of an emerging market. 
 
2.2.4 Transition of emergent leading firms and windows of opportunity in an 
emerging stage 
Based on some early research on the transition of emergent leading firms, this section 
seeks the rationale for the research on the final stage of catching-up – a ‘transition 
process’ by emergent leading firms – and discusses windows of opportunity for 
emergent leading firms in the context of an emerging market. 
 
Rationale for the transition process of emergent leading firms and their hardships 
First of all, the term transition process needs to be unified. Several different terms have 
been used in the literature with respect to the challenges of emergent leading firms in 
the second half of the 20th century. While the Science Policy Research Unit (SPRU) of 
the University of Sussex in the UK originated studies (Dutrénit, 2000; Hobday et al., 
2004) utilising the term ‘transition phase or process’9, most of the Korean studies (e.g. 
                                           
9 When a term needs to imply the meaning of a mechanism, ‘transition process’ is preferentially used. 
Otherwise, ‘transition phase’ and ‘transition process’ are used interchangeably. 
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Choung et al. (2000) and Song et al. (2006)) preferred ‘post catch-up stage’. The term 
‘post catch-up stage’ has been widely used in the Korean literature because in the 
Korean language the term has the distinctive meaning of the discontinuity between the 
catching-up stage and the frontier stage. Here, the thesis uses the term ‘transition’ as it is 
written in English and in what follows, the meaning of the term is specified. 
 
Emergent leading firms in East Asia have exemplified more varied forms of business 
than is suggested in the literature10. Rather than advancing to OBM in order to capture 
more value added as Hobday (1995b) has suggested, several Taiwanese firms actually 
stayed as ODMs. The data on Taiwan IT exports between 1993 and 2002 in fact show 
that the percentage of OEM and ODM in most export products had increased (Chu 
2009). Moreover, some Taiwanese electronics manufacturing firms even transformed 
themselves into firms specialising in manufacturing, so-called ‘contract manufacturers’ 
or ‘electronics manufacturing services’: examples are firms like Foxconn and Pegatron, 
the annual company sales of which amounted to $11139 billion and $31 billion 
respectively as of 201412. They are different from conventional OEMs in that they 
acquire contracts from multiple customers for multiple products based on their 
competitive advantages of economies of scale in manufacturing services, which was 
possible due to their access to the low-wage labour force of the Chinese mainland. 
Other Taiwanese firms such as the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company 
(TSMC) and the United Microelectronics Corporation (UMC) specialised in a 
                                           
10 Lee and Lim (2001) showed several technological trajectories from the cases of Korean emergent 
leading firms, categorising them into three groups: path-following, path-skipping and path-creative 
catching up. 
11 All reference to ‘$’ in the thesis is to US dollars. 
12 Manufacturing Market Insider, ‘Inside the contract manufacturing industry’, http://mfgmkt.com/wp-
content/uploads/2015/04/March-2015-revised.pdf, accessed 13/09/2015. 
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semiconductor foundry business to serve multiple fabless semiconductor companies in 
advanced countries13. The former is not only the world’s largest semiconductor foundry 
company but was also the world’s third largest semiconductor company in terms of its 
revenue in 201214. Yet several conglomerate firms, especially from Korea, competed 
with their own brands on the basis of new products and in-house R&D as described in 
the literature. ASUS from Taiwan has also successfully negotiated the transformation 
from ODM to OBM, increasing its brand presence in the overseas market (Kuo 2009). 
The problem here is that the competitive advantages that each group of emergent 
leading firms are based on are different in each case. Therefore, it is important to 
analyse each group of them separately.  
 
The thesis focuses on the last group of emergent leading firms; they compete head on 
with technology leaders in advanced countries. They have to transform their competitive 
advantages from original cost advantages to incremental process and production 
capacities, and finally to in-house R&D with their own brands, namely a ‘dual frontier’ 
of technology supremacy and market autonomy. A dual frontier involves the most 
dramatic changes in terms of the competitive advantages that emergent leading firms 
rest on. This group of emergent leading firms should not only develop a cutting-edge 
product but also adjust their organisational routines and customise their products to 
specific demands across different markets, the process of which is a prerequisite to 
compete at the top level but not an easy task with high-technology product markets like 
mobile phones that the thesis studied. In this regard, the thesis applies the term 
                                           
13 Anam in Korea also became its own kind of firm, being a packaging-only service for semiconductor 
chip-makers (Hobday 1995a). 
14 http://www.icinsights.com/news/bulletins/PurePlay-Foundries-And-Fabless-Suppliers-Are-Star-
Performers-In-Top-25-2012-Semiconductor-Supplier-Ranking/ (accessed 15/09/2013). 
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‘transition’ to a group of emergent leading firms who advance to compete in the same 
segments of markets with their technological leaders, hence pursuing a dual frontier. 
 
The question then becomes ‘why did previous studies differentiate the transition of 
emergent leading firms from latecomer firms engaged in catching-up?’ And ‘what is the 
rationale for studying it as a separate topic?’  
 
The first rationale arising from previous studies comes from the assumption that 
transition or transformation is accompanied by change in the structure of capabilities or 
competitive advantage within these emergent leading firms. Drawing on the literature 
on both strategic management and marketing based on resource-based view of the firm 
(Barney 1991; Day 1994; Eisenhardt & Martin 2000; Richardson 1972; Teece et al. 
1997; Smirnova et al. 2011), capabilities here are defined as a firm’s ability through its 
organisational processes and routines to co-ordinate, integrate, and leverage its internal 
and external resources of technical and marketing knowledge, experience and skills to 
address market requirements. In particular, emergent leading firms are required to 
reconfigure their internal and external resources in their transition not only to produce a 
high-technology product but also to market the product to a variety of markets at the 
world frontier level as ‘dynamic capabilities’ suggested (Eisenhardt & Martin 2000; 
Teece et al. 1997). The following studies raise issues in that regard.  
 
In the earliest in-depth research (using the case of a Mexican glass company, Vitro-
Glass Containers), Dutrénit (2000) conceived the transition process as a step of building 
new core/strategic capabilities from an earlier simple knowledge base. On the other 
hand, Kuo (2009) and Chu (2009) rely on Hobday’s transition model (1995b) of 
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contract manufacturer or ODM to OBM derived from the case of Taiwanese electronics 
firms. From the resource-based view of a firm, Kuo (2009) argued that some of a firm’s 
innovation capabilities, which used to be useful for contract manufacturer or ODM 
business, become obsolete in the OBM stage of business development. Therefore, new 
innovation capabilities needed to be developed to meet new market demands. In this 
regard, Kuo’s concept of a latecomer firm’s transition process describes how a 
latecomer firm manages this reconfiguration of innovation capabilities within itself. 
Hobday et al. (2004) argue that if latecomer firms decide to enter the OBM stage, global 
leading firms would show a growing reluctance towards technology transfer to those 
latecomer firms. Losing earlier access to advanced technologies and sophisticated 
market demands, emergent leading firms face a strategic dilemma over whether they 
should take the high risk of in-house R&D investment and build their own brand or stay 
in either OEM or ODM business as before. In this regard, emergent leading firms have 
to be different from what they used to be (Chu 2009) and confront different levels of 
technological and managerial challenges, requiring realignment and adjustment of 
internal capabilities within their organisations as Teece el al. (1997) stressed. 
 
A number of researchers also observed other common problems that emergent leading 
firms faced. Firstly, Dutrénit (2000) and Hobday et al. (2004) identified the problem of 
the unevenness of the knowledge bases within these firms. According to Dutrénit (2000), 
Vitro-Glass Containers pursued two distinct technology strategies in parallel. It tried to 
build the capabilities that were required for it to reach technological frontiers in certain 
areas, and at the same time pursued a fast-follower strategy in others15. The failure to 
                                           
15 In the case of Korean mobile handset manufacturers, a portfolio strategy approach was applied within 
the same business unit for a short period. When the first commercialised CDMA network began to 
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coordinate an uneven depth of technological capacity across different organisational 
units within the firm was attributed to the failure of the firm’s transition process. 
Similarly, Hobday et al. (2004) contended that Korean latecomer firms, which are 
mostly conglomerates selling a wide range of products at the same time, adopted a 
‘portfolio strategy’ across different products. These firms held leading positions in some 
product areas, were followers in other areas, and remained latecomers in yet other areas 
within the same entity (or OBM/ODM/OEM in the same firm). 
  
The second rationale used in early studies suggests emergent leading firms are required 
to internalise activities with regard to both generations of new technologies and 
marketing capacity16, requiring significant additional investment in human and financial 
resources. Chu (2009, p.1057) describes this burden as: 
 
...branding requires the firm to produce its own inventory rather than for order. 
To market the products in the developed countries... requires a large amount of 
long term investment; i.e. building new warehouses, setting up sales offices in 
the export market, learning about the export market, committing funds for 
promotion, arranging new lines of long term credit to finance these activities, 
and so on. 
 
Kuo (2009) showed that Taiwanese firms making transitions initially confronted the loss 
of contracts from their OEM/ODM clients due to the business overlap originating from 
their OBM business. Unlike Korean conglomerate firms, most Taiwanese firms were 
specialised and therefore they could not abandon their OEM/ODM business until their 
                                                                                                                           
provide services in 1996, LG designed and produced its own model of a mobile handset (OBM) while it 
also assembled mobile handsets designed by Qualcomm (OEM). By assembling Qualcomm’s handsets, 
LG had the chance to look closely at the design of handsets that were at technological frontiers. 
16 In the marketing literature based on resource-based view of the firm, it comprises customer and 
competitor relations, brand management, and innovation capabilities (Day 1994; Morgan et al. 2009; 
Smirnova et al. 2011). 
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OBM business had become well established because these types of business were a 
major source of cash flow for their transition to OBM business. Kuo (2009) showed that 
some Taiwanese emergent leading firms had to return to ODM business but some were 
relieved from the conflict with foreign buyers by splitting their business units into 
independent entities. 
 
Last but not least, Hobday (1995b) implied that emergent leading firms pursuing a ‘dual 
frontier’, by definition, also open up the possibility of uneven development between 
marketing and technology stages within their organisations. In explaining the ‘stages of 
marketing and technology assimilation’, Hobday (1995b, p.42) contended,  
 
There may not always be systematic, causal links between the stages of 
technology and market development. It is theoretically possible for a firm to 
acquire advanced technological skills but still remain at the early stages of 
marketing – or vice versa. However, it is likely that latecomer firms will tend to 
improve both their technology and marketing capabilities simultaneously 
 
Reading customer needs, especially customers distant from a domestic market, may 
expose emergent leading firms to high risk even though they are fully equipped with 
cutting-edge technologies. Building up their brand values and distribution channels 
(marketing capabilities) is as time and money consuming as acquiring cutting-edge 
technologies (Chu 2009), and implies the possibility of uneven development even 
between technology and marketing stages within emergent leading firms (e.g. 
technologies are at frontier level but weak brand values17 lie behind frontier level). 
                                           
17 Brand awareness was defined as ‘a rudimentary level of brand knowledge involving, at the least, 
recognition of the brand name. Awareness represents the lowest end of a continuum of brand knowledge 
that ranges from simple recognition of the brand name to a highly developed cognitive structure based on 
detailed information ... the distinction between awareness and recognition is a subtle one, the former 
denoting a state of knowledge possessed by the consumer and the latter a cognitive process resulting from 
awareness’ (Hoyer & Brown 1990, p.141). The literature supports positive effect of strong brand 
３１ 
 
 
 
Such uneven development may serve as another important obstacle for the transition 
process. Hobday (1995b) did not provide an explanation of its consequences on the 
transition of emergent leading firms, which will be analysed in detail in Chapter 6. 
 
The issues identified above suggest that having nearly closed the gap with their 
forerunners, emergent leading firms may still need to establish a collaborative 
relationship with foreign forerunners (at least during an early stage) for access to 
technologies and market. Some early studies support this argument, at least in the case 
of technologies. Although not directly tackling the issue of catching-up, the case of 
Korean handset manufacturers studied by Whang (2009) illuminated how emergent 
leading firms successfully engaged with their external partners in the course of handset 
convergence. Lee et al. (2005) also showed in the digital TV industry the successful 
cases of the Korean emergent leading firms Samsung and LG; these firms succeeded, 
not by pure endogenous capabilities but by collaboration with, or acquisition of, foreign 
partners for new nascent technologies. In this regard, the final stage in earlier catching-
up models may confine the scope of analysis within boundaries of latecomer firms and 
lead to the misunderstanding of the catching-up process; therefore, this thesis seeks to 
expand the scope of the analysis beyond the boundaries of emergent leading firms and 
towards their external partners. 
 
Windows of opportunity and the transition of emergent leading firms in an 
emerging stage 
This section expands the discussion of Section 2.2.3 and examines windows of 
opportunity in an emerging stage of industries from the perspective of emergent leading 
                                                                                                                           
awareness on consumer’s choice (Hoyer & Brown 1990; Macdonald & Sharp 2000). 
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firms. According to Perez and Soete (1988), there are windows of opportunity available 
for latecomer firms under the emergence of a new technology paradigm. In this 
emerging stage of technologies and markets, advantages such as low entry cost and no 
lock-in effect to old technologies work in favour of latecomer firms rather than 
incumbent forerunners. This argument is now extended to the transition of emergent 
leading firms. 
 
Stigler (1951) and Rosenberg (1976) argue that firms in the early stage of a new 
industry are initially vertically integrated because demands in the stage are not 
profitable enough for specialised suppliers to emerge, but in later stages the market 
expands sufficiently to allow for the differentiation of the production process and the 
emergence of various specialised suppliers. In the context of developing economies, 
Kim (2000, p.4) also argued that ‘when engineering infrastructure is weak and capable 
component manufacturing firms are rare, as was the case in Korea, vertical (backward) 
integration would be a more plausible option for the assemblers’. However, the 
assumption of vertical integration brings several challenges to emergent leading firms. It 
seems unlikely that emergent leading firms in developing economies by definition have 
mastered all necessary technology areas to be vertically integrated. As Dutrénit (2000) 
and Hobday et al. (2004) suggested, the uneven development of technological areas 
within these firms is common. In this regard, the pure form of vertical integration does 
not seem to be a viable option for most of emergent leading firms, and collaborative 
arrangements with external forerunner partners seem inevitable.  
 
Obvious questions to emerge from the discussion above are: will there be forerunner 
firms who pursue the partnerships with emergent leading firms? And, if so, what would 
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be their motives for the partnerships?  
 
Firstly, the argument of Soete (1985) and Steinmueller (2001) provides one logic to 
these forerunners. They argued that competition among forerunner firms could produce 
opportunities for technology transfer. Established technologies that continue to be 
improved attract a wide range of competitive firms in developed economies. Some of 
them are likely to be successful in technological development but not in product 
markets. It is these companies that try to preserve some part of the investment made and 
sell their knowledge assets in knowledge markets. This logic can be applied to an 
emerging market as well. An emerging market based on new technologies will attract a 
wide range of competitive firms in the developed economies. But not all of these firms 
retain sufficient capital to the point when product markets are created. Some companies 
may have a financial problem from losing shares in their previous businesses or others 
may be small venture companies generally struggling to finance for the long term. It is 
these forerunner firms that are interested in partnerships with emergent leading firms. 
For example, LG acquired shares of financially struggling Zenith in the pursuit of 
access to digital TV technologies (Lee et al. 2005), and Samsung was also able to obtain 
new Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) design technologies from smaller 
venture-capital funded companies in the US who required the infusion of R&D 
investments for their survival (Kim 1997b).  
 
Another possibility in this category is that there is competition to achieve a dominant 
compatibility standard among forerunner firms. In this case, forerunner firms are likely 
to have incentives to attract as many allied companies as possible in order to set their 
technologies as a dominant standard. In addition, some countries may command 
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technology transfer by setting a national standard in return for ensuring the market, so-
called ‘trading market for technology’ (Mu & Lee 2005). 
 
Secondly, another forerunner group who may wish to collaborate with emergent leading 
firms can arise from its different knowledge base; the group may comprise firms that 
had been specialised suppliers in their industry and that may prefer to remain as 
specialised suppliers in a newly emerging market. For example, Hyundai Motors 
Corporation was able to develop a new compact car engine (the α-Engine) in 
collaboration with its English engine design maker, Ricardo, when Mitsubishi Motors 
refused to transfer its engine design technologies to Hyundai Motors Company (Lee 
2005). POSCO, a group comprising the top five steel producers in the world, also 
developed the FINEX (fine iron ore reduction) process based on its shop-floor 
knowledge, initially through the technology transfer of VAI’s (an Austrian engineering 
company in the steel industry) embryonic COREX (coal ore reduction) process (Song & 
Song 2010). Other groups may comprise specialised supplier firms as well but from 
adjacent industries and they would participate in a new industry in the case of 
technology or product convergence.  
 
Firms that have a specialised knowledge base sometimes require a downstream 
knowledge base to complete their embryonic technologies to a commercial level. 
Therefore, these firms have incentives to collaborate but in order to realise them, 
emergent leading firms wishing to set up partnerships will have to have complementary 
assets to attract these forerunner firms. One example is the case of General Instrument 
(GI), a cable TV equipment maker in the US. Without previous experience in the 
production of TV, it collaborated with Samsung, which was an analogue TV producer, 
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in order to develop a prototype of a digital TV (Lee et al. 2005).  
 
If windows of opportunity exist for an emergent leading firm as suggested above, the 
issue for them comes down to the nature of technologies licensed to the recipient. 
Technologies licensed to emergent leading firms in the above examples were in a 
primitive form in both technical and commercial terms, and hence products from those 
technologies were also yet unproven in their markets. Therefore, the question shifts 
from the issue of whether or not there will be an opportunity of technology licensing for 
emergent leading firms, to one of how an emergent leading firm can successfully 
manage to master, upgrade, and finally commercialise unripe technologies licensed 
from leaders to a commercial level; this second issue is examined in more detail in 
Chapter 5. 
 
The discussion so far implies that the analysis of the transition of emergent leading 
firms focusing on their internal aspects does not seem to capture the whole landscape of 
these transitions properly. Challenges for the transition of emergent leading firms and 
availability of windows of opportunity suggest that the scope of the analysis should 
extend the boundaries of emergent leading firms. It is these aspects that link the 
literature on the transition of emergent leading firms with the literature on boundaries of 
a firm and inter-firm coordination.  
 
2.3 Boundaries of a firm and inter-firm coordination  
This section draws on the theoretical implications from the literature on boundaries of a 
firm and inter-firm coordination to examine how emergent leading firms can reconcile 
their innate deficiencies such as the uneven progress of technologies during the pursuit 
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of a dual frontier.  
 
The boundaries of a firm are determined by those activities that are subject to direct 
control compared to those that require negotiation with other parties or that are entirely 
outside the significant influence of the firm. The literature on boundaries of a firm is 
mainly concerned with why firms establish their boundaries with markets in a certain 
way and what factors influence decisions in the design of these boundaries. This is a 
very important strategic issue for the competitiveness of a firm, and in case of emergent 
leading firms, these kinds of decisions are likely to be affected heavily by their 
capabilities, sometimes leading to narrower firm boundaries.  
 
In this vein, this section reviews theories on boundaries of the firm among technology 
leaders and highlights the implications of these theories in the pursuit of a dual frontier 
by emergent leading firms. The contractual view of the firm based on transaction cost, 
and the capabilities view of the firm based on firm-specific capabilities, are two main 
strands of literature. Both views are reviewed in this section in terms of dichotomic 
make or buy decisions, and – acting upon recommendations from recent reviews in the 
literature on the boundaries of a firm – the section then discusses the hybrid mode of a 
firm organisation based on various inter-firm arrangements. The implications of 
boundaries of the firm and inter-firm arrangements are also discussed in the context of 
emergent leading firms and the industry which is the subject of analysis in this thesis, i.e. 
the mobile handset industry. 
 
2.3.1 Transaction cost theory: contract level  
Transaction cost theory, mainly led by industrial organisation economists, aims to 
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provide a theory of firm boundaries. Transaction cost theory conceives of a firm as a 
‘nexus of contracts’ economising transaction costs. It assumes that there are 
coordination costs for negotiating, contracting and enforcing when we use the price 
mechanism of markets (Coase 1937). It argues that firm boundaries are determined in 
order to minimise these transaction costs which in turn arise from asset specificity, 
uncertainty, and the corresponding opportunisms and bounded rationalities of contract 
partners (Williamson 1985). For example, firms tend to vertically integrate when 
suppliers need to invest assets with high asset specificity which can be used only for a 
particular producer (Afuah 2001).  
 
Industrial organisation economists have extended the theory with regard to the issue of 
‘hold-up’ from relation-specific assets between suppliers and producers (Klein et al. 
1978) and have contended that vertical integration occurs to resolve ‘hold-up’. Joskow 
(1985; 1987) empirically verified Williamson (1985) by studying the relation-specific 
investments and contract duration in US coal markets. Monteverde and Teece (1982) 
also showed that producers sometimes purchase and provide manufacturing equipment 
(relation-specific assets) to their suppliers to avoid the possibility of ‘hold-up’. This 
partial integration enables producers to acquire ‘residual right of control’ (Grossman & 
Hart 1986) over manufacturing equipment owned by suppliers and therefore remove the 
fear of ‘hold-up’ between suppliers and producers.  
 
Transaction cost theory mainly pursues the question of what institutional arrangements 
will minimise the transaction costs of achieving an objective. Because of its attempt to 
derive general principles with regard to institutional arrangements, it does not take 
account of the heterogeneity of a firm’s capabilities to implement market transactions 
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(Jacobides & Winter 2005). In this regard, Williamson (1999, p.1103) mentioned that 
the earlier question put forwarded by himself, ‘What is the best generic mode (market, 
hybrid, firm) to organize X?’ should be replaced by the question ‘How should firm A 
which has pre-existing strengths and weaknesses (core competences and disabilities) 
organize X?’ in the case of important and less frequent transactions of the firm. The lack 
of consideration of the role of firm heterogeneity in determining the boundaries of a 
firm in transaction cost theory seems to entail a larger problem in the case of emergent 
leading firms. Due to the negative externalities of emergent leading firms in resources 
and capabilities, transaction cost theory does not cater for the type of a question that this 
thesis asks. 
 
2.3.2 Capabilities view: firm level  
The resource-based view was articulated in terms of a consideration of the limits to firm 
growth by Penrose (1959) and has come to focus on the internal resources of a firm; it 
conceives of a firm as a bundle of resources, which include those that are tangible 
(physical assets), intangible (technology, reputation and culture) and human (skills and 
knowledge embodied in employees) (Grant 1998). Later authors have noted that firm-
specific capabilities emerge when these resources are organised, coordinated and 
utilised within a firm’s own organisational routines (Nelson & Winter 1982), and 
capabilities that are a source of sustainable competitive advantage have been termed 
core capabilities (Leonard-Barton 1992). These capabilities are valuable, rare, 
imperfectly imitable and non-substitutable (Barney 1991) and therefore sticky (i.e. 
relatively immobile) and firm-specific. They have to be systematically nurtured through 
learning within the boundaries of the firm. Core capability theory provides a guide as to 
what activities the company should maintain in-house and what it should outsource to 
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the market.  
 
Some researchers have further attempted to evaluate the effects of changing conditions, 
a dynamic perspective that investigates questions like whether or not firms with a 
vertically integrated structure perform better when they face an emerging stage of 
technologies or technological changes that are competence-destroying. Afuah (2001) 
argued that firms need to be vertically integrated into new technology during 
technological discontinuities while being able to move towards market transactions for 
technologies that are mature or nearing obsolescence. On the other hand, Langlois and 
Robertson (1989) reject a single general theory because of the experiences of the early 
US automobile industry, contending that many factors such as type of innovation, level 
of market demand and degree of specialised suppliers all affect the performance of 
vertical integration in a combined manner. Still, the dynamic perspective implies that if 
an emergent leading firm enters an emerging market (the situation analysed in this 
thesis), it needs to master a wide array of technology areas to cope with frequent 
technical changes, which is common in an emerging stage.  
 
In summary, while transaction cost theory looks at recurrent dyadic transactions from 
the perspective of selecting the best institutional arrangement for coordinating 
acquisition, the capabilities view adopts a firm-level approach which can be thought of 
as the assessment of the make or buy decision. The two theories overlap when 
transactions are recurrent and numerous, with the resource-based view providing further 
guidance about the risks of dissipating a firm’s core competences, even if these are 
frequently exercised. However, when transactions are episodic and large, it makes more 
sense to take account of the firm’s capabilities for particular transactions rather than 
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creating a general rule. Many of the issues this thesis will consider actually involve 
large and relatively infrequent transactions, such as the decision to license or construct 
technologies. For this reason, this thesis will primarily employ the capabilities view; in 
this view, a firm’s capabilities are heterogeneous and dynamic over time and 
accordingly boundaries of firms will be designed and adjusted. Therefore, the 
heterogeneity of a firm’s capabilities will result in heterogeneity of its boundaries. In 
this regard, the capabilities view also seems more suitable to reflect on the features of an 
emergent leading firm.  
 
2.3.3 Inter-firm coordination: beyond firm level  
Subsequent research on theories on the boundaries of the firm has been extended to 
inter-firm relationships, adding upstream suppliers and downstream users in the analysis. 
The systemic nature of technologies leads to the increasing importance of managing a 
close inter-firm relationship with a system-integrator firm as a focal point linked to 
upstream and downstream chains, extending our interests beyond the boundaries of the 
firm. This section reviews the nature and sources of competitive advantages of inter-
firm coordination and how they are sustained, especially in the context of the case 
studied here, i.e. the mobile handset industry. 
 
Multi-dimensionality of boundaries of a firm in the systemic nature of technologies 
Although the concept of modularity (Sanchez & Mahoney 1996) provides a strategic 
guide to what a firm should do at a later stage in its product life cycle, several authors 
have shown that this is not necessarily the best strategy (Brusoni 2001; Prencipe 2000; 
Takeishi 2002). 
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From an empirical study on the division of labour between the automaker Toyota and its 
first-tier suppliers in Japan, Takeishi (2002) argued that knowledge partitioning is 
different from task partitioning. Unlike regular projects which have clear-cut boundaries, 
innovative projects require automakers to have both architectural knowledge and 
component-specific knowledge. In order to maintain both levels of knowledge, Toyota 
co-developed innovative components with suppliers while leaving the production of 
those components to suppliers. In a similar study on the aircraft engine industry, 
Prencipe (2000) also found that aircraft engine makers as system integrators retained 
their capabilities not only at a system level but also in some components, innovations of 
which affect design of a system even though the engine makers do not produce those 
components. By differentiating two boundaries of a firm, namely knowledge boundaries 
and production boundaries, he concluded that the former, ‘what firms know’, are wider 
than the latter, ‘what firms do’ (Brusoni et al. 2001)18. 
 
These studies showed that production of a product and production of technological 
knowledge supporting a product do not always occur in the same place and, as a matter 
of fact, boundaries of production and knowledge are not the same. Therefore, it may be 
appropriate to take a multi-dimensional perspective when we interpret boundaries of a 
firm as there is a clear distinction between the division of labour in knowledge and the 
division of labour in production between suppliers and producers. In the setting of a 
multi-technology and multi-component product, producers as system integrators should 
retain component-specific knowledge as well as system-integrating capabilities over 
core components which may entail the change of system architectures despite high 
                                           
18 These types of boundary arrangements were realised only through close cooperative relationships 
between system integrators and component suppliers; this is the main reason that the multi-dimensional 
perspective of firm boundaries is presented in Section 2.3.3 on inter-firm coordination. 
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modularity and an increasing trend towards outsourcing. 
 
Of particular note here is that even though automobile and jet engines are relatively 
mature products, both are still products in which technological change is competitively 
important. Utterback and Abernathy (1975) examined the automobile industry before a 
number of important changes in the electronic content, fuel economy and environmental 
regulations changed the competitive dynamics of this industry. Therefore, where 
technological changes are prevalent, multi-dimensionality of boundaries should be 
carefully considered. Aggregate measures of firm boundaries may lead to a wrong 
snapshot of such boundaries. The fact that both parties may look similar in terms of 
their production boundaries, namely ‘what they produce’, does not mean that the 
boundaries of a latecomer firm and a technology leader are identical. They may be 
significantly different in terms of their knowledge boundaries, ‘what they know’, as 
Brusoni et al. (2001) stressed. For example, as will be further discussed in Chapter 4, 
Nokia outsourced the production of its baseband chips to Texas Instruments while it 
kept developing its protocol stack19 for the Global System for Mobile communications 
(GSM), Enhanced Data rates for GSM Evolution (EDGE), and Wideband Code 
Division Multiple Access (WCDMA) baseband chips until 2005. In the meantime, 
Korean handset manufacturers sourced both their baseband chips and protocol stack 
from external baseband chip suppliers. In this instance, production boundaries of both 
sides may look the same but knowledge boundaries of them are unequivocally different 
and, therefore, the strategies adopted by both parties are fundamentally different. 
                                           
19 ‘Protocol stack’ in the mobile telecommunication technologies is the term for the family of 
telecommunication protocols between a baseband in a mobile handset and a base station to secure reliable 
communications. These protocols are called a ‘stack’ as they are generally modularised as layers to make 
design and evaluation easier (definition provided by a protocol stack engineer). 
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Relational view and joint competitive advantages beyond firm boundaries 
Advantages from close inter-firm relationships have been well documented in the 
literature for the past two decades. Long-term collaboration enhances relation-specific 
knowledge and skills, which can be acquired only through repetitive transactions with 
specific partners. These relation-specific capabilities allow partners in alliances to 
develop a product with better performance based on customised components and 
facilities. Therefore, a close inter-firm relationship can bring to participants greater 
gains than a conventional arms-length procurement relationship or a firm hierarchy 
(Dyer 1996; Dyer & Singh 1998; Jap 2001). 
 
Relational view and competitive advantages beyond firm boundaries 
While other studies on inter-firm alliances have been largely phenomenological and 
empirical, Aoki (1988) formalised the theory of cooperation from the success of the 
Japanese car manufacturing industry based on its unique subcontracting system. 
 
Aoki interpreted that in Japan a close inter-firm relationship in the form of 
subcontracting was regarded as a form of quasi (or partial) integration. He recognised 
that the organisational form of quasi integration has advantages over vertical integration. 
Quasi integration with a close inter-firm relationship allows prime manufacturers to 
utilise their subcontractors’ resources without the governance costs of vertical 
integration. It can draw relation-specific investments in skills and products that are fully 
customised for prime manufacturers while keeping informational efficiency between 
manufacturers and suppliers, and endowing suppliers with the autonomy to explore new 
R&D opportunities. He termed surplus of rent originating from relation-specific 
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investments as ‘relational quasi rent’. Aoki (1988, p.128) explained the mechanism in 
the way relational quasi rent is created through the bilateral collaborations between 
manufacturers and their suppliers: 
 
…that there arise group-specific economic returns attributable to the 
relational cooperation between the prime manufacturer and its 
subcontractors… One may call such returns relational quasi rent in the sense 
that it is generated by the unique informational efficiency of relational 
contracting in the subcontracting grouping… 
 
In the same vein, Asanuma (1989) also addressed different relation-specific skills that 
suppliers accumulate according to types of components in his study of the Japanese 
automotive industry. In the industry where customised components are common, he 
classified automobile parts into three categories depending on the division of design 
activities between suppliers and car manufacturers: drawing-supplied parts, drawing-
approved parts and marketed goods-type parts. In his classification, drawing-supplied 
parts suppliers only provide to car manufacturers capabilities for manufacturing while 
drawing-approved parts suppliers provide capabilities in design and development as 
well as manufacturing. Finally, marketed goods-type parts are transacted as a pure 
market relationship without any interactions between suppliers and car manufacturers. 
By categorising them, Asanuma argued that suppliers require and accumulate different 
relation-specific skills (or capabilities) according to their relationship with car 
manufacturers. These skills or capabilities can be developed through repetitive 
transactions with their buyers and added to their original capabilities. Therefore, they 
can be acquired only through longstanding relationships with buyers. He clearly 
addressed the fact that these skills are the source of surplus value added (relational quasi 
rent (Aoki 1988)) in comparison with pure market transactions. 
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Dyer and Singh (1998) approached the issue of inter-firm coordination with respect to 
sources of competitive advantages. They advocate the relational view in that firms’ 
competitive advantages sometimes come from a combination of network firms’ 
resources, which are beyond firm boundaries. They listed sources of inter-organisational 
competitive advantage as (a) relation-specific assets, (b) knowledge-sharing routines, (c) 
complementary resources/capabilities and (d) effective governance, and further outlined 
how relational rents can be preserved over the long term. They contended that the close 
relationship between two parties can be sustained in that inter-organisational assets are 
interconnected and their resources are indivisible. In addition, they argued that partners 
who have complementary assets and capabilities are scarce in practice and thus their 
relationship can be sustained. 
 
Co-specialisation and directions of relation-specific investments 
The concept of co-specialisation was originally proposed by Teece (1986) to explain 
who actually appropriates value from innovation. He embodied dyadic dependence 
between assets and innovation through the concept of specialisation. He used the labels 
‘specialised’ when either assets or innovation showed unilateral dependence on each 
other and ‘co-specialised’ when they showed bilateral dependence. Co-specialisation 
may look similar to Chesbrough’s ‘open innovation’ in that the latter argues that firms 
should take full advantage of both internal and external resources (Chesbrough 2007). 
However, open innovation does not speak to the issue of why and how partners 
collaborate, market transaction of intellectual property, nor encompasses the mutual 
dependency of their resources based on long-term inter-firm collaboration, which is the 
essence of Teecean type inter-firm collaborations.  
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Drawing on the concept of Teece (1986), ‘co-specialisation’ can be applied to the 
phenomenon of two parties investing relation-specific assets in each other. If only one 
side invests relation-specific assets, this can be labelled as ‘unilateral specialisation’. As 
well as differentiation between co-specialisation and unilateral specialisation, there is a 
necessity to differentiate two opposite types of unilateral specialisation. As with vertical 
integration, where we call upstream-side integration ‘backward integration’ and 
downstream-side integration ‘forward integration’, this thesis will employ the term 
‘forward specialisation’ if only the upstream firm invests in relation-specific assets for 
the downstream firm and ‘backward specialisation’ if the downstream firm invests in 
relation-specific assets for the upstream firm. This extension of co-specialisation will be 
used to elucidate inter-firm coordination of Korean handset manufacturers with 
upstream and downstream partners in the empirical chapters of 6 and 7. 
 
Multi-dimensionality of capabilities with respect to co-specialisation 
Some studies have identified that the capabilities of firms (regarding asset specificity) 
are multi-dimensional. From research on the automotive industry, Asanuma (1989) 
differentiated between two layers of suppliers’ capabilities, a basic layer and a surface 
layer; the former refers to general technological capabilities, while the latter refers to 
capabilities accumulated from learning through relation-specific investments and 
repeated interactions with a specific manufacturer. In the automotive industry, the 
relationship between a car manufacturer and customised component suppliers is a 
monopsony. In other words, a single car manufacturer generally hires multiple suppliers 
of customised components and these suppliers are not allowed to do business with other 
car manufacturers (this monopsony may lead to forward specialisation). Because of 
４７ 
 
 
 
these limitations, suppliers will be unable to transfer surface-layer capabilities to basic-
layer capabilities that might be useful in their search for new customers (customers who 
are likely to be rivals to a supplier’s principal customer). 
 
In a similar manner to Asanuma (1989), Yasumoto and Fujimoto ( 2006) proposed the 
notion of ‘interface capabilities’ in order to explain why Japanese handset 
manufacturers who incorporated the most cutting-edge technologies into their handsets 
and who dominated domestic markets failed to be successful in overseas markets. They 
expanded the previous dichotomy of either a closed inter-firm relationship with one 
specific partner or complete market transactions. By considering open inter-firm 
relationships with multiple partners on the downstream side, they argued that not only 
can a firm still assimilate partner-specific knowledge and skills while customising 
components or products for its partners, but also it can apply these relation-specific 
capabilities to other partners by absorbing these relation-specific skills and adapting 
them as general capabilities. They defined this kind of a firm’s ability as ‘interface 
capabilities’ and argued that firms can quickly provide customisations to new customers 
by resting on interface capabilities. 
 
If we combine the views of Asanuma (1989) and Yasumoto and Fujimoto (2006), firm 
capabilities can be categorised into three layers: general capabilities, relation-specific 
capabilities and interface capabilities. The last layer includes capabilities that enable 
firms to facilitate exchanges between the first two layers. Thus, interface capabilities 
may play an important role in the case where both sides of co-specialisation deal with 
multiple suppliers or customers. If markets are highly segmented by country borders, 
technology standards or language barriers, there may be more than one co-specialisation 
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partner on the downstream side. Unlike co-specialisation in the case of monopsony, 
however, these downstream customers will not be affected as long as they receive 
guarantees that co-specialised products will be kept from their direct competitors, in 
other words, monopsony is maintained in their market segment. 
 
Despite its utility, operationalising the concept of interface capabilities seems highly 
problematic. Firstly, the capabilities are difficult to measure from the definition. 
Secondly, the reason why firms have difficulties in exchange between two layers may 
be due to other reasons such as organisational barriers, information stickiness and 
tacitness. Even though firms are equipped with proficient interface capabilities, it may 
take some time and effort for a firm to transform its relation-specific capabilities to 
general capabilities and establish relation-specific skills to new customers in practice. 
For example, in 2006 when LG started to produce handsets for Nippon Telegraph and 
Telecom-Docomo (NTT-Docomo), the biggest MNO in Japan, it had to deliver low-end 
handset models even if LG was competing as the fourth biggest handset manufacturer in 
the global market at the time. Not only was the Japanese handset market the most 
sophisticated in the world, but also NTT-Docomo utilised various software modules 
which are highly specific to itself. These include the Access web browser, Felica e-
money service etc. LG did not have the capabilities to incorporate the newest version of 
a mobile web browser into handsets in the beginning and it took more than two years 
for LG to finally deliver high-end handset models for NTT-Docomo. 
 
Is a close inter-firm relationship through co-specialisation always advantageous? 
Some researchers have questioned the relation-specific advantages of close relationships 
between manufacturers and suppliers, asserting that the close inter-firm relationship 
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sometimes exposes firms to a specific partner only, restricting opportunities for learning 
by interactions with external partners. 
 
Since an inter-firm relationship is embedded in social contexts (Eisenhardt & 
Schonhoven 1996; Gulati 1995), it may entail country-specificity in relationships. If 
firms establish their network alliances within their countries, the capabilities 
accumulated from their networks may not be compatible with requirements from 
overseas customers (Gulati, 1995; Yasumoto & Fujimoto, 2006). Therefore, a close 
relationship with local users might hinder manufacturers in their efforts to cope with the 
unique requirements of users in other markets. The failure to achieve globalisation by 
Japanese mobile handset manufacturers supports this argument. Moreover, a close 
relationship entails huge relation-specific costs to a firm, and there always seems to be 
the possibility of ‘hold-up’ caused by opportunistic behaviour of partners who have 
market power (Klein et al. 1978). Lastly, close relationships may lead to a firm’s 
capabilities becoming locked into those of its partners, because a firm making relation-
specific investments is bound to develop capabilities that are customised to its partners 
(Christensen 1997). If a firm’s partners fail to discern the right technology trajectory or 
market demands, then any investment by that firm in huge relation-specific assets is 
also exposed to risks. Therefore, who you meet really matters for the result of the inter-
firm relationship. If this relationship is deep-rooted, such as in the form of a long-term 
contract, the cost is very likely to prove fatal.  
 
Asset specificity in the context of the handset manufacturing industry 
Mobile handsets have shown relatively short product life cycles of between six and 
twelve months (Whang 2009); in addition, the markets are highly segmented by the 
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standards of network technologies and country-specific services across borders. These 
industry-specific attributes may significantly affect the end-result of close inter-firm 
relationships between handset manufacturers and MNOs.  
 
In conventional industries like the automobile industry, manufacturers and suppliers 
establish idiosyncratic inter-firm relationships based on long-term contracts, as 
explained in the previous section. In contrast, a short product life cycle in the mobile 
handset industry makes it undesirable for either party to establish long-term contracts 
between handset manufacturers and MNOs. Thus, it is not possible to prevent 
opportunistic behaviour on the part of either side by way of a long-term contract. 
 
However, short product life cycles are not likely to be invariably linked to the absence 
of long-term partnerships. It is clear that there have not been conventional inter-firm 
arrangements based on long-term contracts in the mobile phone industry. On the other 
hand, the absence of long-term arrangements may have heightened the competition 
between handset producers with considerable benefits to the MNOs, and those handset 
makers that have been successful have had long-term partnerships with the MNOs 
(though not by a formal contract) as will be empirically analysed in more detail in 
Chapter 6. 
 
2.3.4 Implications of the literature on boundaries of a firm on emergent leading firms 
Concluding the discussion on boundaries of a firm, it would appear that in an emerging 
stage of a new industry, firms should conduct many activities internally in order to deal 
with frequent technological changes. This extensive (knowledge) boundary may be 
drawn back towards a tighter boundary later in the product life cycle when the 
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technology has matured (if it does). In this case, the frontier firm increasingly 
specialises in core capabilities which often migrate from production to design and 
marketing with the design element including some of the critical components – this is a 
narrower scope of the firm boundary than when the firm is first introducing the product 
and either producing or co-developing all of the components. In some industries where 
technologies are of a systemic nature, firms are required to maintain a wider knowledge 
scope than their product scope. 
 
However, unlike the forerunner firm which is capable of following this pattern, 
emergent leading firms may have to settle for a more limited position due to the 
problems of uneven technical development. They are unlikely to have the capacity to 
fully vertically integrate and therefore may have to collaborate with other firms, relying 
on some core activities during their transition process. This will limit the ability of 
emergent leading firms to launch their own products or brands, leading to the high 
possibility and importance of inter-firm coordination during the transition process. 
 
2.4 Summary  
This chapter has combined the literature on the contemporary catching-up and transition 
process of latecomer firms and the literature on boundaries of a firm and inter-firm 
coordination in technological frontier firms. The review of the first strand of literature 
has reconfirmed the research rationale of the transition process of emergent leading 
firms and has highlighted the idiosyncratic challenges faced by emergent leading firms; 
the second strand has been reviewed in order to systemically analyse the transition 
process of emergent leading firms. 
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In the first section of the chapter, the term ‘latecomers’ has been differentiated from 
leaders such as ‘forerunners’ and ‘followers’. The uniqueness of the contemporary 
catching-up process compared to earlier similar processes has also been discussed in 
terms of technical and market environments. The chapter has shown that unique 
characteristics in the second half of the 20th century created new mechanisms and 
channels for international technology transfer and technology capability building for 
firms in East Asia; these characteristics are typified by export-led growth on the basis of 
competitive advantages from cheap labour, even in the newly emerged electronics 
industry. 
 
Based on two schematic catching-up models of the contemporary catching-up process, 
the thesis has extracted the transition of emergent leading firms to the world frontier and 
identified several different groups of emergent leading firms based on their competitive 
advantages. Among these groups, the thesis focuses on a group of emergent leading 
firms pursuing a ‘dual frontier’ of technology supremacy and market autonomy because 
they compete head on with technology leaders on the basis of in-house R&D 
capabilities with their own brands. From the several early studies, the thesis has also 
documented the unique challenges of these emergent leading firms and discussed the 
windows of opportunity that are available to them, linking their challenges to the 
literature on boundaries of the firm. Compared to the economic significance of these 
issues and their potential relevance for other latecomer countries and firms, there has 
not yet been sufficient systematic analysis of these phenomena.   
 
In the second section of the chapter, the literature on boundaries of the firm and inter-
firm coordination has been drawn upon to provide theoretical and empirical guidelines 
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for the analyses in the following empirical chapters. After reviewing transaction cost 
theories and capabilities view, the thesis has acknowledged that the capabilities view is 
more suitable for explaining the dynamic boundaries of an emergent leading firm, 
particularly because of such a firm’s documented deficiencies in resources and its large 
and episodic transactions. The review of the issue of boundaries of a firm has identified 
dynamic aspects of firm boundaries and provided an important hint of the challenges an 
emergent leading firm will face when it enters an emerging market rather than a mature 
one.  
 
The literature on inter-firm coordination has enabled the scope of analysis on the 
transition of emergent leading firms to be widened beyond the boundaries of a firm. The 
multi-dimensionality of firm boundaries has enlightened us over the difference between 
‘what firms know’ and ‘what firms do’ when boundaries of an emergent leading firm are 
analysed. The chapter has reviewed how close inter-firm relationships with longstanding 
relational contracts produce relation-specific investments, relation-specific skills and 
therefore, relational quasi rents. Focusing on sources of competitive advantages and 
appropriations of innovation, the concepts of relational view, joint competitive 
advantages, and co-specialisation have also been reviewed with regard to how 
competitive advantages arise from inter-firm relations and how they can be sustained. 
Furthermore, negative aspects of inter-firm coordination have been discussed in 
addition to how they can be reconciled, especially in the context of the industry which is 
the subject of this thesis, i.e. the mobile handset industry.  
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 3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGIES 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter reviewed the relevant literature on the catching-up process, 
especially the transition of latecomer firms to technology frontiers in the context of the 
second half of the 20th century. Based on the review, the chapter identified the need for a 
deeper consideration of the processes involved in latecomer firms’ transition to 
technology and marketing frontiers. In search of relevant tools for examining these 
processes, the preceding chapter highlighted the role of theories of ‘boundaries of a firm’ 
and ‘inter-firm coordination’.  
 
The main objective of this chapter is to address the research design adopted for the 
thesis. The research design is based on a study of a single industry and employs focused 
case studies of two latecomer firms in Korea. Within the overall objective of the thesis 
of improving the understanding of latecomer firms’ transition to world technological 
frontiers, the research design allows (a) some generalisations for the case of an 
important contemporary industry and (b) while the ‘situated particularities’ of the 
specific case studies in the thesis are important in explaining the outcomes that the 
thesis observes, the types of issues that are identified can provide a guide to examining 
the issue of attaining a frontier position more generally. In other words, the principal 
aim of the thesis is to provide a contribution to the interpretation of the transition 
processes in industries where latecomer firms seek to attain a frontier position.  
 
In this regard, the thesis presented the following set of questions in Chapter 1: 
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(1) When emergent leading firms in latecomer economies pursue a ‘dual frontier’ of 
technology supremacy and market autonomy, how do they reconcile uneven 
development within technologies and between technology and marketing stages 
within an organisation? 
(2) How does the fact that emergent leading firms enter the newly emerging market 
rather than mature markets affect their pursuit of a dual frontier? In addition, 
what is the role of inter-firm collaboration in their pursuit of a dual frontier 
under these market conditions? 
 
In order to answer the questions, this chapter designs the research framework in more 
detail, presenting the rationale for the choice of industry and selection of the case 
studies, and describing why specific methodologies were adopted and how they were 
implemented. Section 3.2 sets up the rationale for the choice of the Korean mobile 
handset industry and two Korean handset manufacturers, Samsung and LG, as case 
studies for the purpose of the thesis; it also explains how these choices are expected to 
contribute to existing knowledge. Section 3.3 explains the methodologies, reviewing 
how data from secondary sources and interviews have been acquired and then used to 
undertake qualitative analysis and to come to conclusions.  
 
3.2 Why Korean latecomer firms in the mobile handset industry? 
As noted previously, relatively few latecomer industrialising countries have made the 
transition to a world-leading position in any of their industries. Those examples that 
exist include East Asian countries such as Korea and Taiwan. The industries at a world-
leading position are also relatively limited – they include shipbuilding, DRAM, liquid 
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crystal display (LCD), plasma display panel (PDP) and mobile handsets20 in Korea, and 
electronics manufacturing services (EMS)21, semiconductor foundry and computer 
manufacturing in Taiwan. As discussed in detail in Chapter 2, they can be categorised 
into three different groups on the basis of their competitiveness; of these groups, the 
thesis deliberately focuses on the group of latecomer firms that competes head on with 
international technology leaders on the basis of in-house R&D capabilities with their 
own brands. In this case, ‘achieving leadership by a latecomer firm’ means that the firm 
reaches a dual frontier – technology supremacy and (in part)22 market autonomy, that is, 
attaining stages 4 to 523 in both technology and marketing stages as defined by Hobday 
(1995b).  
 
Among the limited candidates who have reached a ‘dual frontier’ – technology 
supremacy and (in part) market autonomy, the thesis investigates the case of two Korean 
mobile handset manufacturers, Samsung and LG, which have recently acquired high 
global market shares. Table 3.1 shows the rising rankings of these two firms in the 
world mobile handset market between 1998 and 2009. They were second and third 
behind Nokia in the market in terms of their market shares by 2009 but had not been 
among the top five before 2001. 
                                           
20 A mobile handset here means the electronic device compatible with cellular mobile communication 
networks. Therefore, the scope of the thesis excludes other mobile communication gadgets such as pagers, 
walkie-talkie radios and similar systems which involve a limited number of ‘base stations’ and comprise 
‘closed’ radio communications systems.  
21 Also referred to as a contract manufacturer. 
22 The very existence of mobile network operators was highly influential in the marketing strategy of the 
Korean emergent leading firms during their transition, hence the addition of ‘(in part)’ to the term ‘market 
autonomy’. See Chapter 6 for details.  
23 Although Hobday (1995b) conceived of moving from selling products indirectly to retailers and 
distributors to selling directly to customers as an advancement (from stage 4 to stage 5, respectively), the 
findings of this thesis do not concur. The analysis in Chapter 6 shows that the Korean handset 
manufacturers started in Stage 4 to compensate for their lack of brand awareness in the first place but 
stayed in that stage rather than transiting to Stage 5 even after acquiring high brand awareness. 
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Table 3.1 Rankings of major handset manufacturers in the world handset market2425 
Ranking 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
1 Nokia Nokia Nokia Nokia Nokia Nokia 
2 Motorola Motorola Motorola Motorola Motorola Motorola 
3 Ericsson Ericsson Ericsson Siemens Samsung Samsung 
4 Panasonic Siemens Siemens Samsung Siemens Siemens 
5 Alcatel Panasonic Panasonic Ericsson SonyEricsson SonyEricsson 
6 NEC Samsung Samsung Panasonic LG LG 
7 Samsung Alcatel Alcatel NEC Alcatel Others 
Ranking 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
1 Nokia Nokia Nokia Nokia Nokia Nokia 
2 Motorola Motorola Motorola Motorola Samsung Samsung 
3 Samsung Samsung Samsung Samsung Motorola LG 
4 Siemens LG SonyEricsson SonyEricsson SonyEricsson SonyEricsson 
5 LG SonyEricsson LG LG LG Motorola 
6 SonyEricsson - - - - - 
NEC, Nippon Electric Company. 
Source: Strategic Analytics. 
 
The mobile handset industry itself has been highly interesting for both academic 
researchers and management practitioners in several respects. First of all, due to its 
relatively short technology and product life cycle, the industry has already gone through 
several generations (1G to 3G) of new telecommunication technologies during the last 
two decades. The dynamic industry setting in the mobile handset industry allows us to 
examine the several changes in technologies and product architectures and their 
                                           
24 It should be noted here that the two Korean handset manufacturers that this thesis investigates had held 
the second and third positions in terms of market shares in the world mobile handset market by 2009. 
Therefore, the table does not go beyond 2009. 
25 As this table is based on the number of mobile phone units sold, Blackberry, one of the most 
prosperous smart phone makers, did not attain a world top 10 mobile phone position due to its presence 
only in a smart phone segment with the maximum sales of 34.5 million units at 2009 (Strategy 
Analytics).  
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relationships to changes in the industry structure within a short period (see Chapter 4)26. 
 
Secondly, the industry is one of a limited number of cases where latecomer firms, 
specifically Korean handset manufacturers, had begun their transition process in the 
context of an emerging stage of the industry. Many other instances, whether they were 
successful or not, occurred in more mature markets. Unlike conventional circumstances, 
Korean handset manufacturers had entered the competition during the embryonic stage 
of the industry, even before commercialisation of the digital cellular communication 
technologies in the early 1990s. 
 
During the transition process, starting from an embryonic stage of an emerging industry, 
brings additional managerial challenges to executives in emergent leading firms that are 
not present in the case of a transition in more mature markets. They are related to 
uncertainty of both technological and market issues: identifying and exploring the ‘right’ 
technology trajectory, and market development.  
 
In mature markets, there are often firms at technological frontiers who are willing to 
offer their technologies slightly or somewhat behind the cutting-edge to latecomer firms. 
To be successful, these transferred technologies must be applicable with some 
modifications in another context. At the same time, latecomer firms do not need to take 
the risk of strategically selecting a specific technological trajectory if they make 
transitions in a mature industry, since in most cases, de facto standards are already 
                                           
26 It is also noted here that as shown in Table 3.1, the two Korean handset manufacturers that this thesis 
investigates had held top five positions in the world mobile handset market before the emergence of smart 
phones, which were introduced to the market at a relatively late stage in 3G and now are dominant in 
mobile handset markets. Therefore, the scope of this thesis focuses on the emergence of digital mobile 
handsets up to the era of multi-functional phones and does not include the issue of smart phones. 
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established in the industry. In this case, an entrant’s task amounts to following an 
established technological trajectory set by incumbents in the past. 
 
The emerging markets, on the other hand, will provide a more complex landscape for 
technology transfer and subsequent developments. It may be risky for incumbents to 
transfer technologies to possible competitors in this stage as rival firms may be more 
successful in developing the technology and, in doing so, also escape efforts to limit 
their autonomy by ‘inventing around’ IPRs-defended positions. However, the discussion 
in Chapter 2 supports the notion that there will be opportunities for technological 
transfer from within the fierce competition among technology leaders. At this stage, 
because of the uncertainty facing all firms at the frontier, the value of technology 
licensing agreements is unlikely to be high. High access fees are not possible because of 
the uncertainty and high royalties are not likely because buyers may expect other 
sources of technology to become available later in the life cycle. 
 
From the buyer’s perspective, there is not only the prospect that uncertainty will be 
resolved over time, but also the possibility of independent development. A latecomer 
entering an industry may be sufficiently confident to undertake a ‘go- it-alone’ strategy. 
For instance, Samsung refused the offer of technology transfer from a foreign firm when 
it began the development of 1M DRAM (Kim 1997b)27. Whether or not latecomer 
entrants have capabilities to act alone will vary depending on circumstances. 
 
Thus, the nascent nature of technologies characterising the embryonic stage of a new 
                                           
27 It is noted here that the semiconductor capital equipment industry was not vertically integrated and that 
Japanese companies were actively competing with US companies to build a rival semiconductor capital 
equipment industry – a window of opportunity that was fortunate for Korean producers. 
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industry development is at the centre of uncertainty. During the embryonic stage of an 
emerging market, even frontier firms have to keep their eyes open to all the possible 
technological trajectories due to high rate of technical changes. Therefore, latecomer 
firms penetrating an embryonic market also have to gamble on which trajectory to 
pursue; some trajectories may prove obsolete or infertile and become pernicious to them 
in the end. Under the circumstances, latecomer firms have to deal with enormous 
ambiguities coming from the uncertainty of the direction of technological trajectories, 
product architectures and the corresponding industry architecture. 
 
In addition to challenges from technical uncertainties, challenges from market 
uncertainties are also very large at the emerging stage of markets. An emerging market 
is highly uncertain in every aspect, e.g. market participants or size of demand, and 
changes of market participants are commonly observed. New entrants with different 
capabilities may join in the market while some incumbents may retreat due to 
pessimistic expectations or weak performance. The size of a market may explode one 
year but considerably shrink the next. While latecomer firms may find their role easier 
in a stable industry structure in a mature industry, inevitable changes during the early 
stage of an industry’s life will present them with many strategic and managerial issues. 
 
In summary, the assumption of a technology licensor with a well-established 
technological development path always being available for latecomer firms cannot be 
taken for granted in the emerging stage of a new industry (as it can in a mature stage). 
Technologies and products in an early stage are simply unproven and untested. In 
addition, as shown in Table 3.2, Korean handset makers have been competing in the 
high-end segment with their global competitors in terms of the average selling price 
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(ASP), a situation which is unusual in the catching-up of latecomer firms. Therefore 
(and as this thesis establishes) in cases such as the emerging digital mobile handset 
industry, a group of latecomer firms not only entering an emerging handset industry but 
also competing in high-end segments offers an interesting perspective on contemporary 
catching-up processes. 
 
Table 3.2 ASP of all handsets by global major vendor (unit: current US dollars) 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Samsung 218 185 202 194 179 180 173 
LG 179 185 177 159 164 169 169 
Motorola 220 156 151 134 155 147 141 
Nokia 157 148 144 151 138 144 137 
SonyErisson 125 115 172 195 191 179 172 
Source: Park and Kim (2007, p.144). 
 
Lastly, a (digital) mobile handset is a product that incorporates a range of technical 
knowledge and diverse functionalities together within its product architecture (Whang 
2009). It is a typical example of a multi-technology and multi-component electronic 
device. In particular, it has become a product with high complexity due to the evolution 
of digital telecommunication technologies and functional convergence spearheaded 
through collaboration with MNOs. Therefore, although a mobile handset is a typical 
mass-produced electronic device, the rapid change in its components and subsystems 
makes the role of manufacturers closer to a system integrator rather than a simple 
assembler28. This characteristic of the industry makes it very difficult to nurture all of 
                                           
28 The role of a handset manufacturer seems very much analogous to that of gun makers in the UK during 
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the requisite technologies and capabilities within a single firm. To do this, a handset 
manufacturer must coordinate the upstream and downstream actors such as component 
suppliers and MNOs in the mobile handset industry. Therefore, the industry demands 
highly sophisticated system-integrating capabilities on the part of handset manufacturers 
(Prencipe 2000), and these demands are among the key issues discussed in this thesis.  
 
3.3 A qualitative study on a single industry with two firm-level case studies  
The primary research method for the thesis is a qualitative case study of an industry 
with more focused case studies of two mobile handset manufacturers in Korea, 
excluding the utility of a survey-type quantitative analysis. According to Yin (2009), a 
case study approach is desirable for the type of research questions that this thesis seeks 
to answer, that is, ‘how’. The main objective of the case studies as a methodology in this 
thesis is not ‘statistical generalisation’ but ‘analytical generalisation’ (Yin 2003). This 
type of research in general adopts theoretical sampling not statistical sampling (Strauss 
& Corbin 1998) and cases are purposefully selected for theoretical reasons in order to 
‘replicate previous cases or extend emergent theory or they may be chosen to fill 
theoretical categories and provide examples of polar types.’ (Eisenhardt 1989, p.537). 
The thesis investigates a specific type of latecomer firms in transition, achieving a dual 
frontier, and in practice, the number of candidates of this kind is limited. Although 
guided by theoretical sampling (Glaser & Strauss 1967), however, the research process 
here does not pursues a theoretical finding based on diverse cases within each category 
to replicate the finding as Eisenhardt (1989) suggested because we know the strategies 
                                                                                                                           
the 19th century (Rosenberg 1972). Unlike the so-called ‘American System of Manufacturing’ which 
allowed US gun makers to produce guns with complex mechanisms on an interchangeable basis with 
standardised components such as locks and stocks, the production of guns in the UK at the time was 
typified by the ‘fitting’ or ‘adjustments’ process among parts. The role of a handset manufacturer involves 
‘fitting’ or ‘adjustments’ in both hardware and software aspects, a process that occurs for a particular 
model rather than for each individual device (as was the case with British guns). 
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and behaviours of the control group (e.g. foreign companies like Nokia or Motorola).  
 
As Glaser and Strauss (1967) suggested, the process of theoretical sampling provided 
with a local concept a foothold where initial interviews were able to embark for the 
research. Then, new issues were uncovered from the initial round of interviews. With 
growing theoretical sensitivity, these polar types of strategies and behaviours that 
Korean handset makers adopted against foreign ones, were identified and further 
investigated at the subsequent round of interviews as they are of interest with 
‘transparently observable’ (Eisenhardt 1989, p.537).  
 
Two types of data were mainly gathered for the thesis: secondary documents and in-
depth interviews. This permits one to strengthen grounded theory by triangulation of 
evidence (Eisenhardt 1989, p.533). In order to collect data, two rounds of fieldwork 
were carried out in Korea between January 2010 and March 2011, each round taking 
roughly three months. Two rounds of in-depth interviews with various experts related to 
the Korean mobile handset industry were conducted, the first and the second round 
comprising 16 and 20 interviews respectively - additional seven interviews were carried 
out in the final stage of writing between 2012 and 2014 in order to complement the 
main findings. Secondary document-gathering also took place during both rounds of 
fieldwork and was focused on the evolution of mobile handset technologies, mobile 
handset manufacturers and their market performances (mainly utilised for Chapter 4). 
Secondary documents included specialised technical journals, trade publications, 
analysts’ reports, company annual reports and other similar publications, and online 
newspapers. The collection of these types of data mainly aimed to establish the overall 
picture of the evolution of a mobile handset industry from both technical and market 
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perspectives. What follows explains the nature, objective and progress of interviews in 
each round of the fieldwork. 
 
3.3.1 The first round of fieldwork: open-ended interviews 
The first round of fieldwork was mainly aimed at identifying key issues behind the 
transition of Samsung and LG. Therefore, the list of interviewees in the initial fieldwork 
included a diverse range of people directly and indirectly involved in the Korean mobile 
handset industry. It included: 
  
(1) managers and engineers who had worked or were still working for mobile 
handset divisions in companies (e.g. Samsung, LG, Pantech, Motorola, and 
Maxon Telecom)29, in strategic planning teams, software development 
teams, hardware development teams, protocol teams through to patent 
management teams; 
(2) managers and engineers who had worked or were still working in 
downstream and upstream industries such as component suppliers (e.g. 
other divisions in Samsung and LG, EMW Antenna and Youngpoong 
Electronics) and MNOs (e.g. SK Telecom, Korean Telecom); 
(3) industry experts in research institutes (e.g. Science and Technology Policy 
Institute (STEPI)) and other related organisations (e.g. Telecommunications 
Technology Association (TTA)).  
 
                                           
29 The author admits that interviews on the mobile handset manufacturers were highly skewed to LG. 
This is because Samsung was highly sensitive to the issue of information leak through interviews, while 
LG was relatively indifferent to the issue. From the interviews with industry experts, the author confirmed 
that the strategies of LG that were to be discussed in the empirical chapters of the thesis would be 
regarded as identical to those of Samsung, the main themes of which included the technology sourcing of 
CDMA, the collaboration with MNOs, and the utilisation of contract developer organisations. 
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The interviews were carried out in a semi-structured form, with open and closed 
questions, due to its flexibility (Gillham 2000). While interviewees were asked for facts, 
therefore, opinions and insights about the evolution of Korean handset manufacturers, 
the discussion also followed other topics as the author (interviewer) developed an 
understanding of the issues that were raised by the respondents. The whole conversation 
was recorded except for a few cases when the recording was refused by the interviewee 
on the grounds of confidentiality. The interviews normally lasted one to two hours. 
Interviewees were sometimes contacted again on points requiring clarification or 
confirmation during the later analyses and writing. 
 
3.3.2 The second round of fieldwork: focused interviews 
In order to examine in depth the key issues that had been identified from the results of 
the first round of fieldwork, for the second round of fieldwork, the scope of interview 
topics was narrowed down, and specific persons were targeted. For example, the 
industry expert in STEPI in the first round of interviews was revisited for the Joint 
Development Project between the Electronics and Telecommunications Research 
Institute (ETRI) and Qualcomm (Chapter 5) whereas a team leader of an LG North 
American marketing team at the time was visited to discuss the relationship between LG 
and the US MNOs between 1999 and 2004 (Chapter 6). In addition, the project leader of 
LG at the time was visited for the 3 Italia Digital Video Broadcasting-Handheld (DVB-
H) phone project in 2005 (Chapter 6) while engineers who participated in the ‘Shine 
Phone’ series were interviewed about the division of labour between handset 
manufacturers and their ‘contract developers’ (Chapter 7) and similar matters. Therefore, 
the questions asked and issues raised during the second round of interviews were more 
direct and specific than in the first round of fieldwork even though the interviews during 
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the second round adhered to most of the interview principles applied to the first round.   
 
The information gathered from the two rounds of interviews with industry experts was 
cross-checked for credibility against, and used to complement, data originating from 
secondary sources on the Korean mobile handset industry.  
 
The thesis continues in Chapter 4 with an overview of the mobile handset industry. It 
then presents, in Chapters 5 to 7, the empirical evidence which is used to answer the 
research questions; these three chapters use the methodology and theoretical 
perspectives developed in Chapter 2 to present the detailed analysis on the efforts of the 
two Korean mobile handset producers to attain a world frontier position. 
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4. OVERVIEW OF THE DIGITAL MOBILE HANDSET INDUSTRY 
 
4.1 Introduction 
By way of laying foundations for the main empirical studies, this chapter aims to 
present key features of the (digital) mobile handset industry. It examines the evolution 
of technologies and industry structure over time. Based on the evolution of mobile 
communication technologies and the corresponding capacity improvements in wireless 
data communications, the chapter shows how mobile network services provided by the 
industry have gradually expanded from simple voice-centric to various data-centric 
services such as text messaging, music downloading, mobile Internet browsing and 
video calling. Furthermore, the chapter explores the dynamics of industry structures 
over time through the identification of key actors across the value chain of handset 
manufacturers. In particular, it investigates the dynamic division of labour among these 
key actors, focusing on dynamic competition with respect to baseband chip capabilities 
on the upstream side of handset manufacturers and with respect to intermediary roles of 
MNOs on the downstream side. In doing so, the chapter aims to provide readers with 
the fundamental knowledge for understanding the evolution of the mobile handset 
industry and the subsequent empirical chapters. 
 
The remainder of the chapter comprises three sections. Section 4.2 sets forth the history 
of the emergence of modern mobile communication systems and describes the co-
evolution of mobile communication technologies, functions of mobile handsets and 
mobile network services. Section 4.3 identifies two key actors – baseband chip suppliers 
and MNOs – based on the importance of their roles in the value chain of handset 
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manufacturers. It shows how these key actors have affected innovation and the 
competitive advantage of handsets by looking at the dynamics of their inter-firm 
relationships in the industry over time. Firstly, the section stresses the role of the 
handset manufacturer as a system integrator and presents a general handset development 
process. Secondly, it addresses the importance of the baseband chip as a core 
component in the mobile handset industry and explains how unbundling of baseband 
chip makers from vertically integrated handset manufacturers occurred and affected 
competitions among handset manufacturers. Lastly, it presents how MNOs as key 
downstream players shaped two distinct distribution structures of the industry and 
affected the innovation of handsets by mobile handset manufacturers according to their 
mobile services.  
 
The final section of the chapter recapitulates the dynamic characteristics of the mobile 
handset industry explained in the previous sections, and highlights the implications of 
the technical and managerial challenges for the Korean handset manufacturers. 
 
4.2 Evolution of the mobile handset industry 
This section offers a brief history of modern mobile communication systems and the 
evolution of (modern) mobile communication technologies. Here, a modern mobile 
communication system is characterised by the ‘cellular’ concept and its ‘handheld’ 
portability, the latter of which turned out to be the feature that established the trajectory 
for mass acceptance.  
 
4.2.1 Advent of a modern mobile handset industry 
The concept of ‘cellular network’ was originally proposed by Bell Labs in 1947 (Agar 
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2004). Cellular network communication systems have two advantages over a 
conventional radio communication system. First, the ‘cell’ involves a limited geographic 
area so that, over a larger area, frequencies that are used in other cells may be reused for 
carrying calls, allowing the larger area to support many more calls than a system having 
a single base station. The other advantage is that the ‘cell’ enables mobile stations 
(handsets) to save a considerable amount of energy while communicating with the more 
numerous cellular base stations, because cells covering small geographic areas require 
lower power transceivers.  
 
However, cellular radio systems were not used in early mobile communication systems. 
These early systems involved manual switching between the frequencies of adjoining 
cells using different frequencies30. In 1956, Ericsson commercialised the first (outgoing 
calls) automated mobile system – called Mobile System A (MTA)31 in Sweden – and 
several other improved automated services followed. Even so, the mobile phone 
services were limited within the coverage of one base station throughout the phone call. 
The concepts of ‘frequency reuse’ and ‘handoff’ were provided in the late 1960s32 and 
were realisable in practice in the late 1970s as, by then, semiconductor and high 
frequency directional antennae technologies were sophisticated enough to support the 
concepts.  
 
In 1973, Martin Cooper with his colleagues33 in Motorola developed the first 
                                           
30 Signals from two cells away were (ordinarily) sufficiently attenuated such that the same frequency 
could be re-used in an alternating pattern over the larger. 
31 http://www.businessinsider.com/complete-visual-history-of-cell-phones-2011-5?op=1, accessed 
22/12/2014. 
32 http://fonenews.weebly.com/who-is-fone.html, accessed 30/09/2015. 
33 According to the US patent registered as US03906166 in 1975, inventors include Martin Cooper, 
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prototype34 of modern concept of mobile (portable by hand) handset, DynaTAC35 
8000X (Gow & Smith 2006). Cooper made the first call to his rival, Joel Engel, the 
head of research at Bell Labs, the only competitor to Motorola at the time. By 1977, 
American Telephone and Telegraph (AT&T) and Bell Labs had constructed a prototype 
cellular system. A year later, public trials of the new system began in Chicago with over 
2,000 trial customers. In 1979, in a separate venture, the first commercial cellular 
telephone system was made operational by NTT in Tokyo. Subsequently, after several 
attempts to establish regulatory structure for commercialised cellular systems, the 
Federal Communications Commission finally authorised a commercial modern cellular 
network service in the US in 1982. A year later, Ameritech introduced the first American 
commercial analogue cellular network service in Chicago (Agar 2004).  
 
4.2.2 Evolution of mobile communication technologies 
Since the commercialisation of the first modern cellular network, mobile 
communication technologies have dramatically evolved over a relatively short period of 
time. Based on technical standards and the speed of mobile communications, such 
technologies can be generally divided into four different generations: 1G to 4G. As 
Korean handset manufacturers acquired top global positions in terms of market share 
before the commercialisation of 4G, the thesis excludes 4G from the scope of the 
description in this subsection. Here, the brief story of the transition of technologies and 
the corresponding functions of, and services provided by, handsets over generations is 
                                                                                                                           
Richard W. Dronsuth, Albert J. Mikulski, Charles N. Lynk Jr., James J. Mikulski, John F. Mitchell, Roy A. 
Richardson, John H. Sangster (http://inventors.about.com/library/weekly/aa070899.htm, accessed 
21/12/2014). 
34 The commercial type of Motorola’s DynaTAC was available to the public in 1983 
(http://www.businessinsider.com/complete-visual-history-of-cell-phones-2011-5?op=1#ixzz3MbzGFrft, 
accessed 21/12/2014). 
35 DYNamic Adaptive Total Area Coverage. 
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discussed.  
 
(1) 1st Generation (1G) 
1G mobile communication technologies are mainly based on analogue voice modulation 
technologies, using Frequency Division Multiple Access (FDMA) for transmitting 
information (see Box A). Three different modes based on FDMA were mainly used 
across the world: Advanced Mobile Phone Services (AMPS) in North America and Asia, 
Total Access Communications System (TACS) and Nordic Mobile Telecommunication-
900 (NMT-900) in Europe. The purpose of communication was solely voice-centric, and 
therefore the function in handsets was limited to voice calls. The main factors for 
competition amongst handsets producers in the market were the quality and connectivity 
of voice calls.   
 
From the late 1980s, however, 1G based on FDMA was unable to cope with the upsurge 
of customers’ demands on mobile communications due to its limited method of utilising 
frequency resources. It therefore triggered the adoption of digital communication 
technologies, i.e. 2G. 
 
(2) 2nd Generation (2G) 
The most radical shift to have occurred in the history of mobile communication 
technologies was from 1G to 2G, in terms of both technical and market competitions. 
With regard to a technical perspective, voice modulation technologies switched from 
analogue to digital technologies, and this transition enabled the significant expansion of 
mobile communications. In addition to the advantage of enhanced capacity, digital 
communication technologies allowed more stable and secure communications by their 
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unique error correction and encrypting mechanisms in comparison with analogue 
communication technologies.  
 
There are two standard modes of digital communication: Time Division Multiple Access 
(TDMA) and Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) – brief explanations of these 
mobile communication technologies are given in Box A. Three main technologies based 
on TDMA have been used around the world. They are Digital–Analogue Mobile Phone 
System (D-AMPS) for North America, Global System for Mobile communications 
(GSM) for Europe, and Personal Digital Cellular (PDC) for Japan. The whole European 
continent adopted GSM as the only 2G standard in 1992 to allow for easier and cheaper 
roaming services in the region. The following year, Japan established its own standard 
of digital communication technologies with PDC. The other mode of digital 
communication, CDMA, was first commercialised by the Korean MNOs in 
January1996. Throughout its existence, the 2G market was composed of roughly 70% 
GSM, 20% CDMA and 10% other technologies36. 
 
The main functions of a 2G mobile handset included new text messaging services as 
well as voice calls provided by 1G. The form factors37 of 2G mobile handsets also 
became diverse as handset manufacturers introduced clamshell and flip types in addition 
to the bar type in the market. 
 
 
                                           
36 Market data from Strategic Analytics. 
37 Form factor in the mobile handset industry means the physical appearance and operation of a handset. 
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Box A Principles of mobile communication technologies 
 
* FDMA 
FDMA is mainly used for analogue transmission technologies that divide the allotted 
spectrum into uniform 30kHz bandwidths so that base stations and mobile phones 
send their signal through these channels. (Below TDMA and CDMA are compared 
with the normal analogue system.) 
 
* TDMA 
TDMA is a digital transmission technology that splits channels that are uniformly 
divided into 30 kHz-wide bandwidths as with FDMA, but that are 6.7 milliseconds 
long in the spectrum into three uniform time slots. Therefore, in principle, TDMA 
has three times the capacity of an analogue system.  
 
* CDMA 
CDMA is a digital transmission technology that spreads out each digitalised sound 
segment over the entire spectrum. Multiple calls are spread over the spectrum 
(1.25MHz channel) with unique sequence codes, which can be used to recover the 
signals. CDMA has theoretically 15 to 30 times the capacity of an analogue system. 
 
Source: HowStuffWorks, http://electronics.howstuffworks.com/cell-phone7.htm, accessed 
22/07/2010. 
Comparison of analogue FDMA, and digital TDMA and CDMA 
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(3) 2.5 Generation (2.5G) 
Although 2.5G is normally considered as a transition phase from 2G to 3G, it is worth 
noting as a separate generation here because MNOs provided services that were distinct 
from services available in 2G or 3G technologies. 2.5G technologies include General 
Packet Radio Service (GPRS) and Enhanced Data rates for GSM Evolution (EDGE) 
originating from GSM, and CDMA2000 1x originating from CDMA. In 2.5G, the 
superiority of digital over analogue technologies was consolidated, product design of 
mobile handsets underwent a drastic change, and a diverse group of new network 
services were introduced. An interview with a manager in a Korean MNO revealed that 
the quality of voice calls was not a factor differentiating handsets in 2.5G, mainly for 
two reasons. He argued:  
 
The first was that the capabilities of handset manufacturers had matured 
enough for voice quality capabilities to have become generic. Second, the surge 
of demand for 2G mobile handsets meant that MNOs were forced to set up 
enormous numbers of base stations, resulting in smaller average cell zone 
coverage and therefore yielding better quality of voice calls. 
 
In addition to the achievement of generic high-quality voice calls, strong demand and 
quick market saturation among advanced countries further heightened market 
competitions for both handset manufacturers and MNOs. Against fast market saturation, 
handset manufacturers sought ways to stimulate the replacement demand of handset 
customers. In contrast, MNOs pursued ways to boost Average Revenue Per User 
(ARPU). Competition for customers under these conditions drove a functional 
convergence and an incorporation of data services in a mobile handset due to the 
compatible incentives facing both handset manufacturers and MNOs (e.g. handsets with 
a colour camera are more expensive and produce more data charge) (Whang 2009). 
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These became the ‘other features’ that differentiated competition, and these functional 
evolutions in mobile handsets could be realised through the enhanced data transmitting 
capacities of new 2.5G network technologies. Through various interviews, handset 
engineers insisted that the competition among handset manufacturers be mainly based 
on two factors:  
 
(1) how fast handset manufactures could integrate and stabilise new functions 
in a mobile handset system such as colour screen, camera, mobile TV and mp3 
(hardware and software integration capabilities); and (2) how manufacturers 
could accommodate these multimedia functions into more attractive designs 
(e.g. slimmer design and diverse form factors).  
 
In case of the competition among MNOs, new mobile data services became paramount, 
typified by uploading/downloading of pictures, songs, video clips, and Internet 
browsing. However, 2.5G mobile network technologies could not deliver the speed and 
the price that wired communications technologies provided, nor, in fact, that all of the 
new data services began to require. Two distinct approaches were adopted in order to 
overcome this issue: Wireless Application Protocol (WAP) delivering web pages with 
less data and mainly led by big handset manufacturers38, and operator-specific services 
such as NTT-Docomo’s i-mode led by each MNO (Haas 2006). 
 
(4) 3rd Generation39 (3G) 
3G technologies encompass WCDMA originating from GSM, CDMA 2000 1x 
                                           
38 Ericsson, Motorola, and Nokia were the main founders of the WAP Forum in 2002, which later became 
the Open Mobile Alliances (OMA). 
39As already noted in Chapter 3, Samsung and LG had already achieved global top five positions with 
their successful launch of multi-functional handsets onto the world mobile handset market before the 
emergence of smart phones, which started to be introduced to the market at a relatively late stage in 3G. 
Therefore, the scope of this thesis does not include smart phone-related issues such as platforms of iOS of 
Apple and Android of Google. 
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Evolution-Data Only (EV-DO) Rev.A originating from CDMA, and the Chinese 
standard of Time Division-Synchronous Code Division Multiple Access (TD-SCDMA).  
 
These mobile technologies surpassed some of the restricted data capacity of 2.5G 
network services, allowing fully fledged Internet-based services. The classes of new 
services introduced through the adoption of 3G technologies were not that different 
from those provided by 2.5G. Based on considerably faster wireless data connections, 
however, 3G technologies provided full-browsing Internet services by 3G handsets 
(rather than WAP-enabled Internet), and real multimedia messaging services, 
particularly represented by video calls. In 3G handsets, the functional convergence was 
further reinforced.  
 
To summarise, the evolution of mobile communication technologies from 1G to 3G has 
gradually expanded the functions and services which were delivered through mobile 
handsets in each generation, correspondingly incurring changes in product architecture 
of a mobile handset and rules of competition in the industry. While the competitive 
advantages of earlier (1G) incumbents were based on voice quality and connectivity, 
they were diminished due to the progress of digital mobile technologies in the 2G era. 
The subsequent heavy investment in the mobile network infrastructure by MNOs made 
these capabilities even more obsolete. Even so, the main service in both 1G and 2G 
stayed as voice-centric. In some ways, to differentiate their products from those of their 
competitors, handset manufacturers from 2.5G onwards began to integrate multimedia 
functions into the handset system such as colour screen, camera, mp3, and movie clips. 
In the meantime, in order to create additional revenue, MNOs also introduced various 
new mobile network data services from the commencement of 2.5G based on advanced 
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mobile wireless technologies. This further pushed the direction of a mobile handset 
towards multi-functionality. This interdependency between handsets and services led to 
close inter-firm relationships between handset manufacturers and MNOs. Table 4.1 
summarises the evolution of mobile communication technologies, embedded services, 
and phone types of each generation described above.  
 
Table 4.1 Evolution of mobile communication technologies, mobile handsets and their functions 
Generation 1G 2G 2.5G 3G 
Technology AMPS, TACS, NMT 
GSM, US-
TDMA 
CDMA, PDC 
GPRS, EDGE 
CDMA2000 1x EV-
DO 
WCDMA,  
TD-SCDMA 
CDMA2000 1x EV-
DO Rev. A 
Embedded 
services 
Voice Call Voice call Voice call  Voice/video call 
 Text message 
Multimedia message 
Camera and mp3 
WAP-enabled or 
operator-specific 
Internet service 
Multimedia message 
Camera and mp3 
Full-browsing Internet 
Handset 
form factor Candybar 
Candybar 
/Clamshell 
Candybar  
/Clamshell 
/Slide 
Candybar  
/Clamshell 
/Slide 
Phone type Basic phone Basic phone Feature phone Feature phone Smart phone 
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
 
The next section investigates further how the evolution of mobile communication 
technologies and corresponding mobile data services has shaped the dynamic structure 
of the mobile handset industry, including key actors and their relationships over time. 
 
4.3 Dynamic structure of a mobile handset industry: key actors and their 
inter-firm relationships over time 
This section presents a discussion on the dynamic structure of the mobile handset 
industry. Considering the handset manufacturer to be at the centre of a model, it 
identifies two key actors on the supplier and user sides of the manufacturer and 
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discusses how the inter-firm relationships have changed in the course of the evolution of 
the mobile handset industry. 
 
4.3.1 Key actors with regard to competitions in the industry 
To identify key actors that are associated with handset manufacturers, the mobile phone 
value system provided by Porter & Paija (2011) has been modified in the thesis (Figure 
4.1) based on the review of secondary documents and interviews with experts in the 
mobile handset industry. The figure shows handset manufacturers at lower centre, and 
two key actors (in bold boxes): baseband chip suppliers and MNOs. 
 
On the upstream side of handset manufacturers, baseband chip suppliers have been set 
apart from other component suppliers because a baseband chip is one of the most 
important hardware components in terms of the criticality of components (it is identical 
to a CPU in a PC). Criticality of the chip here means that significant innovation in a 
baseband chip at the component level can entail a corresponding change of product 
architecture at the system level (Prencipe 2000). In particular, the capabilities of a 
baseband chip can have a significant impact on the performance and competitiveness of 
mobile handsets in several respects, which will be discussed in detail in the next 
subsection. 
 
On the downstream side, MNOs have been set apart from general distributors as they 
also play significant roles, such as being source of innovation and financial 
intermediaries. In addition to selling handsets to customers, they contribute to 
innovations in a mobile handset by promoting multimedia functionalities to support 
their mobile services.  
  
 
Source: modified by the author 
Figure 4.1 Structure of the mobile hand
 
Further detailed discussion on 
chip suppliers and MNOs 
 
4.3.2 Handset manufacturers
Three different types of firms can be considered a
chain of the mobile handset industry, depending on 
and design house (Kim 2005)
in-house factories and market them with their own brands
MNOs) to downstream distributors including MNOs. ODMs 
deliver their handsets to OBM
their brands. Design house
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based on Porter & Paija (2011, p.23). 
set industry 
the three key actors – handset manufacturers, 
– are presented in the following three subsections. 
 
s handset manufacturer
their vertical scope
 (see Figure 7.1 as well). OBMs produce their handsets in 
 (sometimes co
develop, assemble and 
s or MNOs so that these buyers can 
s are specialised in handset design and development
 
baseband 
 
s in the value 
: OBM, ODM 
-branding with 
market them with 
; they are 
８０ 
 
 
 
basically an ODM without production facilities. However, these three forms are not 
mutually exclusive. For example, OBMs sometimes act as an ODM (especially to 
MNOs) and outsource development of handsets to ODMs or design houses. 
 
In what follows, the role of handset manufacturers is identified through an examination 
of the nature of capabilities and activities required for handset development. In addition, 
the general procedure of new handset development is provided. 
 
Handset manufacturer as a system integrator 
A mobile handset is a multi-technology, multi-component, electronic device. As shown 
in Figure 4.2, a general multi-functional mobile handset comprises several hardware 
modules of baseband processor, application processor, memory, radio frequency module, 
display module, camera module and other peripheral components. These hardware 
modules are incorporated through a mobile operating system with software modules 
such as middleware platform, graphic user interface and various application programs.  
RF, Radio Frequency; LSI, Large Scale Integrated Circuit; CPU, Central Processing Unit; 
DSP, Digital Signal Processor; SRAM, Static Random Access Memory. 
Source: Nikon homepage40. 
Figure 4.2 Block diagram of a mobile phone system 
 
                                           
40 Types of ICs and applications, http://www.nikon.com/products/precision/society/story0201/index.htm, 
as reproduced in Whang (2009, p.135), accessed 22/07/2010.  
８１ 
 
 
 
In terms of product architecture, therefore, a mobile handset is also a system composed 
of several subsystems supported by multiple components and software modules. The 
main role of handset manufacturers is to understand and maintain knowledge resources 
on a mobile handset as part of a mobile communication system as well as a system that 
integrates these subsystems into a single system from a hardware/software perspective 
(Prencipe et al. 2004). On the other hand, handset manufacturers generally outsource 
most of these hardware components and software modules to specialised suppliers (with 
some exceptions around core semiconductor chips and mobile operating systems of a 
mobile handset). The trend towards modularity of handset subsystems and specialisation 
of handset manufacturers in the mobile handset industry is clear (Anderson & Jönsson 
2006).  
 
This contrast in characteristics of mobile handsets between system integration and 
modularity needs some consideration. The fact that the level of modularity in a mobile 
handset system is extremely high does not directly imply that the role of handset 
manufacturers is confined to being a comparatively simple assembler. It is important to 
consider the level of system integration required to design and develop a mobile handset. 
Sako and Murray (2000, p.4) have described system integration capabilities, and 
differentiating them from simple assembling capabilities:  
 
Although the basic architecture of an automobile is fairly stable, it is said that 
there are many aspects of the linkages within the electro-mechanical 
architecture that are not yet fully understood. For example, to achieve a 
particular noise/vibration/harshness level at different maximum speeds, 
engineers need a deeper understanding of the subtle linkage between the body, 
chassis, engine, and drive-train. This means that without the integration 
capability of vehicle manufacturers, the body, chassis, engine, and drive-train 
produced by separate suppliers each with their own specialised systems 
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knowledge may not, upon assembly, lead to a workable automobile…[this 
author’s emphasis].  
 
In addition, Whitney (2004) has also stressed that the nature of the car door design 
process is that of a complex system. The assembling of components for a car door 
appears comparatively simple. Taking the design process into account, car 
manufacturers have to consider ‘attributes’ of a door system that affect customers such 
as safety, closing effort, wind noise and water leakage. These attributes sometimes 
affect each other in conflicting ways, which makes the design process more complex.  
 
As mentioned above, a mobile handset is one of the subsystems of a mobile 
telecommunication system. According to ETRI (1994) and Porter and Paija (2011), a 
mobile telecommunication system consists of mobile stations (or mobile handsets), base 
stations (base transceiver stations plus base station controllers) and mobile telephone 
exchanges, as shown in Figure 4.3. A mobile handset is therefore part of a mobile 
telecommunication system and in order to communicate in a wireless manner, it should 
be compatible with a base station through predetermined protocols within a system. 
Therefore, a mobile handset manufacturer should understand the complete mobile 
telecommunication system, and in particular the interface between a mobile station and 
a base station. The implication is that a handset manufacturer cannot leave aside other 
parts of the system as if they were in a black box.  
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Source: Porter & Paija (2011, p.23). 
Figure 4.3 Schematic view of a mobile cellular network 
 
In the beginning of 2G, the role of handset manufacturers was similar to that of motor 
companies, and most components were procured from component suppliers. Handset 
manufacturers mainly focused on the design of a main circuit board for a mobile 
handset system, arraying hardware components in order to minimise the interferences 
among hardware components and therefore guarantee connectivity and quality of voice 
calls. The industry also began to be pushed towards standardisation and modularisation 
of components, subsystems and their interfaces (Anderson & Jönsson 2006).  
 
From 2.5G onwards, on the other hand, the incorporation of multimedia functions of 
colour screen, camera, and music to video into a handset system and intensive software 
integration activities have emerged as other competitive advantages for handset 
manufacturers, especially since the emergence of multi-functional handsets (Whang 
2009). A former handset developer in Maxon Telecom witnessed this issue in the early 
stage of convergence:  
 
Maxon was one of the successful early Korean handset companies that 
specialised in wireless technologies, having acquired these capabilities from a 
Danish company. However, it struggled to cope with the complexities of 
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integrating a colour screen with a camera module into a handset system. 
Adding the camera module resulted in many problems such as poor display of 
colour under low light intensity and the control of standby power. The camera 
module provider did not have knowledge of the handset system while Maxon 
Telecom had capabilities that were limited to wireless technology. 
 
The ratio of hardware to software engineers in handset makers also significantly 
changed from 1:1 before multi-functional handsets to approximately 1:541 after multi-
functional handsets42. Due to the evolution of mobile technologies and their data 
services, complexities residing in integration of hardware components and software 
modules have significantly increased.  
 
In this vein, the requirements of incorporating all the features – or, as in Whitney (2004), 
‘attributes’ – in a mobile handset did not disappear in the course of the evolution of a 
mobile handset system despite high modularity in a mobile handset. This meant a 
continuing role for mobile handset manufacturers in collaborating with their specialised 
suppliers and their MNO partners to sustain their competitive advantages43. 
 
Development process of new handsets and the division of labour44 
Bearing in mind the specialisation of handset manufacturers over time, the general 
                                           
41 Interview with a protocol stack engineer. 
42 In the case of a Chinese design house company producing low-end multi-functional handsets, the ratio 
was approximately 1:3.8 (Imai & Shih 2007). Also, Yasumoto & Fujimoto (2006) reported that the 
proportion of software engineering accounted for more than 70% of human resources in a project for the 
Japanese market where handsets featured the most advanced functions. 
43 Kim (2008) studied the change in handset architecture originating from the adoption of a camera 
application processor. On the other hand, Whang (2009) investigated the change in handset architecture 
originating from the change in baseband chip processors. 
44 The original information for this section was provided by an employee of one of the Korean mobile 
handset manufacturers who asked for anonymity; this information was added to by several interviewees 
afterwards. 
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procedure45 of new handset development and the role of manufacturers in each 
development stage are explained below. A complete development process generally 
takes between six and twelve months. 
 
(1) Stage 1 – product planning  
A product planning team in a handset manufacturing firm takes charge of the first stage, 
together with product-development teams (both hardware and software teams) and 
marketing teams. First of all, each team discusses, debates, and finally agrees on a 
concept and the target market of a new handset. Subsequently, they contemplate the 
detailed specifications of a new handset, which includes retail price, form factor (e.g. 
candybar/clamshell/slide type etc.), external design as well as size (e.g. length and width, 
thickness, screen size, etc.), screen type (monochrome or colour, LCD or OLED46) and 
additional functions that will be embedded (e.g. GPS/mp3/camera/DMB47).  
 
On the basis of the concept and required features proposed by the new product-
development team, hardware and especially mechanism teams in a manufacturing firm 
verify the producibility of a newly designed handset. They check whether components 
required for delivering the concept are actually available on the market or can be 
developed by component suppliers, and that they can physically fit into the proposed 
design. Finally, a mock-up is produced to verify producibility and feasibility and this is 
used for acquiring orders from MNOs (only one or two mock-ups, which are identical to 
a real product apart from exterior finishing, are produced as their manufacturing cost is 
                                           
45 The development process provided here is from one of the Korean mobile handset manufacturers. 
Based on confirmation by several interviewees, the author acknowledges that each handset manufacturer 
may have slightly but not significantly different development processes. 
46 Organic Light Emitting Diode. 
47 Digital Multimedia Broadcasting. 
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between $5,000 and $10,000). There is a final round of discussion amongst the product 
planning team, the product design team, the development team and the marketing team 
to cross-check the requirements. 
 
MNOs may be involved in a new product-development process from stage 1, 
particularly in regard to up-to-date handsets. In such cases, the entire development 
schedule will be planned and customised right up to the release date of a product by 
MNOs. In other words, handset manufacturers fully coordinate with the product 
portfolios and roadmaps of an MNO. In addition, most of the basic specifications, for 
example, retail price, form factor and secondary functions, are heavily influenced by the 
opinions of MNOs (see Chapter 6). 
 
(2) Stage 2 – working-sample production  
At this stage, working samples operating only primary functions are produced under the 
responsibility of development teams. Manufacturers assess material and component 
costs based on produced working samples, and select appropriate components on the 
basis of performance and cost. Mechanisms are made from an interim mould because 
there may be modifications in design. Generally, 30 to 100 handset samples are 
produced. Working-sample productions can be iterated between two and four times 
depending on the extent to which they employ new technologies.  
 
(3) Stage 3 – engineer sample production 
This is the last stage led by development teams in a manufacturing firm. Both hardware 
and software development teams need to complete the development of all handset 
functions and simultaneously carry out bug corrections. Thereafter, the design of the 
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handset and hardware components cannot be modified for any reason other than solving 
any production and compliance problems arising from this engineer sample stage. The 
stage is normally gone through once or twice, but sometimes three times if the sample is 
not satisfactory. In each round, 100 to 200 samples are manufactured, and these are used 
for certification by MNOs or other certification organisations. Finally, a manufacturer 
determines which component suppliers will deliver each component and places orders 
accordingly with the required specifications. Such orders are placed four to eight weeks 
ahead of mass production stage, and take account of time needed for deliveries. 
 
(4) Stage 4 – pilot sample production 
From stage 4 onwards, the responsibility shifts from development teams to production 
management teams. Any minor modifications at this stage and afterwards are reported 
and registered as an engineering change order (ECO). Based on the design and engineer 
samples, production management teams consider all possible problems that may occur 
at the time of transitioning from the pilot phase to mass production. During the pilot 
phase approximately 100 to 200 samples are produced.  
 
From stages 3 through to 4, MNOs and handset manufacturers perform a sample test, 
also known as an ‘event’, roughly three times to verify the completion of a new handset 
development (e.g. to check that further problems have not been re-introduced). MNOs 
and handset manufacturers concurrently carry out field tests by connecting newly 
developing handsets through either a test network or a real network. Each MNO has its 
own checklists and requirements48 for a handset manufacturer to meet regarding a new 
mobile handset. While the first event mainly concentrates on checking on primary 
                                           
48 Each event has mandatory and optional requirements designated by network operators. 
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functions in a mobile handset, second and third events focus on rather peripheral 
functions in line with development processes at a handset manufacturer. For each event, 
MNOs and quality assurance (test) teams from the manufacturing firm test the newly 
developing handset according to checklists and report to a handset manufacturer any 
errors for corrections. The handset manufacturer then corrects all the errors reported by 
test teams from both sides. 
 
Software integration activities by software development teams are carried out 
simultaneously from stages 2 to 4. These activities are the most time-consuming and 
also the most important in the current mobile handset development process. Software 
integration consists of three main integration activities: functional porting, graphic user 
interface development and protocol stabilisation. First, software teams in a 
manufacturing firm connect and integrate all subsystem modules into a baseband chip 
as a system, based on software architecture provided by baseband chip makers. Second, 
software teams also build graphic user interfaces with which customers directly interact 
to utilise the phone’s features. Third, the teams undertake protocol stabilisation, which 
allows a handset to communicate and utilise other services through base stations run by 
MNOs. 
 
(5) Stage 5 – mass production and quality control 
The final stage consists of actual mass production, with assembly and quality control for 
manufactured products. Mass production eventually begins after receiving the guarantee 
of quality assurance teams. 
 
During several interviews with respect to the development process of a new mobile 
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handset, interviewees stressed the involvement of MNOs in stages 1, 3 and 4 for 
operator-specific models. To meet the requirements, the development process for these 
mobile handsets cannot be executed by a handset manufacturer alone.  
 
4.3.3 Baseband chip suppliers 
Baseband chips are application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs) that process calls 
and data in and out through wireless transmissions – this is the primary function of a 
mobile handset. ‘ASICs are integrated circuits that are designed and built for a specific 
application, and for a specific customer’ (von Hippel 1998, p.633). The performance of 
these ASIC systems requires specific elements to be implemented in electronic circuitry 
which also includes microprocessor-type circuitry that can be programmed and hence 
needs software which, in turn, can be modified and improved within the rules 
established by the design of the ASIC. Therefore, a baseband chip generally comes to 
handset manufacturers as a package, including hardware baseband chips in tandem with 
protocol stack software and reference design from which handset manufacturers develop 
their handsets. 
 
The subsequent sections discuss the importance of baseband chip capabilities with 
respect to competitiveness of handset manufacturers and the trend towards the dis-
integration of baseband chip divisions from handset manufacturers. 
  
Criticality of baseband chip capabilities 
In order to guarantee interoperability with mobile networks, a baseband chip must be 
designed according to predetermined standards and protocols by international standard-
setting organisations. Designing a baseband chip requires knowledge of mobile 
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communications and semiconductor technologies. Knowledge and experience from both 
technological streams are required to acquire the design capabilities.  
 
Apart from technical difficulties, the main question that arises is ‘why are design 
capabilities of baseband chips so important in the mobile handset industry?’, and the 
following points offer some answers.  
 
(1) Royalty: burden or leverage? 
The mobile handset industry is based on communication standards that are set in 
advance of product introduction. This requires R&D activities on a new generation of 
mobile communication technologies to precede the process of setting standards and 
communication protocols. R&D activities driven by market players produce many 
newly developed technologies and corresponding patents. These patents play an 
important role as ‘essential IPRs’ on the process of setting standards by standard-setting 
organisations with a group of interested participants. When the standards are put in 
place by nations for commercialisation, manufacturers in the mobile handset industry 
can claim their rights according to their contributions on setting standards to other 
manufacturers under the terms of the Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discrimination 
(FRAND) standard (Geradin & Rato 2007). Companies with essential IPRs are given an 
option to cross-license with each other or license them to companies without essential 
IPRs. 
 
During the 2G era, for instance, Korean handset manufacturers had to pay 5% and 7.5% 
of the handset prices within their domestic and export markets, respectively, on each 
CDMA handset to Qualcomm as a running royalty (Song 1999). These payments 
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resulted from the manufacturers’ active participation in two big telecommunication 
standards bodies: the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP)49 and the 3rd 
Generation Partnership Project 2 (3GPP2)50. Korean handset makers had heavily 
invested in R&D, had accumulated patents on new mobile communication technologies 
and exerted influence to make these patents part of the essential IPRs accepted by 
telecommunication standards bodies51.  
 
(2) Dependency on the chip makers’ technology roadmap 
The production capacity of manufacturers can be limited by the production capacity of 
baseband chip makers, especially in the embryonic stage of the industry. This challenge 
was witnessed in the early phase of the CDMA handset market when Qualcomm was 
the only CDMA baseband chip supplier in the world. When Korea commercialised the 
CDMA network for the first time in the world in 1996, Korean handset manufacturers 
could not match the very rapid growth in demand due to an insufficient supply of 
baseband chips from Qualcomm (the firm could not keep up with the increasing demand 
in both the US and Korea). 
 
More importantly, a new-generation handset cannot be introduced into the market 
without a new-generation baseband chip; this means that handset manufacturers without 
chip design capabilities cannot become first movers in a new-generation handset market 
on their own and hence are hampered in their ability to react quickly to market demands. 
                                           
49 3GPP is a telecommunication standards body which produces technical specifications and technical 
reports for a 3G mobile system based on evolved GSM core networks and the radio access technologies 
that they support (http://www.3gpp.org/About-3GPP, accessed 17/09/2015). 
50 3GPP2 is also a telecommunication standards body which produces technical specifications and 
technical reports for a 3G mobile system, but based on CDMA 
(http://www.3gpp2.org/Public_html/Misc/AboutHome.cfm, accessed 17/09/2015).  
51 Interview with a product planning manager in LG. 
９２ 
 
 
 
Therefore, a protocol stack engineer argued: 
 
Without the support of baseband chip makers, it is impossible for handset 
makers to become a first mover strategy, failing to pursue their own 
technology/product roadmap independently of the baseband chip makers’ 
product roadmap.  
 
In addition, such dependence on baseband chip makers’ capabilities may bring high risk 
of lock-in problem as well.  
 
(3) Cost competitiveness 
Manufacturers with design capabilities are able to reduce production costs by not 
incurring royalty payments on its in-house baseband chips and software architectures. 
When chip makers provide handset manufacturers with baseband chips, they sell not 
only hardware chips but also embedded software architecture, which specifies the 
integration of other components and functions with baseband chips, as explained earlier. 
Therefore, the first handicap of handset manufacturers without design capabilities for a 
baseband chip is the cost burden incurred from market transactions with specialised 
suppliers. In addition, these manufacturers must secure multiple sources of baseband 
chips in order to avoid heavy dependency on a specific baseband maker; if they do not, 
they will be locked into a specific chip maker, which will limit their product portfolios 
and make them entirely dependent on a chip maker’s competitiveness52.  
 
The second handicap mainly comes from the fact that these software architectures are 
unique to each chip maker. Therefore, manufacturers also have to build unique (relation-
                                           
52 Interview with a protocol stack engineer at Pantech and a product planning manager at LG. 
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specific) capabilities for the different baseband chips and software architectures that 
they utilise. Given that software integrating capabilities based on software architectures 
are the main role of handset manufacturers, adopting two distinctively different 
baseband chips means that manufacturers not only have the burden of two licence fees 
but also have to retain and develop two distinct capabilities. However, these 
manufacturers have no choice but to keep two groups of human resources for R&D in 
multi-functional handsets. 
 
Unbundling of baseband chip production and specialisations of handset 
manufacturers 
Since the commercialisation of digital mobile communication technologies, large firms 
such as Motorola, Nokia and Ericsson have dominated the mobile handset industry. All 
these firms vertically integrated themselves into baseband chipset and network 
equipment. They utilised their own proprietary baseband chip packages developed from 
their semiconductor divisions. These baseband chips can be categorised as typical 
ASICs as they serve one specific customer, which is its internal handset manufacturing 
division. However, specialised baseband chip makers such as Texas Instruments and 
Analog Devices Inc. had emerged in the market between 1996 and 1998 (Funk 2002; 
Yasumoto & Shiu 2009). These specialised suppliers began to offer baseband chips as a 
form of Application Specific Standard Processor (ASSP), serving multiple (specialised) 
handset manufacturers (von Hippel 1998).  
 
The unbundling (Anderson & Jönsson 2006) of the mobile handset industry started in 
the late 1990s (see Table 4.2) when Qualcomm split their mobile handset and baseband 
chipset divisions. Qualcomm was the only CDMA baseband supplier until 1998 and 
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therefore the only vertical integrator in CDMA at the time. Selling off its handset 
division to Kyocera in 1999, it became a specialised baseband chipset provider. 
Qualcomm insisted that this change of strategy was to allow it to focus on the baseband 
chipset market, but it was in fact the poor financial performance of the handset division 
that made investors pressurise Qualcomm’s top management to dis-integrate (see 
Section 6.3.1). In addition, Siemens, which was focused on low-end GSM handsets, 
also dis-integrated its structure by creating Infineon (hardware chipset and its software 
solutions) in 1999 after the acquisition of Comneon (software architecture platform 
solutions).  
 
Ericsson also divided its organisational structure by creating Ericsson Mobile Platforms, 
and its handset division became a joint venture with Sony, creating Sony Ericsson 
Mobile Communications (Sony Ericsson) in 2001. In 2008, it was announced that 
Ericsson Mobile Platforms had merged with ST-NXP Wireless53, a mobile phone system 
solution provider, and in 2009, ST-Ericsson was created as a 50/50 joint venture 
between Ericsson and STMicroelectronics54. Freescale was also created from the 
divestiture of Motorola in 200455. Dis-integration in these handset manufacturers, 
summarised in Table 4.2, is due to bad performance of their handset divisions. Apart 
from this trend, only Nokia stayed as a vertically integrated handset manufacturer, 
retaining baseband chip design capabilities in-house. 
 
 
                                           
53 ST-NXP Wireless was originally a joint venture of wireless business of STMicroelectronics and NXP 
Semiconductors in 2008. NXP was also formerly a semiconductor division of Philips Electronics, created 
in 2006. 
54 Ericsson Mobile Platforms, ST-NXP Wireless homepages. 
55 Cellular Monthly, ‘M&A in mobile handset manufacturers’, 08/2005. 
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Table 4.2 Dis-integration of semiconductor divisions and handset divisions in the mobile 
handset industry 
Companies Semiconductor divisions  (Baseband chip + software platform) Handset divisions 
Qualcomm Stayed as Qualcomm Sold to Kyocera (1999) 
Siemens Infineon (1999) -> Bought by Intel (2010) Sold to BenQ (2005) 
Philips NXP (2006) -> ST-NXP Wireless (2008) -> ST-Ericsson (2009)  
Ericsson 
Ericsson Mobile Platforms (2001) -> 
ST-NXP Wireless (2008) -> ST-Ericsson 
(2009) 
Joint venture with Sony as 
Sony Ericsson (2001) 
Motorola Freescale (2004) Motorola Personal Communications Sector 
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
 
The logic behind the dis-integration of baseband chip divisions from handset 
manufacturers has several elements. While the trend towards modularisation in the 
mobile handset industry accelerated specialisation of industry participants, first of all, 
the emergence of specialised baseband chip suppliers such as Texas Instruments and 
Analog Devices Inc. in late 1990s allowed many handset manufacturers without 
baseband chip capabilities to enter the market. These new entrants would have no 
reason to source baseband chips from vertical integrators due to concerns over 
knowledge spillover and information leakage. Given this reluctance, the performance of 
baseband chip divisions in incumbent vertically integrated firms would be entirely 
reliant on that of their handset divisions regardless of competitiveness of the former. If 
the latter suffered in sales, the former had a reason to become an independent entity as 
was the case of Qualcomm (see Chapter 6). 
 
In vertically integrated industries more generally, component divisions of vertical 
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integrators would have an incentive to dis-integrate, or new entrants would join if the 
market were to reach ‘critical minimal size’, as discussed by Rosenberg (1976). 
Becoming a specialised supplier, a component division would be able to serve multiple 
customers more efficiently on the basis of economies of scale, which would be 
beneficial for original vertical integrators. 
 
At the time of their market entry, Korean handset manufacturers specialised in handset 
design and manufacturing, relying on baseband chips from Qualcomm. Given that 
Qualcomm was also a CDMA handset manufacturer at the time, the competition 
between Korean makers and Qualcomm seems to have had two opposing aspects. On 
the one hand, Qualcomm as a vertical integrator was competing with Korean handset 
manufacturers in the CDMA handset market. While Qualcomm retained cost advantages 
from in-house production of baseband chips, Korean competitors might be more 
susceptible to Qualcomm’s hold-up and technical changes in the early stage of CDMA 
technologies (Afuah 2001). On the other hand, Qualcomm was also a beneficiary from 
sales of CDMA chips to, and royalties for sales of CDMA handsets by, Korean handset 
producers. This issue will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6. 
 
Overall, the emergence of specialised baseband chip suppliers, the unbundling of 
baseband chip divisions from incumbent manufacturers and the modularisation of 
handset architecture presented above seemed to relieve handset manufacturers without 
capabilities in baseband chips from being vulnerable to vertically integrated incumbents. 
Due to the persistent importance of baseband chips in handset development, however, 
specialised manufacturers would still have to collaborate with the right partners (as they 
generally source from plural suppliers) in order to keep their competitiveness.  
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4.3.4 Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) 
Positioned between handset producers and end-users, MNOs play a unique role in the 
mobile handset industry. Here, the changing role of MNOs and their impact on the 
distribution structure over time are discussed. 
 
From a network operator to a service provider as an intermediary user 
Until the 2G era, MNOs’ activities were mainly focused on the operation and 
management of mobile telecommunication networks. The early saturation of the mobile 
communications market, however, pushed MNOs towards deployment of new services 
for customers in order to seek an opportunity to increase ARPUs (Whang 2009). Since 
2.5G, MNOs have tried to adopt various new data services like NTT-Docomo’s i-mode 
and have strongly encouraged handset manufacturers to develop handsets for them with 
multi-functionalities. Since these handsets were generally expensive owing to their 
technological novelty, MNOs provided subsidies which reduced the price of novel 
handsets to an acceptable level, stimulating the growth of handset demand and data 
usage. As a result, MNOs did not have to rely solely on voice calls for their revenue and 
have created many data services that are accessed using multi-functional handsets (and 
paid for by data charges that are part of a service package or are separately charged to 
their customers). 
 
Therefore, MNOs have not remained as mere distributors who purchase handsets from 
producers (handset manufacturers) and distribute them through their own channels to 
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end-users (final customers). In this sense, they have acted as ‘intermediary users’56 in 
that they have provided product definitions and specifications to handset producers, 
purchased these handsets, bundled them with their mobile services, and marketed them 
through their own channels to end-users (sometimes with subsidies).  
 
There arises the necessity of distinction between the concept of intermediary users and 
that of ‘lead users’ proposed by von Hippel. Lead users are a small fraction of end-users 
of a certain product who ‘face needs that will be general in a marketplace but face them 
months or years before the bulk of that marketplace encounters them, and are positioned 
to benefit significantly by obtaining a solution to those needs’ (Urban & von Hippel 
1988, p.549). Intermediary users in fact play a role of lead users by conveying end-users’ 
needs to producers. However, the former do not belong to end-users like lead users, 
lying between producers and end-users. In addition, the former benefits by selling 
products to end-users instead of obtaining products. 
 
During this intermediation process, they have played several important roles for both 
producers and end-users. Firstly, MNOs are innovation facilitators, acting as sources of 
innovation on behalf of end-users. Positioned closer to end-users than handset 
manufacturers57, MNOs are quicker to recognise end-users’ needs, experience and new 
ideas and feed these back to handset producers. However, this does not mean that 
MNOs will act for the benefit of end-users all the time. Sometimes MNOs guide the 
direction of handset innovation towards their own benefits at the expense of end-users’ 
                                           
56 The concept of an ‘intermediary user’ used in this thesis has not been articulated yet in the literature. 
Boon et al. (2011) utilised the term ‘intermediary user organisations’ but these were representative groups 
of heterogeneous potential users. For an overview of general ‘intermediary innovation organisations’ as 
facilitators of interactions among actors, see Howells (2006). 
57 If producers originate from foreign countries, the gap between producer and end-user will be wider. 
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utilities. In mid 2000s, for example, Korean local MNOs did not introduce handsets 
with a WiFi module prior to the introduction of the iPhone in order to secure their 
profits from 3G data transmission5859.  
 
Secondly, MNOs have played the role of ‘guarantor of quality’ (Jacobides et al. 2006) 
for end-users in the market. In comparison with simple distributors, they are equipped 
with the experience and knowledge of mobile network services that enable them to 
verify the quality of handsets from producers through interoperability tests based on an 
operator’s requirements specification. Of course, the level of knowledge varies 
depending on the MNO. A software engineer at LG at an interview described: 
 
The knowledge gap between 1st and 2nd tier MNOs is ‘enormous’. Checklists of 
1st tier MNOs like Verizon in the US exceed by almost a factor ten to those of 
2nd tier MNOs like Movistar in Latin America. Sometimes, they act as a market 
barrier to those trying to penetrate 1st tier MNOs.  
 
However, new entrants will benefit from 1st tier MNOs’ strict quality screening process 
if they clear this hurdle because they will then be able to access the marketing, 
distribution and financial resources of MNOs (Chapter 6 discusses this issue in detail).  
 
Lastly, MNOs are also important financial intermediaries for handset makers. On the 
one hand, MNOs provide handset makers with direct revenue on purchases of handsets 
that are, in fact, leased from an MNO. Although this arrangement allows the MNO to 
earn financial profits from its subscribers, it provides handset makers with immediate 
cash flow from handset sales. On the other hand, MNOs also promote their new mobile 
                                           
58 Korean customers called this kind of domestic handset without a WiFi module a ‘castrated phone’. 
59 Ddaily, ‘Spec down of LG’s new Chocolate: Domestic version without WiFi module’, 22/09/2009, 
http://www.ddaily.co.kr/news/article.html?no=54368, accessed 27/01/2015. 
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services bundled with new handsets (especially from 2.5G) by giving substantial 
subsidies, generally together with handset producers, to customers who commit to long-
term contracts (usually more than 18 months).  
 
Globalisation of MNOs and bundling of their mobile Internet services 
Against fast market saturation, the two main strategies adopted by MNOs were: (1) 
creating a new business model with mobile Internet services; and (2) globalisation 
through Mergers & Acquisitions (M&A) across borders. The former was related to 
efforts for higher ARPU and the latter was an endeavour to achieve cost reductions 
through economies of scale, mainly by global sourcing of handsets and the launching of 
new mobile services.  
 
Table 4.3 shows the globalisation of major MNOs by 2005. Examples of globalisation 
by European MNOs through M&As across borders include Vodafone, France Telecom 
(Orange), Deutsche Telekom (T-Mobile) and Telefonica60. Among these, Vodafone is the 
biggest globalised MNO in terms of subscribers; it also exceeds 90% in terms of share 
of foreign subscribers, and operates in 32 different countries, as shown in Table 4.3. 
These globalised MNOs launched their wireless data services on a global scale. The 
global launch of such examples are ‘Vodafone Live!’ by Vodafone in 19 countries and 
‘i-mode’ by NTT-Docomo in 13 countries as of August 2004. 
  
                                           
60 These four MNOs accounted for 78% of the EU market in 2009 in terms of subscriptions (EC, 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A Digital Agenda for Europe, 2000). 
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Table 4.3 Global presence of MNOs and their respective numbers of subscribers (as of 
31/12/2005) 
Network 
operator 
Origin of 
company 
Number of 
subscribers 
(thousands) 
Global presence 
(no. of 
countries) 
Per cent of 
foreign 
subscribers 
Vodafone UK 179,316 32 90.9% 
America Movil Mexico 92,635 14 61.2% 
Deutsche 
Telekom Germany 85,428 14 65.6% 
France Telecom France 71,946 27 68.6% 
Telefonica Spain 71,273 25 74.2% 
Mobile 
TeleSystems Russia 59,014 6 25.1% 
Sprint Nextel US 44,780 7 1.5% 
Telenor Norway 42,599 15 93.6% 
Verizon Comms US 37,203 5 24.1% 
NTT-Docomo Japan 33,975 7 13.9% 
Singapore 
Telecom Singapore 30,698 7 94.7% 
Source: Curwen & Whalley (2006) 
 
Economies of scale were realised mainly through co-sourcing handsets and mobile 
telecommunication equipment and sharing mobile service platforms. In particular, 
European MNOs – who for lack of scale had not been able to order customised handsets 
(Haas et al. 2006) – could guarantee enough volume for handset manufacturers. 
Therefore, globalisation of MNOs through M&As gave these operators greater 
bargaining power over handset manufacturers than previously61; however, it also 
presented an opportunity for handset manufacturers who were willing to engage in 
customisations. Contracts with these global MNOs for a new mobile service allowed 
handset manufacturers to easily attain economies of scale mainly due to the global scale 
                                           
61 Businessweek, ‘Can Nokia get the wow back?’, http://www.businessweek.com/printer/articles/184300-
can-nokia-get-the-wow-back?type=old_article, accessed 15/01/2015. 
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and sharing of data platforms instead of serving multiple MNOs across borders at a 
lesser scale and with various data platforms. Therefore, the influence of MNOs in the 
market has increased through the process of globalisation. 
 
Distribution channels: open market vs closed (operator) market 
The mobile handset market can be divided into two different types of market according 
to who is a final distributor to handset customers: open market and closed market (or 
operator market).  
 
An open market is where handset manufacturers sell their own handsets directly to 
customers through their own distribution channels or professional distributors (non-
network operators) such as Carphone Warehouse. In this market, handsets are 
compatible with any networks utilising the same standards. These handsets are 
sometimes called ‘unlocked phones’. They include manufacturers’ own standard 
platforms without supporting operator-specific services. Therefore, this type of handset 
is generally low-end and cheap with standardised functions.  
 
A closed market (or operator market) is where MNOs are the main distributors; here, 
new mobile handsets are generally introduced in association with new services provided 
by network operators. Handsets sold through closed market channels generally include 
platforms to accommodate specialised services created by MNOs. They tend to be high-
end products with brand-new functions and are therefore expensive. These handsets are 
marketed with subsidies from network operators or sometimes together with handset 
manufacturers, provided that customers accept long-term contracts, as explained above. 
In a closed market, collaboration between handset manufacturers and MNOs is crucial. 
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As noted in Section 4.3.2, MNOs are closely engaged in the development process of a 
new handset from initial (product specifications) through to final stages. The main 
functionalities of a new handset are heavily influenced by MNOs who also strictly 
control the development schedule by their own release schedule for these new products.  
 
The proportion of an operator market vs an open market varies significantly across the 
world. As shown in Table 4.4, the European market has had a higher ratio of pre-paid 
subscription ratios compared to countries like Japan, Korea and the US. A high 
proportion of pre-paid subscribers generally means the dominance of open market. The 
proportion of an operator market around the world is approximately 50% in Western 
Europe, 98% in Latin America, 96% in the US, and close to 100% in South Korea and 
Japan (2007 data); in contrast, it is only 5% in emerging markets excluding Latin 
American countries (Jo & Mun 2007). In the next subsection, the main reasons behind 
the discrepancies between the EU, Japan, Korea and the US are examined. 
 
Table 4.4 Mobile pre-paid subscription ratios among major OECD countries (in %) 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
France 35 47 49 44 39 37 35 33 32 
Germany 24 55 56 53 51 42 51 47 55 
Italy 84 88 90 90 91 91 92 90 89 
Japan 3 2 - 3 3 3 3 2 2 
Korea - - - 2 2 1 2 1 2 
Spain 62 66 65 66 58 52 49 56 54 
UK 50 77 70 69 67 67 66 65 64 
US 5 6 9 8 7 8 11 15 17 
OECD 26 37 41 41 41 40 42 43 44 
Source: OECD Communications Outlook (2009, p.135). 
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The origin of discrepancies in the distribution channels across countries 
When the GSM standard was commercialised in Europe as a single 2G standard, the 
standard setting and the development of the GSM were promoted mainly by companies 
like Nokia and Ericsson. They manufactured both network equipment for network 
operators and handsets for end-users in the course of the GSM commercialisation. 
Therefore, the European telecommunication market was driven by manufacturers rather 
than MNOs (Tee & Gawer 2009). As a result, the business scope for these 
manufacturers covered entire European countries, while most of the European MNOs 
stayed as local players. At the time, handset functions were oriented towards voice calls 
and simple text messaging services. It made it hard for MNOs to differentiate 
themselves, unlike handset manufacturers. The situation was intensified as 
manufacturers like Nokia and Ericsson grew into global market players based on the 
success in the European GSM market. In particular, Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) 
cards used in GSM handsets allowed customers an easy shift between MNOs62. 
Therefore, under a single 2G standard of GSM in the whole European continent, 
handset manufacturers enjoyed strong bargaining power over local MNOs. During the 
interview, a former marketing manager at an European MNO mentioned: 
 
During Nokia’s heyday, no MNOs could engrave their brand in Nokia's handset. 
Not a single character was allowed. Contracts with Nokia, without exceptions, 
were made solely under the Nokia’s terms. 
  
The advantage of global handset manufacturers continued till the emergence of global 
MNOs such as Vodafone and T-Mobile through continuous M&As across borders and 
the ensuing launch of global wireless data services (Haas 2006).  
                                           
62 Interview with a manager in a Korean MNO. 
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In contrast, the markets in Japan, the US and Korea are typically operator-dominated, 
where the operators control more than 90% of handset distribution (Jo & Mun 2007). 
However, the reasons for operator domination of the market differ across these countries.  
 
Japan has been one of the most operator-dominant countries in the world (Tee & Gawer 
2009). This mainly comes from the fact that in the emergence of the 2G era, NTT-
Docomo took the leading role in the development of PDC (the first national 2G standard) 
with the collaboration of handset manufacturers (Haas et al. 2006). Therefore, technical 
specifications in the mobile communication systems were ruled by NTT-Docomo. In 
order to source handsets, MNOs designate specifications of new handsets and share the 
development costs with handset manufacturers in Japan. If handset manufacturers 
deliver developed handsets, MNOs purchase at wholesale cost new handsets from 
manufacturers and market them with their service. Printed in a single Roman alphabet 
character in a model number, the brand of handset manufacturers has been shadowed by 
those of MNOs. This arrangement was very similar to a form of ODM contract. In 
addition to subsidies from MNOs, three dominant MNOs had strong bargaining power 
against more than ten local handset manufacturers (Haas et al. 2006; Tee & Gawer 
2009). 
 
In Korea, on the other hand, the nature of CDMA technologies and the government’s 
policies mattered. Given that CDMA handsets do not use a SIM card and are locked to 
one specific MNO (due to subsidies provided by the MNOs), customers cannot switch 
from one MNO to another, like GSM, by just purchasing and inserting a new SIM card 
(Husso 2011). The Korean government acknowledged CDMA as a single national 2G 
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standard in 1993 as a way to support the successful commercialisation of the joint 
CDMA development project between Qualcomm and ETRI (see details in Chapter 5). 
When the CDMA network system was commercialised in 1996, the Korean government 
also issued the licence for sales to MNOs so that they could establish operator shops and 
sell handsets directly to customers to promote the domestic digital mobile industry. Two 
MNOs sourced handsets at bulk from more than five local and two foreign handset 
manufacturers, thus enjoying stronger bargaining power over manufacturers. In tandem 
with subsidies63 from November 1996, Korean MNOs never lost their bargaining power 
against handset manufacturers.  
 
In the US, there were the intertwined effects of the diversity of national 2G standards 
and the tradition of subsidies over the strong bargaining power of nationwide MNOs. 
Switching MNOs was also cumbersome for US customers for two reasons. First, four 
different national 2G standards – CDMA, GSM, TDMA and integrated Digital 
Enhanced Network (iDEN) – in the US made it difficult for customers to change their 
network providers because of incompatibility. Even though GSM was one of 2G 
standards, most GSM handsets were also locked to a specific MNO in the US. Second, 
US customers were accustomed to buying handsets at lower prices with subsidies based 
on long-term contracts or purchase of bulk minutes with MNOs. These handsets were 
also locked to a specific MNO. Nokia’s chairman Jorma Ollila explained the nature of 
                                           
63 In Korea, the history of subsidies for the purchase of mobile handsets began with advent of the second 
MNO, Shinsegi Telecom. It joined in the market in April 1996 but showed less successful results than its 
main rival (Korean Mobile Telecommunications Corporation), gaining only 77,000 subscribers over the 
first seven months. Facing retreat from the market, Shinsegi Telecom provided subsidies to new 
subscribers from November 1996, which turned out to be a huge success, securing around 130,000 
subscribers over just one month. Korean Mobile Telecommunications Corporation, the dominant operator, 
had no choice but to join in the subsidy race. Marketing based on subsidies among MNOs became more 
fierce from October 1997 when new three Personal Communications Service (PCS) MNOs penetrated the 
market (Cellular Monthly, ‘History of handset subsidies in Korea’,11/2005). 
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US market as ‘It’s not like we have 300 million+ customers in the US. There are four to 
five customers who control access.’ (Steinbock 2010, p.205). Concerning these 
operator-dominant markets, Ollila also commented ‘...MNOs will decide which phones 
are sold, when and at what price. Their brands are strongest than those of 
manufacturers... If you don’t get along with operators, you are out of the market.’ 
(Husso 2011, p.72). 
 
The transition of mobile communication technologies from 2G to 3G and the 
corresponding network services from voice-centric to data-centric generally enlarged 
the role of MNOs in the mobile handset industry and therefore reduced the open market, 
especially around developed countries. Moreover, the globalisation of MNOs as 
explained in the previous subsection further strengthened the bargaining power of 
MNOs, in favour of operator markets in those countries. 
 
4.4 Summary 
The main objective of this chapter has been to provide some basic knowledge about 
how mobile telecommunication technologies and services have evolved and how three 
key actors (handset manufacturers, baseband chip suppliers and MNOs) within the 
industry have set their roles and scopes across the value chain over time. While the 
transition from analogue (1G) to digital (2G) was a gradual process in order to meet 
increased demands, that from 2G to 3G fundamentally has evolved from simple voice-
centric to data-centric. The later transition had a significant impact on the product 
architecture of handsets and the role of MNOs in the industry, leading to the co-
evolution of mobile handsets and data services through close inter-firm relationships.  
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On the upstream side, leading handset manufacturers like Nokia, Motorola and Ericsson 
were all vertically integrated with in-house baseband chips in the early stage of the 
industry. With the emergence of specialised baseband chip suppliers in late 1990s, 
however, the unbundling of baseband chip division from these leading manufacturers 
began to proceed along with modularisation of handset architecture, as presented in 
4.3.2. At the same time, the main role of a mobile handset manufacturer has been 
specialised to hardware design and software integration activities as a system integrator. 
This change of the division of labour on the upstream side can be summarised as 
vertical dis-integration and specialisation. 
  
On the downstream side, two distinctive distribution channels exist: open and closed 
markets. The former is where handset manufacturers sell their handsets through their 
own distribution channels as well as specialised distributors. In the latter, MNOs play an 
important role in the industry as intermediary users. They influence handset designs, 
purchase handsets, bundle their mobile services and distribute these handsets to 
customers exclusively through their own branches. Globalisation of these MNOs has 
further helped to reinforce their bargaining power against handset manufacturers. As a 
result, interactive collaboration between handset manufacturers and MNOs has become 
more prevalent.  
 
Given the evolution within the industry of technology, market and actors, as elucidated 
in this chapter, the thesis now moves to three empirical chapters in order to investigate 
how Korean handset manufacturers achieved the transition from being latecomers to 
reaching the world frontier of their industry.   
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5. JOINT CDMA DEVELOPMENT BETWEEN QUALCOMM AND 
ETRI64 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter addresses how Korean handset manufacturers accumulated (or acquired) 
technological capabilities to compete head on against global leaders in the industry. The 
conventional conjecture regarding the situation facing emergent leading firms is that, to 
the extent that they seek technological leadership (i.e. being at ‘the top tier of the 
game’), they will be considered as potential competitors by previous technology 
licensors who may discontinue licences (Chu 2009; Hobday et al. 2004; Kuo 2009). The 
outcome of this logic is that the emergent leading firms are forced to rely solely on in-
house development. Others, however, have argued that the more common situation will 
be the existence of continuing opportunities for technology licensing due to competition 
among global frontier firms, new market entries by venture companies and firms from 
adjacent industries (Kim 1997a; Soete 1985; Song & Song 2010; Steinmueller 2001). In 
this chapter, we consider this issue with the case of the Korean government’s ‘Digital 
Mobile Telecommunication Development Project’ 65 implemented by ETRI as the 
‘Joint Development Project’ in tandem with Qualcomm (the pioneer66 of CDMA 
technologies).  
 
                                           
64 This chapter is mainly based on ETRI final reports (1992–1996), Lee (2009) and Song (1999). 
65 This project has been shown as a successful example of a developing state’s active intervention in its 
early technology development and industrial and market creation. The author acknowledges the 
importance of the role of the Korean government for the success of the project. As this issue has been 
extensively studied so far (Ahn & Mah 2007; Kim 2001; Lee & Lim 2001; Song 1999), this chapter will 
focus on the issue of windows of opportunity. 
66 Qualcomm should not be called an inventor of CDMA technologies as the concept had been known 
since 1935. 
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The chapter is composed as follows. Section 5.1 describes in detail the challenges that 
the Korean government faced in the course of providing its AMPS network to the public, 
and the reasons for pursuing the development of a digital mobile communications 
system. Section 5.2 explains the factors behind the change of strategy from in-house to 
joint development (with technology licensing), the options that were available to the 
Korean government, and how the government’s efforts to license US-TDMA were 
blocked. Section 5.3 looks at how Qualcomm agreed to a joint project with ETRI, and 
Section 5.4 traces the chronological progress of the Joint Development Project between 
Qualcomm on the one hand, and ETRI and four Korean designated manufacturers on 
the other. In Section 5.5, the results of the project are presented in terms of the division 
of labour between Qualcomm and its Korean counterparts during the project and the 
knowledge boundaries thereof after the project. Section 5.6 examines the likelihood of 
emergent leading firms that acquire technology licence of getting to ‘the top of their 
game’, and – as a conclusion for this chapter – the role of technology licensing is 
discussed in the transition of emergent leading firms into technology leaders, in 
comparison with the more conventional views that are expressed in the literature on the 
catching-up process. 
 
5.2 Pursuit of the development of a digital mobile communications system by 
the Korean government 
The history of commercial mobile telecommunication services in Korea commenced 
with the AMPS analogue cellular service for the Seoul Metropolitan area in 1984. 
Between then and 1992, the number of subscribers of the service dramatically increased 
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at an average annual growth rate of 60% (see Table 5.1). In the early years, there was a 
surge in demand for the service leading up to the Seoul Olympics in 1988. From 1987 
to1992, the number of new subscribers in the analogue mobile telecommunication 
service roughly doubled each year. Due to the rapid increase in demand, the quality of 
voice calls in the Metropolitan area became noticeably worse, and it was anticipated that 
the capacity of analogue mobile telecommunication services in Korea would not be able 
to serve the demands from 1996 onwards67; from the Korean government’s perspective, 
this represented a looming crisis.  
 
Table 5.1 Number and annual growth rate of new subscribers in the Korean mobile 
telecommunication service 
Year Subscribers* Growth rate 
1984 2,658 76.3% 
1985 4,685 51.4% 
1986 7,093 44.7% 
1987 10,265 98.3% 
1988 20,353 98% 
1989 39,718 95% 
1990 80,005 101% 
1991 166,198 107% 
1992 271,868 64% 
*All subscriber numbers represent AMPS subscribers. There was no digital service until January 1996.  
Source: modified by the author based on Song (1999, p.66 & p.79). 
 
The other concern for the Korean government was a huge trade deficit in the industry. 
At the commencement of the analogue mobile service in 1984, Korean Mobile 
                                           
67 In order to cope with the increase of 960,000 new subscribers over the previous five years, Korean 
Mobile Telecommunications Corporation (which became SK Telecom in 1993) had to order 
telecommunication equipment worth $100 million from AT&T, in August 1995, only four months before 
the commencement of the digital mobile telecommunication service (Businessweek, ‘Seoul Finally Dials 
Competition’s Number’, 01/10/1995). 
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Telecommunications Corporation adopted Motorola’s network equipment with its 
mobile telephone exchanges. In addition, all mobile handsets were imported from Japan 
(Toshiba, NEC), US (Motorola, E.F. Johnson) and Canada (Novatel). Without adequate 
knowledge of mobile telecommunication technologies, Korean Mobile 
Telecommunications Corporation had to rely on foreign suppliers, even for minuscule 
network problems. It had no bargaining power68 against foreign sellers to keep prices 
down or to transfer technology. Without domestic products in the mobile 
telecommunication market, high demand for the service directly meant a high trade 
deficit on network equipment and mobile handsets. Throughout the modern 
development of the Korean economy, the government has used trade deficits as an 
indicative planning tool for areas needing domestic development (Kim 2000). 
  
To make matters worse, from January 1987, the US government began to call for the 
opening up of the Korean telecommunication market (Amsden 1989), which included 
the telecommunication service and telecommunication equipment markets, and removal 
and/or lowering of tariff barriers. There were numerous indirect attempts by the US to 
pressurise Korea into opening its market, including the designation of Korea as a 
priority foreign country for trade diplomacy. Eventually in 1991, the two counterparts 
agreed that the Korean telecommunication equipment market would be liberalised from 
1993 (Lee 2009).  
                                           
68 All that Korean Mobile Telecommunications Corporation could do was to change the bidding system. 
In November 1988, two executives of the company travelled to Motorola to ask for greater capacity of 
exchange, more base stations and extra maintenance resources and technology transfer on equipment 
production. The CEO of Motorola, however, refused to accept the terms based on Motorola’s relationship 
with the Blue House (Lee 2009). Korean Mobile Telecommunications Corporation changed the bidding 
system for a contract to a designated open bid for the subsequent purchase of analogue 
telecommunication equipment. The three foreign companies of Motorola, AT&T (later Lucent) and 
Ericsson were allowed the opportunity to bid, and AT&T took over the position of a monopolistic supplier. 
However, the price did not go down as much as expected (ibid.). 
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Three factors – the fast saturation of the analogue mobile network, a corresponding high 
trade deficit, and the added pressure on trade due to the opening of the market – drove 
the Korean government towards the launch of immediate and drastic policies on mobile 
telecommunication technologies. Firstly, the Korean government swiftly implemented 
policies on privatisation and competition into the previously monopolised industry in 
1988. Secondly, the Ministry of Information and Telecommunication delegated to its 
nationally funded institute, ETRI, an ambitious nationally sponsored R&D project on 
digital mobile communication technologies, the ‘Digital Telecommunication System 
Development Project’ in January 199069. The scope of the project was to develop a 
complete system of digital mobile telecommunications including a mobile handset, a 
base station and a mobile exchange, and to provide a full commercial service by 1997. 
The length of the project was to be seven years from 1990 to 1996 with 411 man-years 
and a budget of about $60 million.  
 
5.3 Failed efforts on technology licensing 
When the Korean government announced the Digital Telecommunication System 
Development Project in January 1990, the plan was for ETRI to develop an in-house 
system based on US-TDMA technologies. However, it did not take long for the 
researchers in ETRI to realise that it was impossible to implement the project without 
proper knowledge of digital mobile communication technologies (Lee 2009). ETRI 
                                           
69 The decision of the Korean government to launch such an ambitious project mainly came from the 
success of the telephone digital exchanges R&D project. Its goal was to develop in-house and 
commercialise a Korean digital electronic telephone switching system, substituting imports with domestic 
goods. It was carried out successfully from 1977 to 1991 by ETRI with the support of four private 
companies (Samsung, LG, Daewoo, Dongyang). This import substitution effort proved to be successful 
with the domestic product share of the digital switching market and became the template for the digital 
mobile communication system development project (Song 1999). 
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surrendered its original in-house development strategy and decided to undertake a joint 
R&D project with a foreign manufacturer. There were three different kinds of digital 
mobile telecommunication technologies by the time ETRI changed its strategy. The first 
technology was GSM which was ready to be commercialised in Europe, and which had 
been mainly developed by European companies such as Nokia and Ericsson; the second 
was US-TDMA, which was very close to the commercialisation stage70, mainly through 
the efforts of US companies like AT&T (later Lucent), Northern Telecom and Motorola; 
and the third was CDMA pioneered by Qualcomm, which at the time was merely a 
small US venture company, and had not yet demonstrated its serviceability on a 
commercial scale. 
 
Initially, CDMA was not considered by ETRI engineers to be a candidate for licensing; 
they did not know of the existence of CDMA at the time, an indication of the limited 
knowledge of Korean engineers on the latest trends in digital mobile telecommunication 
technologies (Ibid.)71. In case of GSM technologies that were about to become 
commercialised in the European market, many stakeholders like Nokia, Ericsson, 
Siemens and Alcatel had contributed towards them. Therefore, GSM was not 
appropriate for ETRI’s plan for technology licensing since the Korean side would have 
had to make multiple licensing contracts with these foreign companies. With no 
alternatives left, and given the inclination of the Korean trade market towards the US, 
ETRI and the Korean government agreed to pursue the US-TDMA technology as the 
country’s 2G standard.  
 
                                           
70 US-TDMA had already been announced as a digital standard in the US in 1989. 
71 The remaining details on the Joint Development Agreement with Qualcomm in section 5.3 and 5.4 are 
mainly retrieved from Lee (2009) unless specified otherwise. 
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At the time, there were three candidates that could have been the designated technology 
licensor of US-TDMA in the US: AT&T (which later became Lucent), Motorola and 
Northern Telecom. Both AT&T and Northern Telecom instantly declined the request 
from ETRI for technology licensing (Song 1999). ETRI had anticipated such responses 
as it did not have adequate technologies to leverage for a technology licence from these 
two companies. It may be significant that both AT&T and Northern Telecom produced 
digital switches, the technology which ETRI had developed from the national 
telecommunication digital exchange R&D project which resulted in a loss of market 
share by these companies. ETRI expected a better chance with Motorola as a possible 
licensor as it did not produce digital switches (Ibid.). ETRI assumed that some exchange 
of mobile technology for digital switching capabilities could be arranged. In November 
1990, engineers from ETRI visited the Motorola headquarters to request a joint 
development project for US-TDMA. However, Motorola’s conditions were 
unacceptable to ETRI, given that it had provided Korea with early AMPS network 
equipment and dominated the Korean market for the analogue mobile handsets to the 
extent of having had more than 50% of the market share. Motorola demanded that the 
Korean government should guarantee its company a certain portion of the Korean 
domestic market in return for technology licensing, to ensure that the successful 
completion of the project would benefit itself. Moreover, it also demanded that Korean 
manufacturers would have to get permission from Motorola whenever they exported 
developed products overseas. For the Koreans, these conditions were not compatible 
with the main purpose of technology licensing, i.e. substituting domestic production for 
imports and exporting Korean products (Lee 2009).  
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5.4 Qualcomm’s offer of joint development 
Having failed to reach agreement with Motorola, the ETRI engineers that had contacted 
Motorola came across the existence of CDMA technologies by accident through a 
former ETRI engineer, who at the time worked for a US venture company in New York 
(Ibid.). At the same time, the CEO of Pactel72 Korea, Park Heon Seo, who knew that 
Pactel had invested in Qualcomm’s CDMA technologies, visited ETRI and 
recommended that they consider the potential of CDMA technologies. Within days, 
William Lee, the vice president of Pactel, visited the Institute with Allen Salmasi, a vice 
president of Qualcomm, and gave a seminar on the trends of digital mobile 
telecommunication technologies in ETRI, and it was Allen Salmasi who first proposed a 
joint CDMA development project at a subsequent meeting with the president of ETRI 
(Ibid.).  
 
Why did Qualcomm intend to allow technology licensing with a Korean counterpart? 
This requires some insight into the context of the US digital mobile communication 
market at the time. Qualcomm was a small venture company running OmniTRACS – a 
satellite-locating and messaging service for long-haul trucks – and serving digital radio 
communications projects for the Department of Defense in the US. In the early 1990s, it 
was trying to apply CDMA technologies, originally developed for military purposes, to 
the field of civilian mobile telecommunications. When Qualcomm visited ETRI, US-
TDMA had already become the first US 2G standard in 1989, and was expected to be 
commercialised with the support of large groups of network operators and network 
                                           
72 Pactel (Pacific Telesis) was one of seven so-called ‘baby Bells’ originating from Bell System around 
San Francisco area. 
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equipment companies. On the other hand, Qualcomm was seeking capital investment 
for the verification of CDMA’s commercial potential in order for CDMA to be approved 
as another 2G standard by the US Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association. 
Therefore, it had the incentive to pursue the technology transfer of CDMA technologies 
from manufacturers of network equipment and mobile handsets to as many network 
operators as possible (i.e. not only to ETRI) in order to push CDMA as a global digital 
mobile telecommunication technology. 
 
In the absence of an alternative, ETRI finally decided to pursue a joint project with 
Qualcomm for the commercialisation of CDMA technologies and signed a 
memorandum of understanding (MOU) with Qualcomm in January 1991 (Song 1999). 
On 6 May 1991, after four months of in-depth negotiations to finalise the MOU, 
Qualcomm and ETRI signed the Joint Development Agreement which consisted of two 
forms: the first was the Joint Development Agreement between Qualcomm and ETRI, 
and the second was the Licence Agreement between Qualcomm and designated 
manufacturers. Designated manufacturers were private companies that would produce 
commercial network equipment and mobile handsets under Qualcomm’s licence. 
Therefore, the project’s final goal was the full-scale commercial service provision of a 
digital mobile telecommunication system.  
 
The original plan of the project was to be executed in three steps. Firstly, ETRI would 
study CDMA technologies with the help of Qualcomm. Secondly, ETRI and Qualcomm 
were to jointly design and develop a CDMA system and its sub-modules. Lastly, 
Qualcomm and ETRI would hand over the results of their co-development to designated 
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manufacturers who would in turn deliver commercial-level products to MNOs. 
Qualcomm was also supposed to provide technical support to these manufacturers 
during the commercialisation process. Table 5.2 presents the timetable, licensing fees 
paid to Qualcomm and the goal for each phase of the joint development.  
 
Table 5.2 Original timetable, fee, and goal for each phase of the Joint Development Project 
Phase Period Fee Goal 
Phase I 5 months $1.9 M Understanding CDMA technologies 
Phase II 9 months $10 M High-level design of a CDMA system 
Phase III 5 months $5.05 M Low-level design of a CDMA system 
Phase IV-1 
19 months 
To be renegotiated Pre-production support 
Phase IV-2 To be renegotiated Field tests and full-scale commercialisation 
Total 38 months $16.95 M  
Source: modified by the author based on Song (1999) and corroborated by ETRI (1992–1996). 
 
By the time Qualcomm and ETRI had signed the Joint Development Agreement in 1991, 
there was still intense dispute among industry experts and government officials over the 
likelihood of CDMA commercialisation (Song 1999). Therefore, ETRI proposed a 
stepwise project whereby they would move to a new phase only if the previous phase 
had been carried out successfully. Such an approach would enable ETRI to lessen the 
risk of the joint project and would also appease those who were pessimistic about the 
future of CDMA technologies (Lee 2009). The Joint Development Project comprised 
four phases. Given that ETRI did not possess basic knowledge on wireless technologies, 
Phase I was intended to provide its staff with the opportunity to understand the 
fundamentals of CDMA technologies by working with Qualcomm. Phase II was to be 
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targeted at the high-level design of a CDMA system, including a mobile telephone 
exchange (later to become a mobile switching centre), base station controller, base 
transceiver station, and mobile station by installing a roving test system developed by 
Qualcomm in ETRI. Phase III was to comprise the low-level design of a CDMA system, 
and Phase IV was intended to provide pre-production support (including support of field 
tests and full-scale commercialisation). 
 
5.5 The progress of the Joint Development Project73 
Like most projects, the Joint Development Project did not proceed as planned. In this 
section, we present a detailed description of what has been learned and accomplished 
over the course of the joint project, mainly from a Korean perspective, and what was 
changed against the original plan and why.  
 
Phase I lasted for five months from September 1991 to January 1992. The goal of the 
phase was for the Korean engineers to understand the fundamentals of CDMA 
technologies with the support of Qualcomm. 
 
During the period, five researchers from ETRI were sent to Qualcomm in San Diego, 
US, and given the opportunity to study CDMA system technologies through secondary 
documents, seminars, and by participation in CDMA system tests carried out by 
Qualcomm. As planned, this phase enabled ETRI researchers to understand and absorb 
knowledge on the fundamentals of CDMA technologies. However, as a preliminary 
                                           
73 This section was mainly based on ETRI reports (1992–1996), which were submitted at the end of each 
year to the Korean government. 
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R&D step, this phase did not result in much tangible outcome for ETRI (1993). 
 
While Phase I was nearing its end, the negotiations for Phase II had begun (in January 
1992) and the main concern in the joint venture was the amount of royalty that 
designated manufacturers had to pay to Qualcomm for the licence of CDMA products. 
After intense negotiations, both sides agreed on a royalty in April 1992 and moved into 
Phase II (Lee 2009).  
 
Phase II began in August 1992 and lasted for 15 months (originally nine months had 
been expected), until November 1993. The main objectives of this phase included the 
installation of Qualcomm’s roving test system in Korea and its field tests, i.e. the high-
level design of a CDMA system and selection of designated manufacturers.  
 
Qualcomm handed over the roving test system to ETRI in December 1992, which was 
installed in Daejeon (where ETRI was situated) and in Seoul for field tests. The roving 
test system produced by Qualcomm was a prototype machine system with digital 
switches, base stations, base station controller, and a mobile handset within a rack 
enabling CDMA mobile communications with minimum size and functions, in order to 
showcase the potential for commercialisation of CDMA technologies. Although 
minimal, it demonstrated the essence and revealed the scope of Qualcomm’s cutting-
edge CDMA technologies. In addition, ETRI engineers could accelerate their 
assimilation of knowledge on CDMA technologies by reverse engineering and field 
tests with the roving test system. In March 1993, based on the design of Qualcomm’s 
roving test system, ETRI produced its own prototype of a CDMA network system 
named ‘Korea Cellular System-1’.  
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When the recruitment of designated manufacturers was announced, six companies 
submitted applications in September 1992: Samsung, LG, Daewoo, Dongyang, Hyundai 
and Maxon74. During the negotiations, however, Daewoo and Dongyang withdrew due 
to the scale of royalties and R&D investment (Song 1999). In January 1993, the Korean 
government announced that Samsung, LG, Hyundai and Maxon were to be the 
designated manufacturers of the project and assigned the first three companies to 
collectively take on the role of network equipment developer and all four companies to 
take on the role of mobile handset developer75. As project coordinator, ETRI assigned to 
these designated manufacturers research areas according to subsystems, and facilitated 
sharing of research results among them, as shown in Table 5.3; 30 personnel from each 
designated manufacturer were dispatched to ETRI for collaborative design work from 
April 1993. 
 
Table 5.3 Division of labour amongst Korea’s designated manufacturers 
Subsystem Company participants 
Mobile station (mobile handset) Samsung, LG, Hyundai, Maxon 
Base transceiver subsystem LG, Hyundai 
Base station controller Samsung, Hyundai 
Mobile eXchange Samsung, LG 
Subscriber location registry Samsung, Hyundai 
Source: Song (1999, p.123). 
                                           
74 The first four companies were all main participants in the former telecom digital exchange R&D 
project organised by ETRI. Maxon was a specialised wireless telephone company, but Hyundai, the 
second biggest conglomerate in Korea, had not been involved in the telecommunications industry before 
and regarded the project as a good opportunity to extend its activities into this new field. 
75 From the beginning, the Korean government targeted only the domestic market for network equipment 
but both domestic and foreign markets for mobile handsets. Assuming that there would be very little 
opportunity in the export market for network equipment and considering the size of the Korean domestic 
market, the government judged that three manufacturers would be adequate (Song 1999). 
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In addition, a total of 20 researchers from ETRI and the four designated manufacturers 
were sent to Qualcomm to agree on the fundamental structure of a CDMA digital 
mobile communications system. According to the Joint Development Agreement, 
Qualcomm and ETRI were supposed to jointly design a CDMA network system based 
on Qualcomm’s roving test system and develop other sub-modules (Lee 2009). 
However, they disagreed on the technologies for a CDMA mobile exchange (Song 
1999). In the end, both sides agreed to follow their own designs while sharing 
information on some identical subsystems that could be utilised for both designs. 
 
Korean designated manufacturers were also dissatisfied with ETRI’s design of the 
Korean Cellular System-1 based on Qualcomm’s roving test system (Song 1999). Based 
on their previous experience with commercialising digital switches, these companies 
recognised that the Korean Cellular System-1 was inappropriate for commercialisation 
in terms of manufacturability and economic feasibility (Lee 2009). From August 1993, 
ETRI began to develop its new CDMA system, called ‘CDMA Mobile System-2’, 
reflecting all the requirements of manufacturability at a commercial level provided by 
designated manufacturers.  
 
Phase III lasted for 12 months from February 1994 to February 1995 and aimed to 
accomplish the low-level design of a CDMA network and a mobile handset prior to a 
pre-production stage.  
 
During this phase, the first air call was successfully made on 30 April 1994 through 
CDMA Mobile System-2, and the modifications and improvements to the system were 
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successfully completed in November 1994 (Song 1999). While ETRI was responsible 
for completing its development of CDMA Mobile System-2, Qualcomm successfully 
developed the CDMA interface subsystem76 and selector bank subsystem77 of the base 
transceiver station and base station controller and handed over documents on hardware 
and software design of these subsystems between April and August 1994.  
 
The other important events were ‘Programme Review Meetings’ that were held every 
two months between ETRI and Qualcomm with regard to the progress of Qualcomm’s 
development of ASICs for a mobile handset and a base station. If Qualcomm’s ASICs 
were to change, the software and design of a mobile handset and base station would 
have to change accordingly. As the commercialisation of a CDMA mobile 
communication network came close to becoming a reality, the development of 
Qualcomm’s ASICs was of prime importance. Around this time Qualcomm was the only 
developer of CDMA ASICs78 and it continued to improve its ASICs for a mobile 
handset and base station. ETRI’s reliance on Qualcomm for the design of a CDMA 
handset was such that the deputy minister of the Ministry of Information and 
Communications asked the project leader to visit Qualcomm’s headquarters in San 
Diego every two weeks in February 1994, which subsequently became every four weeks 
from March onwards when Qualcomm itself began to send engineers to Korea (Lee 
2009).  
 
                                           
76 The CDMA interface subsystem is a subsystem that routes traffic and control signals among base 
transceiver stations and subsystems in a base station controller. 
77 A selector bank subsystem is a subsystem in a CDMA base station controller that processes calls and 
transmits/receives voice data to/from a mobile switching centre.  
78 Samsung managed to develop ASICs for baseband chips in August 1996 (Yonhapnews, ‘Samsung 
developing chips for mobile equipment’, 23/08/1996). 
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the operator79 to launch a ‘project management group’ within the company in order that 
technical experts could supervise and speed up progress of the project. The group first 
transformed the project structure from co-development by the four designated 
manufacturers with ETRI leading them, to competitive development among the 
designated manufacturers supported by ETRI. In addition, as the only national MNO at 
the time, Korean Mobile Telecommunications Corporation set the service provider 
requirements of more than 1,000 items for a commercial certification test in July 1994, 
and this helped the designated manufacturers to set clear R&D goals for a commercial 
product. Furthermore, Korean Mobile Telecommunications Corporation spurred on the 
competition among the designated manufacturers by declaring that it would procure 
network equipment only from the first designated manufacturer that passed the 
certification test. 
 
Phase IV (optional) was originally composed of two sub-phases, including nine months 
of Phase IV-1 and ten months of Phase IV-2. Phase IV-1 was aimed at pre-production 
network development and manufacturing, and Phase IV-2 was targeted at carrying out 
field tests and full-scale commercialisation support of developed products. However, 
Phase IV was cancelled in its entirety when ETRI did not feel the necessity of 
Qualcomm’s support after the successful development and subsequent modifications of 
CDMA Mobile System-2.  
 
5.6 Outcomes of the Joint Development Project 
In January 1996, the project had succeeded not only in terms of the resulting 
                                           
79 The operator was the wholly state-owned subsidiary of the monopoly phone company Korea Telecom, 
and the source of funding for the project. 
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commercial service but also as it had led to the creation of the world’s first commercial 
service of a CDMA system.  
 
Here, the importance of the policies implemented by the Korean government cannot be 
underestimated. The ‘digital mobile communication system development project’ of the 
government, including its joint project with Qualcomm was a very substantial national 
level R&D project that was unprecedented in the history of Korea’s R&D. It lasted for 
eight years – from 1989 to 1996 – and the budget amounted to more than $125 million 
and represented 1,042 man-years of investment (ETRI 1996). Moreover, the total 
investment of both public and private sectors reached $275 million. Given that the 
telecom digital exchange R&D project was in only half its size in terms of budget 
(being only $75 million), the CDMA commercialisation project implemented by the 
Korean government was on an extremely large scale (Lee 2009).  
 
In addition to the launch of this unprecedented project, the Korean government also 
ensured CDMA technologies were commercially viable by designating CDMA as a 
single standard both for cellular network services (800 MHz) and the PCS network (1.8 
GHz), as shown in Table 5.4. In tandem with the early launch of CDMA network 
services, the project created an early market for CDMA products and protected CDMA 
technologies from competition against US-TDMA and GSM, both of which had been 
already on the market (Ahn & Mah 2007; Kim 2001).  
 
Table 5.4 summarises the important events that occurred during the joint CDMA 
development project between 1989 and 1996.  
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Table 5.4 Chronological summary of main events during the Joint Development Project 
Year.Month R&D-related events Policy-related events 
89.1  
 Digital mobile 
communications system 
development project launched 
91.5  JDA between ETRI and 
Qualcomm  
92.12  RTS installed in ETRI  
93.1  Designated Manufacturers 
appointed  
93.7   CDMA approved as a 2G standard by the US CTIA 
93.11  
 CDMA designated as a single 
2G cellular (800 MHz) 
national standard by MIC 
93.12   GSM project launched by MOCIE 
93.9  Project Management Group 
launched in KMT  
94.1  SPRs announced by KMT  
94.7 
 First CDMA handset (car-
phone type, 40 sets) by 
Samsung 
 
94.6  CMS-2 design finished 
 KMT stocks sold to SK 
Telecom 
 Shinsegi Telecom acquired the 
cellular network licence 
95.2  CMS-2 commercial-level 
tests completed  
95.10  
 CDMA designated as a single 
standard for PCS (1.8 GHz) 2G 
by MIC 
96.1  Commercial CDMA 
service by SK Telecom  
96.4  Commercial CDMA 
service by Shinsegi 
Telecom 
 
JDA, Joint Development Agreement; RTS, Roving Test System; CTIA, Cellular Telecommunication 
Industry Association; MIC, Ministry of Information and Communication; MOCIE, Ministry of 
Commerce, Industry and Energy; KMT, Korean Mobile Telecommunications Corporation; SPRs, Service 
Provider Requirements; CMS, CDMA Mobile System. 
Source: modified by author based on Song (1999, p.121).  
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At the beginning of the project, Qualcomm only possessed laboratory-scale knowledge 
on mobile handset baseband chips, mobile handsets, base stations and mobile switching 
centres, that demonstrated the potential of CDMA technologies. On the other hand, the 
capacity of Qualcomm’s Korean counterparts was limited to the production of telephony 
switching centres (digital switches in wired telecommunication). By the time CDMA 
technologies were commercialised in Korea, both Qualcomm and the Korean 
manufacturers had significantly expanded the boundaries of their knowledge of CDMA 
systems, as shown in Table 5.5. Qualcomm successfully improved its capacity from 
laboratory-scale to a commercial level, producing baseband chips, mobile handsets and 
base stations80. Meanwhile, although its Korean counterparts had also successfully 
acquired the capacity to produce mobile switching centres, base stations and mobile 
handsets, they relied on Qualcomm for a baseband chip (which defined the core of 
Qualcomm’s capabilities). Table 5.5 denotes the dynamics of knowledge boundaries of 
Qualcomm and its Korean counterparts in the course of the joint project. 
 
Table 5.5 Change of knowledge boundaries in Qualcomm and its Korean counterparts 
Phase 
Mobile 
station 
baseband 
Mobile 
handset 
Base station 
Mobile 
switching 
centre 
Telephone 
switching 
centre 
Qualcomm 
O 
↓ 
█ 
O 
↓ 
█ 
O 
↓ 
█ 
O 
 
 
 
 
Korean 
counterparts     █ ←    █ ←   █ ← █ 
O, laboratory-scale knowledge; █, commercial-level knowledge; →, expansion of knowledge boundaries. 
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
                                           
80 Qualcomm decided to produce mobile handsets and base stations because none of the leading handset 
producers showed any intention of developing them (Mock 2005). 
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The lack of knowledge on baseband chips in Korean manufacturers was witnessed 
through two episodes. In the first, CDMA handset development by Korean 
manufacturers was hampered by the late delivery of Qualcomm’s second generation 
ASIC chip (MSM 2.0)81. Qualcomm was supposed to deliver MSM 2.0 in November 
1994 but delivery was delayed by more than six months due to fatal errors in the initial 
circuit design. Until MSM 2.0 was finally received (in July 1995), the Korean 
designated manufacturers could do nothing but wait; this meant that they had only six 
months to develop the commercial version of the CDMA handsets instead of the 
original plan of one year82. 
 
In addition, several weeks prior to the launch of commercialised CDMA network 
services scheduled for 1 January 1996, Korean engineers kept experiencing call drops 
during interoperability tests between mobile handsets and the CDMA network. Through 
repeated experiments, they finally identified the reason for the call drops (which 
occurred mainly during hand-offs between analogue and digital networks). As the 
Korean engineers did not have knowledge of the software protocols between a baseband 
chip and a base station, the problem was left entirely to the Qualcomm engineers, who 
immediately flew to Korea to identify its cause. The call drops were due to the 
difference between the US and Korean AMPS networks. Despite the imminent 
Christmas holidays, several engineers from Qualcomm remained in Korea to adjust 
software protocols on the Korean AMPS (analogue) network, in order to meet the 
                                           
81 Unlike the pilot version of MSM 1.0, it was equipped with features of subscriber authentication, low-
power consumption and sleep mode, which enabled smaller and lighter handsets. 
82 Cellular Monthly, ‘Development of CDMA handsets this year looming’, 05/1995. 
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commercialisation timeline.  
 
The second episode occurred in the first half of 1996 when Korea commercialised the 
CDMA network. At this time, not only had LG produced its own handset model (LDP-
200, OBM) but also it had assembled handsets from knocked-down kits of QCP-800 for 
Qualcomm (OEM). LG expected that the QCP-800 it had assembled itself and that 
imported from Qualcomm would display the same quality of voice calls and length of 
battery time. However, it turned out that the handset assembled by LG for Qualcomm 
showed much worse voice-call quality and much shorter battery (standby) time than 
Qualcomm’s handset when tests for certification were run by Korean MNOs. Later on, 
the engineers in LG discovered that Qualcomm – for its own QCP-800 handset – had 
used the latest version of its baseband chip equipped with improved software protocol 
stack but had provided a slightly older version to LG83. This dependence of Korean 
counterparts on Qualcomm’s ASICs capacity never disappeared (Whang 2009). 
 
5.7 Discussion of the Korean technology access experience and the uneven 
expansion of knowledge boundaries 
When ETRI pursued technology transfer from foreign technology leaders, most of the 
latter had no intention of transferring their US-TDMA technologies to Korea, with 
Motorola, Northern Telecom and AT&T turning down offers from Korea, as shown in 
Section 5.3. At the time, these companies were ready to commercialise their new 
technologies in the US digital mobile telecommunication market and achieve large 
                                           
83 Cellular Monthly, ‘Development of CDMA handsets this year looming’, 05/1996. 
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economic returns. They could be confident of dominating the Korean domestic market 
even in the digital era, following their successful monopolisation of the market during 
the analogue era.  
 
Yet, as noted in Section 5.4, it did become possible for Korean firms to access digital 
mobile telecommunication technologies from a foreign source. This opportunity 
emerged from the small US venture company Qualcomm. At the time of the Joint 
Development Project between Qualcomm and ETRI, Qualcomm was at an early stage in 
developing and demonstrating the commercial potential of CDMA technologies. As a 
consequence, Qualcomm still required lengthy and costly R&D investment in the 
commercialisation of CDMA technologies to make them a viable alternative to the 2G 
standard. This laid the foundation for technology transfer between Qualcomm and its 
Korean counterparts.  
 
Therefore, successful technology transfer for Korean handset manufacturers – as studied 
in the thesis – materialised for several reasons. Qualcomm was not a strong incumbent 
in the industry but a new entrant (although originating from the US) building upon its 
initial competences in a related but distinct industry, satellite telecommunications. 
Therefore, it endeavoured to set its CDMA technologies as a 2G standard across 
markets against other incumbents’ 2G standards such as US-TDMA and GSM. 
Qualcomm was a vigorous licensor of its CDMA technologies (Mock 2005) because it 
had an interest in receiving licensing revenues for the technology, and it pursued the 
expansion of a CDMA market. In this regard, the lack of competition for new entrants 
from an adjacent industry increased the potential for entry and offered Korea an 
opportunity to facilitate Qualcomm’s entry to provide a new mobile technology. 
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However, the existence of an opportunity for technology transfer itself should not be 
interpreted as a guarantee of success. First of all, success or failure of this kind of 
technology transfer is heavily influenced by the level of technological capabilities and 
subsequent R&D efforts of a technology licensee (Cohen & Levinthal 1990; Lee et al. 
2005; Odagiri & Goto 1996). In particular, CDMA technologies licensed to Korean 
counterparts were in a nascent stage and not fully developed to a commercial level, as 
emphasised above. They had to be proven and tested in the subsequent commercial 
stage on a number of aspects: technical performance, economic production and 
marketing. This involved not only conventional learning, assimilation and localisation 
of transferred technologies (Bell & Pavitt 1993; Rosenberg 1970), but also a complex 
process of trial and error during field tests for commercialisation set by from a 
technology licensee. The Korean manufacturers could utilise their technical and market 
know-how from their experiences of a similar process during a previous telephony 
digital exchange project (Song 1999)84.  
 
How, then, can the collaborative relationship between Qualcomm and ETRI (and the 
Korean manufacturers) be described during the project? Was it mutual or unilateral?  
 
During Phase II, Korean designated manufacturers were critical of developing a 
commercial product from Qualcomm’s roving test system and with ETRI, decided to 
design their own CDMA system (which later materialised as CDMA Mobile System-2). 
With the successful development of CDMA Mobile System-2, the cancellation of Phase 
IV (Qualcomm’s support in pre-commercialisation and commercialisation) points to the 
                                           
84 From the interview memos, which the author had access to with the interviewee’s permission. 
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extent of knowledge that Qualcomm’s Korean counterparts had acquired on CDMA 
systems by the time. On the other hand, Qualcomm did not produce CDMA mobile 
switching centres from its original roving test system. Based on these facts, Song (1999) 
and Lee (2009) insisted that ETRI was able to acquire the opportunity for the joint 
project with Qualcomm in return for ETRI’s capabilities on digital switches, arguing 
that the relationship was mutual.  
 
However, Qualcomm did not intend to develop a commercial mobile switching centre 
(Yang 1996). In fact, the main efforts of its R&D activities were focused on mobile 
handsets and base stations including ASICs because leading handset manufacturers such 
as Nokia, Ericsson and Motorola were reluctant to develop CDMA handsets (Mock 
2005)85. In addition, Qualcomm would have allowed technology licensing to any 
company, regardless of digital switch capabilities. Motorola and Lucent had already 
licensed Qualcomm’s CDMA technologies before the signing of the agreement with 
ETRI (Funk 2002; Mock 2005). Therefore, it seems that Qualcomm was mainly keen on 
deriving licensing fees from its Korean counterparts. In tandem with Qualcomm’s 
contribution to the commercialisation process presented above, it is likely that the 
collaborative relationship between Qualcomm and the Korean manufacturers was 
unilateral. 
 
In summary, the opportunity in this case for technology transfer of technologies even in 
a nascent stage did arise from competition to achieve a dominant compatibility standard 
among technology leaders. Qualcomm licensed its CDMA technologies to its Korean 
                                           
85 Lucent was developing CDMA network equipment and became the first CDMA network provider to 
the US CDMA MNOs in 1996 (Funk 2002). 
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counterparts in order to promote CDMA markets in the early 1990s. Through this joint 
project, the Korean licensees successfully commercialised a CDMA system by 
expanding their knowledge boundaries in most areas across a CDMA system. Even so, 
the licensees’ reliance on Qualcomm’s knowledge on ASICs-related areas continued 
during the project and after commercialisation.  
 
5.8 Summary 
This chapter has addressed whether or not emergent leading firms in the pursuit of a 
dual frontier are given adequate opportunities to obtain licences for cutting-edge 
technologies from technology frontier firms during an emerging stage and if so, under 
what circumstances. The existing literature related to conventional catching-up concerns 
‘cutting off’ from previous arrangements of OEM/ODM (Hobday et al. 2004; Kuo 
2009). However, the chapter has illustrated that this issue can be reconciled through 
windows of opportunity from the competition to achieve a dominant compatibility 
standard among technology leaders in advanced countries, Korean manufacturers 
themselves have encountered the opportunity to license cutting-edge digital mobile 
telecommunication technologies. The US small venture company Qualcomm offered 
technology licensing of CDMA to its Korean counterparts in order to promote the 
market for CDMA technologies.  
 
As is typical of technology transfer arrangements (Odagiri & Goto 1996), technology 
licensing of CDMA from Qualcomm did not automatically bring commercial success to 
its Korean partners. Qualcomm’s support to Korean engineers to enable them to grasp 
the fundamentals of CDMA technologies (Phase I and II) was crucial at an early stage 
of the joint project. On the other hand, there were also indigenous R&D efforts (Phase 
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III) by the Korean partners that moved nascent CDMA technologies on to a commercial 
level, albeit again with Qualcomm’s support. As a result, Korean manufacturers 
successfully managed to expand their knowledge boundaries across a CDMA system 
from their knowledge on wired digital telecom switches and commercialised the world’s 
first CDMA network in January 1996. Even so, they did not acquire knowledge of 
ASICs in mobile handsets and base stations – as Nokia and Motorola had done – and 
continued to rely on Qualcomm.  
 
In conclusion, the outcome of this chapter supports the argument that there is an 
opportunity available for technology transfer to emergent leading firms in the emerging 
stage of a new industry. At the same time, previous experiences and capacity of 
emergent leading firms also matter in the successful commercialisation of cutting-edge 
but commercially unproven technologies. At the time of commercialisation of the 
CDMA system, however, Korean handset manufacturers underwent uneven 
development in their knowledge boundaries (Dutrénit 2004; Hobday et al. 2004), 
lacking knowledge of a baseband chip, which is a critical component in a mobile 
handset. 
 
In the next chapter, the thesis examines further how Korean handset manufacturers have 
competed against foreign incumbents in the mobile handset market under conditions of 
uneven knowledge boundaries.   
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6. COMPETITION AGAINST FOREIGN MANUFACTURERS: 
FROM THE DOMESTIC TO THE EXPORT MARKET 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The preceding chapter has illustrated how Korean firms acquired the opportunity for 
technology transfer, managed to assimilate laboratory-demonstrated CDMA 
technologies and expanded to a commercial level in collaboration with Qualcomm. The 
previous chapter has also provided an important example of how emergent leading firms 
might seize the opportunity to acquire advanced technologies due to competitive forces 
in other countries, particularly in the emerging stage of an industry.  
 
This chapter presents how Korean handset manufacturers competed against foreign 
incumbents on the basis of the success from the Joint Development Project with 
Qualcomm. Starting from the Korean domestic (CDMA) market, Korean handset 
manufacturers subsequently entered the US CDMA handset market and later expanded 
to other foreign markets. The first part of the chapter focuses on the competition of 
Korean manufacturers in the Korean and US markets. In both markets, MNOs play a 
central and dominant role, as presented in Chapter 4. Despite the similarities at a 
superficial level, the chapter explains chronologically why the Korean manufacturers 
adopted different branding strategies in the US, i.e. ODM and co-branding, from those 
chosen for the Korean market. The second part of the chapter shows how Korean 
handset manufacturers created new market opportunities in the era of multi-functional 
convergence and mobile services through their strategic alliances with MNOs, the main 
mechanism of which was full customisation of handsets for MNOs. The case of the first 
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DVB-H mobile TV service by 3 Italia in the Italian handset market is presented as an 
example of the approach taken by the Korean manufacturers. 
 
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 6.2 examines how Korean firms were 
able to establish dominance from the beginning of the digital (2G) mobile telephone era. 
It elucidates that these firms’ dominance in the Korean domestic CDMA handset market 
was based on their technological advantages as first movers in CDMA technologies in 
tandem with their strong brand presence in the domestic market. It further explains how 
they successfully avoided the persistent challenges presented by global foreign giants 
such as Qualcomm, Motorola and Nokia.  
 
Section 6.3 investigates the marketing strategy used by a group of Korean handset 
manufacturers to tap into the CDMA handset market in the US (the first country chosen 
as an export target), as a way of overcoming its weak brand presence with its 
technologically world-leading handsets. The section focuses on the nature of ODM and 
co-branding business conducted through foreign distributor networks (principally the 
MNOs) as a means to overcome an initial weak brand presence in the US market.  
 
Section 6.4 delves more deeply into the significance of bilateral collaborations between 
Korean handset manufacturers and foreign MNOs for new mobile services introduced 
along with new handsets, using the example of the world’s first DVB-H mobile TV 
service launched by 3 Italia with the support of Samsung and LG. It examines how 
Korean handset manufacturers took the opportunity to sell new handsets while other 
global foreign manufacturers such as Nokia were reluctant to provide similarly capable 
handsets when 3 Italia sought a major launch of its DVB-H mobile TV service in Italy.  
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Using the experience of Korean handset manufacturers, Section 6.5 discusses the merits 
and demerits of the operator-dependent business model adopted by Korean handset 
manufacturers and presents how these strategies affected the Korean firms’ production 
structure in comparison with other foreign companies. It concludes with a discussion of 
concerns in the pursuit of a dual frontier, i.e. unevenness between technology and 
marketing stages. 
 
6.2 Early dominance of Korean handset makers as OBMs in the Korean 
handset market 
This section presents how Korean handset manufacturers dominated the domestic 
market as OBMs and prevailed over global foreign manufacturers like Qualcomm, 
Nokia and Motorola, largely eliminating them from the market. 
 
6.2.1 Korean handset makers starting as OBMs in the operator-dominant domestic 
market86  
When SK Telecom and Shinsegi Telecom began their CDMA network service in 
January and April 1996, six companies introduced CDMA handsets onto the market in 
the first half of 1996: Samsung, LG, Hyundai and Maxon (the four designated 
manufacturers of the Joint Development Agreement); and Qualcomm and Sony87 (joint-
                                           
86 There were early examples of co-branding between handset makers and MNOs in the Korean handset 
market. In June 1997, LG InfoComm (LG IC – which later merged with LG Electronics) co-branded its 
handsets with both the brand and logo of LG IC and the network operators. For example, SP-1000 was 
branded as ‘Freeway’ (the brand), ‘LG IC’ (the company logo) and ‘017’ (the recognition numbers of 
Shinsegi Telecom), and SD-2000 was branded as ‘011’ of SK Telecom (Yonhap news, 02/06/1997). 
However, co-branding between handset manufacturers and MNOs in the Korean market did not become 
dominant until the policy of mobile number portability was implemented by the Korean government. 
87 Hanchang was the local distributor for Qualcomm. On the other hand, Kolon was an OEM for Sony 
and one of the main shareholders of Shinsegi Telecom. 
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venture members of Qualcomm’s CDMA handset division). At the launch of the CDMA 
network service, two Korean MNOs sourced network equipment and handsets as a 
package deal from their first service provider requirements qualifiers (see Chapter 5). 
They were LG for SK Telecom and Samsung for Shinsegi Telecom88. Korean domestic 
handset manufacturers immediately became dominant against foreign manufacturers. In 
this regard, the advantages of Samsung and LG against other manufacturers at the early 
stage came from their close relationship with local MNOs originating from the Joint 
Development Project.  
 
This early dominance continued. Korean handsets outperformed foreign handsets in 
technical terms, especially in terms of talk time and standby time, as shown in Table 6.1. 
Qualcomm’s first phone (QCP-800) showed 30% shorter battery time against Korean 
handsets and Motorola’s SC-720 had a problem with its voice-call quality. Korean 
handset makers also presented many user-convenient functions. For example, all Korean 
handsets on the market came with two batteries: standard and large. In addition, 
Samsung and LG provided nine and five different ringtones, respectively, in addition to 
other functions such as alarm and lamp/vibration modes. Foreign handsets came with a 
single battery and ringtone without other functions.  
  
Moreover, Samsung and LG outclassed their foreign competitors in terms of 
introduction of new models. Samsung had introduced six models during the 16 months 
between April 1996 and August 1997, and LG had also introduced four models onto the 
market89. As presented in Figure 6.1, new models came with a new form factor or 
                                           
88 Cellular Monthly, ‘Structure of the CDMA handsets market’,09/1996). 
89 Yonhap news, ‘Handset introduction cycle getting shorter’, 07/08/1997, 
１４０ 
 
 
 
lightness, or sometimes additional user-friendly functions. Korean domestic customers 
were particularly sensitive to the weight of handsets90. In the meantime, Qualcomm and 
Motorola did not deliver their second model until early 199891. For the first half of 1998, 
the situation became worse. Samsung, LG and Hyundai marketed 12, 8 and 5 models 
respectively on the shelves while Motorola, Kolon and Qualcomm had only one model. 
Foreign manufacturers did not keep up with their Korean competitors in the speed of 
introducing new models.  
 
Table 6.1 Comparison of the performance of digital phones on the Korean market  
* The Korea Consumer Agency found no difference among handsets in terms of call connectivity and 
quality other than Motorola SC-720’s poor performance.  
Source: Korea Consumer Agency (1997, p.77). 
 
                                                                                                                           
http://news.naver.com/main/tool/print.nhn?oid=001&aid=0004187193, accessed 14/01/2015. 
90 Cellular Monthly, ‘Motorola, where is its turf gone?’, 10/1997. 
91 Ibid., ‘Supply status of mobile handsets in the first half of 1998’, 08/1998. 
Companies 
& models 
Battery time 
Ring 
tones 
Weight (g) 
Price ($) Stand
by 
(h) 
Talk (min) 
Standard 
cell 
Large 
cell Fully charged 
30 min 
charged 
Samsung 
SCH-200F 82 246 69 9 205 211 950–1,150 
LG 
LDP-880 73 161 58 5 224 228 730–880 
Hyundai 
HHP-9300 45 175 61 1 255 300 670–820 
Maxon 
MAX-1000K 32 109 27 1 271 311 650–780 
Qualcomm 
QCP-800 51 201 30 1 257 620–770 
Motorola 
SC-720 18 145 42 1 219 290 810–920 
  
Source: Author’s elaboration
Figure 6.1 CDMA handsets introduced 
between January 1996 and August 1997
 
In addition, Samsung, LG and Hyundai, 
established good after
contrast, neither Qualcomm nor the local distributor for Qualcomm, Hanchang, was 
well known to local customers and 
Korean local conglomerates. For i
42 for Samsung vs 3 for Qualcomm in 
 
From the second half of 1996, Qualcomm enjoyed market expansion in the US CDMA 
market but struggled to meet the high demands from the 
CDMA handset supplier in the US market until Samsung entered the market (see the 
next section). Therefore, the importance of the K
CDMA market seems also 
brands, the retail price of handsets manufactured by foreign companies doubled in 1998 
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due to the Asian economic crisis. For example, the retail price of the Q phone from 
Qualcomm reached 60% higher than that of Samsung’s new handset92. Since then, even 
though handsets made by foreign manufacturers were arriving in the market, they were 
unable to diminish the dominance of local handset manufacturers.  
 
Table 6.2 shows the dominance of Korean handset makers, especially Samsung, in the 
domestic market in the course of the transition from analogue to digital network 
services. 
 
Table 6.2 Market shares of vendors in the Korean handset market  
Companies 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 /06 1998 
 ← Analogue AMPS only → ← Digital CDMA → 
Samsung 18% 15% 20% 30% 45% (42%+48%)* 55% 54% 
LG*** 8% 7% 4% 3.8% 15% (0%+24%) 22% 26% 
Hyundai*** 6% 3% 1% 0.3% 7% (4%+9%) 8% 12% 
Motorola 50% 54% 50.7% 51.9% 21% (41%+0.5%) 6% 7%
** 
Qualcomm - - - - 7% (0%+14%) 5% - 
All 
Japanese**** 9% 4% 2% 1% - - - 
Others 9% 17% 22% 13% 13% 9% 2% 
*The first figure in parentheses indicates the analogue market share; the second figure indicates the digital 
market share. 
**Motorola’s ODM by Appeal Telecom (5% in 1998) was also included. 
***LG and Hyundai were both assemblers of foreign mobile handsets in the analogue era. 
****The import of Japanese handheld handsets was prohibited until January 1999. 
Source: Cellular Monthly, January 1998 & January 1999. 
 
It should be pointed out here that although the Korean CDMA handset market was 
                                           
92 Cellular Monthly, ‘Qualcomm-Motorola: dark future to return to the Korean handset market’, 04/1998. 
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tightly controlled by local MNOs, large manufacturers like Samsung and LG maintained 
their handset business as OBMs, which was not the case in the US CDMA handset 
market, as presented in the next section. On the one hand, this was due to their strong 
brand presence in the domestic market. Local venture companies such as Appeal and 
Telson served the Korean MNOs as ODMs due to their weak brand presence. On the 
other hand, the Korean MNOs were not interested in promoting MNO-branded handsets 
to the public93. This was because subscribers bought handsets mostly through MNOs’ 
sales channels and the first three digits of their phone numbers were an operator 
identification number so that everyone would know who was using which telecom 
company94. 
 
6.2.2 Failure of global incumbents in the Korean handset market 
In the early days of CDMA commercialisation, Qualcomm entered the Korean CDMA 
handset market with its own CDMA handset in a similar manner to the Korean 
manufacturers. On the other hand, global handset incumbents like Nokia and Motorola 
appeared to have placed less effort in developing products for the CDMA market and to 
be observing whether CDMA could secure its market share in the 2G digital 
telecommunication market. This apparent indifference may also have been related to 
rapid growth of demand for GSM digital technologies in the global market. Although 
the CDMA market was burgeoning from the beginning, the market size was small 
compared with that of GSM. Motorola and Nokia introduced new CDMA handsets onto 
the market in 1997 and 1998, respectively, which proved to be too late to capture a 
major share of the CDMA market. 
                                           
93 Interview with a manager in a Korean MNO. 
94 For example, a phone number of SK Telecom subscribers was 011-xxx-xxxx and that of ST subscribers 
was 017-xxx-xxxx. If subscribers changed their companies, they could not keep their phone numbers. 
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Motorola’s failure due to the late response to the digital shift 
In the mid 1990s, Motorola overlooked the rapid expansion of the digital handset 
market95, believing that digital handsets would be too big and bulky to compete with 
analogue ones. Instead, Motorola introduced its new analogue StarTAC with slim 
design of 88 grams (but expensive at $1,500) in January 1996. However, Motorola’s 
previous strength in the analogue market was eroded due to the local MNO SK 
Telecom’s own interest. As SK Telecom allotted more bandwidth to its digital CDMA 
network rather to an analogue AMPS network, Motorola quickly lost its previously 
strong position by not introducing CDMA digital handsets. Moreover, Motorola 
exacerbated the relationship with local MNOs by introducing a distribution policy for 
StarTAC in both Korea and US called the ‘Signature program’, under which Motorola 
provided StarTAC only to MNOs and distributors purchasing more than 75% of their 
handsets from Motorola (and with stand-alone displays) in order to maintain high 
margins. This ‘program’ turned out to be a huge failure in both Korea and US. 
 
In addition to Motorola’s failure with analogue StarTAC, its failed attempts to introduce 
its first digital phone into the Korean market gave it a fatal blow. The company 
introduced its first digital cellular phone, MicroTAC SC-720, in July 1996. However, it 
had less than ten hours standby time due to technical problems and was finally 
withdrawn from the shelves within six months, leaving Motorola with a bad reputation 
for digital handsets. Having had less than 0.1% of the market share in 1997, it was 21 
months later in March 1998 when Motorola provided its second digital CDMA handset, 
                                           
95 In 1995, US MNOs including Ameritech, AT&T and Bell Atlantic requested Motorola to deliver digital 
handsets for them (Businessweek, ‘How Motorola lost its way’, 03/05/1998).  
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DMT-8000, to the Korean market. From 1998, Motorola also utilised several ODM 
models from local venture companies such as Telson Electronics (later Nokia Korea) 
and Appeal Telecom (later Motorola Korea). However, Motorola acquired only 2% of 
market share in 1998, and although it gained meaningful success in November 1998 
from the digital CDMA version of StarTAC, it was never able to overcome the 
dominance of Samsung and LG.  
 
Nokia’s failed localisation through ODM strategy 
Nokia entered the Korean handset market in 2001 in a joint alliance with the Korean 
ODM handset manufacturer Telson five years after CDMA commercialisation. At the 
time, Nokia was so successful in the 2G GSM market that it had caught up with 
Motorola and from 1997 onwards held the top position in the global handset market. 
The CDMA handset market never exceeded 21% of the global 2G handset market while 
the GSM handset market occupied an average of around 70%96. It can therefore be 
surmised that Nokia was less serious about the CDMA handset market than it was about 
the GSM market, and evidence for this supposition is that, instead of in-house 
development of CDMA handsets, Nokia established a partnership with the Korean 
CDMA handset venture Telson.  
 
When Nokia launched its CDMA handset onto the Korean market using this ODM 
strategy, it had not paid sufficient attention to local customers’ preferences for cutting-
edge technologies (such as colour display), and it introduced handsets without the 
colour screens that were being popularised by Korean handset makers at the time. 
Moreover, all of the Nokia handsets that were introduced only supported the CDMAone, 
                                           
96 Strategy Analytics. 
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and not the latest CDMA200097. In addition, Nokia failed to introduce handsets for SK 
Telecom, which was the dominant MNO with CDMA cellular networks, having a 
market share of approximately 50% at that time98. The apparent reason for this failure to 
provide a handset for SK Telecom was that most of the CDMA cellular engineers of 
Telson that were experienced in developing handsets for SK Telecom, had left Telson 
due to internal conflict. This meant that Nokia could not promote its handsets to half of 
the market no matter how good its handsets were, and the first handset for SK Telecom 
did not arrive in the market until November 200199.  
 
To make matters worse, Nokia made errors in an important localisation issue regarding 
polyphony ringtones in September 2001. While a polyphony ringtone service was 
heavily promoted by Korean network operators at the time, Nokia phone users realised 
that they could not play 16 polyphony ringtones after downloading them from networks. 
The problem resulted from the different chipsets used by Korean handset manufacturers 
and Nokia. While all Korean handset makers utilised Musical Instrument Digital 
Interface (MIDI) chips manufactured from Japanese midi-sound chipset maker, Yamaha, 
Nokia used the General Midi (GM) format, which was not supported by Korean 
domestic network operators. These problems with localisation encountered by Nokia – 
stemming from its ODM relationship with Telson – resulted in huge losses in terms of 
customer loyalty, and Nokia retreated from the Korean handset market100. Finally in 
2003, Nokia decided to discontinue its Korean presence.  
 
                                           
97 The CDMA2000 provided double the capacity and faster data packet speed of CDMAone.   
98 Cellular Monthly, ‘Interim evaluation on Nokia's penetration into the Korean handset market’, 11/2001. 
99 Ibid. 
100 HanGyereh, ‘Nokia retreats from the Korean market’, http://legacy.www.hani.co.kr/section-
010100002/2003/01/010100002200301101511735.html, accessed 15/08/2015. 
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6.2.3 Local manufacturers’ dominance driven by a close producer–user relationship 
and first mover’s advantage 
As presented above, Korean handset manufacturers were able to dominate the local 
Korean handset market as first movers since the market’s creation. There were handsets 
available on the market also from foreign competitors such as Qualcomm and Motorola. 
However, handsets from local makers outclassed those from foreign brands in terms of 
both technical performance and the speed of introduction of new models, as shown in 
the previous section. Korean products benefited from the weak Korean currency101 as 
well due to the Asian economic crisis in late 1997. 
 
Lieberman and Montgomery (1988) originally contended that there are three main 
mechanisms for first movers to enjoy their advantages: technological leadership, pre-
emption of assets and buyer switching costs. Although there are elements of each of 
these in the case of Korean mobile telecommunications, the pre-emption of scarce assets, 
in this case the relationship with local MNOs, seems to have played a particularly vital 
role. Firstly, the collaboration between two Korean MNOs and two Korean designated 
manufacturers during the Joint Development Project, i.e. SK Telecom with LG and 
Shinsegi Telecom with Samsung, enabled these local manufacturers to secure the first 
order of network equipment and mobile handsets. Secondly, pre-emption of the close 
relationship with MNOs during the Joint Development Project provided local handset 
manufacturers with many learning opportunities to improve the quality of handsets 
through operators’ networks established by their own network equipment102.  
 
                                           
101 The annual average value of the Korean Won dropped by 32% in 1998 year on year and recovered 
only 17.6% in 1999 (Bank of Korea, Annual report of foreign currency statistics 2000, 2011).  
102 Interview with a former CDMA handset development leader at Samsung. 
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Korean MNOs dominated the distribution and sales of handsets through bulk purchase, 
and later fortified their influence through promotions with subsidised handsets based on 
long-term contracts (which also raised buyer switching costs). Under the circumstances, 
local Korean handset manufacturers supplied handsets according to local MNOs’ 
demands while foreign manufacturers were slow to react to Korean MNOs’ demands. 
This fortified the local collaboration between handset manufacturers and MNOs in 
Korea. 
 
The strong collaborations between MNOs and local handset producers were further 
reinforced as Korean MNOs began to provide operator-specific mobile data services 
through the upgrade of CDMA networks to CDMA2000 1x (2.5G). This feature created 
a major barrier for foreign handset manufacturers that entered the Korean domestic 
handset market, as exemplified in the case of Nokia. Customising foreign handsets to 
meet the local requirements of the Korean MNOs not only entailed technical difficulties 
but also became too costly for foreign makers, considering the size of the Korean 
handset market103.  
 
The existence of the Korean CDMA domestic market played an important role also in 
terms of global competitiveness of Korean handset makers during the early stage of the 
global CDMA handset market. Firstly, the dominance of Korean manufacturers in the 
domestic market gave a scale advantage because the Korean CDMA market was bigger 
than that of the US until mid 1999 (Funk 2002). The scale was mainly due to the 
adoption of CDMA technologies as a single national 2G standard (both cellular and PCS) 
by the Korean government (see Chapter 5). Moreover, Korean CDMA networks 
                                           
103 Interview with a handset engineer at Motorola Korea. 
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functioned as a good test bed for exporting handsets104 (Kushida 2008; Whang & 
Hobday 2011). The competition among local manufacturers and early launch of mobile 
data services by local MNOs stimulated miniaturisation and functional improvements 
(later convergence) of mobile handsets.  
 
6.3 Entering the US CDMA handset market through ODM or co-branding  
This section presents the Korean handset makers’ entry into the US CDMA handset 
market subsequent to their domestic market developments discussed in the previous 
section. Since the US handset market was MNO-dominated in a similar manner to the 
Korean domestic market (see Chapter 4), Korean handset makers approached the US 
CDMA MNOs such as Sprint and Verizon. However, this section explains the 
contrasting strategy adopted by Korean makers in the US handset market and shows 
why they pursued different strategies.  
 
6.3.1 Overview of the US CDMA handset market and Qualcomm’s dis-integration 
Unlike Korea and the European countries, the US opted for the policy of open 
competition in the 2G digital mobile market, and as a result adopted three different 2G 
standards, US-TDMA, GSM and CDMA, which were successively commercialised in 
1992105, 1995 and 1996, respectively. As the US Federal Communications Commission 
did not award new licences until 1995, most 2G telecommunication services in the 
country only began between 1996 and 1997 (Funk 2002). As seen in Table 6.3, the early 
stage of the US digital handset market was dominated by traditional handset giants such 
                                           
104 In contrast, Samsung struggled with exporting GSM handsets in the late 1990s due to the absence of a 
domestic GSM network for testing (Cellular Monthly, ‘Struggling to export GSM handsets’, 02/2000). 
105 However, the digital handsets comprised only 0.1%, 1.5% and 7.5% of new subscribers in 1992, 1993 
and 1994, respectively (Funk 2002). 
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as Nokia, Ericsson and Motorola due to their early adoption of US-TDMA and GSM. 
With the commencement of the US CDMA service in late 1996, however, the share of 
CDMA handsets among digital handsets rapidly grew from 3% in 1996, to 33% in 1997 
and 38% in 1998 (Funk 2002).  
  
Table 6.3 Shares of the US digital phone market between 1995 and 1998 (by company) 
Company 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Nokia 29% 33% 20% 34% 
Ericsson 34% 56% 41% 21% 
Motorola 36% 8% 6% 12% 
Qualcomm 
(including Sony) - 3% 24% 13% 
Other - 0% 9% 20% 
Source: Funk (2002, p.170). 
 
In the US CDMA market, Qualcomm was the only company with a completely 
vertically integrated structure spanning baseband chips to mobile handsets106. In the 
beginning, Qualcomm did not intend to produce CDMA handsets (Mock 2005). 
However, big mobile handset companies such as Motorola and Nokia were reluctant to 
develop CDMA handsets. As the commencement of the CDMA network service in the 
US approached, Qualcomm decided to provide its own CDMA handsets, and, in 
February 1994, it set up its new mobile phone manufacturing unit as a joint venture with 
Sony Corporation and let Paul Jacobs, the son of the co-founder of Qualcomm, Irwin 
Jacobs, run the business. The factory was set up based on a former medical-supply 
facility. However, neither Qualcomm nor Paul Jacobs had any experience in the 
                                           
106 In the GSM market, dominant players like Nokia, Ericsson and Motorola were all vertically integrated 
manufacturers with baseband chips as well. They competed against each other with handsets including 
their own baseband chips. 
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consumer electronics business where it is crucial to have knowledge of, and capacity for, 
mass production107. Analyst Albert Lin of American Technology Research Inc., 
commenting about Qualcomm’s production plant, claimed that ‘It was a very, very 
chaotic environment’108. 
 
Nevertheless, Qualcomm virtually dominated the early US CDMA handset market 
because it was the only handset provider until the first half of 1997. In addition, high 
licensing fees for CDMA technologies compared to other digital standards kept handset 
giants like Nokia, Motorola and Ericsson from entering the CDMA handset market for a 
while. Qualcomm’s prominence in CDMA technologies to US CDMA MNOs also 
helped (Mock 2005). Once the shipment had started for Sprint and PrimeCo (later 
Verizon), Qualcomm could not keep up with market demand, and its founder Irwin 
Jacobs and his son Paul often disagreed over how many phones each carrier should get. 
Qualcomm’s sales in the US market did rise with the rapidly growing market from 2.9% 
in 1996 to 24% in 1997 (Funk 2002). Even so, the sales of CDMA handsets were 
accompanied by a growing deficit in Qualcomm’s financial performance109. 
 
To make matters worse for Qualcomm, its monopoly status in the US market was short-
lived, leading to price competitions. New market entrants began to emerge from the 
second half of 1997 when the US CDMA market became more than negligible. 
Specialised baseband chip suppliers like Very-Large-Scale-Integration (VLSI) 
                                           
107 Qualcomm also had a continuing loss in its network equipment business and later sold it to Ericsson 
in early 1999. (EE Times, ‘Is chipset focus enough for the new Qualcomm?’ 
http://www.eetimes.com/document.asp?doc_id=1124054, accessed 16/01/2015.) 
108 Businessweek, ‘The once and future Qualcomm’, 03/05/2004. 
109 Ibid. 
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Technology and Digital Signal Processing (DSP) Communications110 joined the CDMA 
baseband chip market. For example, VLSI introduced sample baseband chips in June 
1998 and finally launched volume shipments in early 1999. In addition, Nokia and Oki 
Electric with their own baseband chips also introduced their CDMA handsets in April 
and May in 1998. When these competitors lowered their CDMA phone prices by 14% 
below Qualcomm’s price in late 1999, Qualcomm had no choice but to follow its 
competitors by lowering its prices (Funk 2002). Finally, Qualcomm sold its mobile 
phone business unit to Kyocera Corporation in 2000.  
 
Qualcomm’s experience may be explained by the fact that it was originally an R&D 
engineering company and had never acquired experience in manufacturing electronic 
goods. This lack of experience led to problems in scaling up production efficiently and 
achieving competitive production costs. Given the context of the US CDMA handset 
market at the time, the next section explores how Korean manufacturers penetrated the 
US CDMA handset market.  
 
6.3.2 Samsung and LG’s initial steps into the US CDMA handset market 
Samsung and LG entered the US CDMA market in 1997 and 1998 respectively. They 
approached specialised distributors and US MNOs but received different reactions. 
When Samsung and LG approached electronics distributors such as Best Buy and 
Circuit City, these distributors refused to market handsets from Korean manufacturers 
due to lack of brand awareness111 and credibility over the quality of handsets112. While 
                                           
110 VLSI Technology and DSP Communications were specialised baseband chip suppliers and were later 
acquired by Philips and Intel respectively in 1999. 
111 When a brand is weak, country of origin exacerbates the situation. See Ahmed et al. (2002). 
112 The Federation of Korean Industries, The case study on the strategies of overcoming crisis in 
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electronics distributors generally recognised Korean makers as OEM/ODM makers for 
electronic goods, they did not consider these makers as firms with the capability to 
produce cutting-edge handsets113. On the other hand, some US CDMA MNOs expressed 
their interests in expanding their handset sourcing from other manufacturers. 
 
Co-branding114 for Samsung and ODM to co-branding for LG 
In June 1997, Samsung began its handset business in the US as it started to export 
CDMA PCS handsets (SCH-1011) to Sprint Spectrum L.P. of the US115, the biggest 
CDMA MNO in the US at the time116. Sprint announced 100% digital service to cellular 
phone subscribers while other operators like AT&T and AirTouch were providing both 
analogue and digital network services. Originally, Sprint had mainly sourced its CDMA 
handsets from Qualcomm Personal Electronics117, a joint-venture company of Sony 
Electronics and Qualcomm. However in 1997, plastic cases of the Q Phone (Q1900) 
from Qualcomm (and distributed by Sprint) turned out to be fragile and easily broken. 
Qualcomm and Sprint had to recall all their sold handsets and in August 1997, they 
withdrew from the market118. This incident led Sprint to diversify its handset sourcing.  
 
While Sprint was looking for a new partnership other than with Qualcomm, Samsung 
                                                                                                                           
companies, FKI Media (2010) (in Korean). 
113 Interview with a marketing manager in LG.  
114 In this thesis, the definition of co-branding is ‘a form of cooperation between two or more brands with 
significant customer recognition, in which all the participants’ brand names are retained’ (Blackett & 
Boad 1999). One well-known example of co-branding is ‘Intel Inside’ of Intel with computer 
manufacturers. 
115 This was a joint venture company of Sprint Corporation, Tele-Communications Inc., Cox 
Communications and Comcast Corporation, running services in the Washington DC/Baltimore area.  
116 Federal Communications Commission, The Commercial Mobile Radio Services Report 1999. 
117 This was founded in 1994 and was the only CDMA handset producer in the first half of 1997 in the 
US market.  
118 Cellular Monthly, ‘Fierce domestic competition in folder-type handsets’, 11/1998. 
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proposed co-branding and co-marketing with Sprint119. The proposal was mutually 
beneficial for Sprint – who announced a brand-new service – and for Samsung, which 
was, at the time, a less well-known brand in the US market with no previous mobile 
phone products. The two companies agreed the deal and acquired a co-branding position 
with the ‘Sprint–Samsung’ label in their handsets. Even so, it was uneven co-branding 
as the Sprint logo was printed on the front cover in large letters while Samsung was 
printed on the back in much smaller letters120.  
 
LG followed a similar path to Samsung but in a different fashion as it entered the US 
handset market. In 1997, LG acquired the export contract of one CDMA model (LGC-
300W) from Ameritech121, the fourth biggest US CDMA network carrier at the time122. 
Unlike Sprint-Samsung, however, LG’s LGC-300W was sold under the name of 
Ameritech. This type of ODM contract continued with LGC-320W and -330W in 1999 
with other US CDMA MNOs such as GTE Wireless and Alltel. A marketing manager in 
LG recalls that US MNOs had been proposing co-branding to LG since 2000 after the 
recognition of the quality of its handsets. However, it was LG itself who decided to 
remain an ODM producer; according to her, co-branding of two sides meant co-
marketing by two sides. Under co-branding, LG also needed to invest in marketing and 
share risks. She asserted that LG itself was not confident whether LG’s brand would 
appeal to US customers at the time.  
 
                                           
119 Neither Nokia nor Motorola was ready for Sprint (Chicago Tribune, ‘Samsung getting Motorola’s 
Number’, 07/03/2004). 
120 The Federation of Korean Industries, The case study on the strategies of overcoming crisis in 
companies, FKI Media (2010) (in Korean). 
121 Ameritech was one of the seven regional Bell operating companies and later became part of AT&T. 
122 Federal Communications Commission, The Commercial Mobile Radio Services Report, 1999. 
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In January 2002, LG finally decided to pursue a co-branding contract in the US CDMA 
market123. Firstly, LG and Sprint agreed to co-brand LG’s handsets, starting with LG’s 
TP5250 dual folder phone. Similarly, LG and Verizon also concluded that they would 
co-brand all LG’s handsets with both LG and Verizon brand logos in October 2002124, 
starting with VX10. Therefore, it took about five years for LG to move from an ODM to 
become a co-branding handset provider. 
 
Neighbouring support and provision of customised handsets for the US MNOs  
Based on their brand awareness from success in the global handset market, Nokia and 
Motorola adhered to their own product roadmaps with own brands, resisting MNOs’ 
request for customisations. An executive with a US network operator described the 
situation as: ‘The attitude at Nokia was basically, “Here is a phone. Do you want it?”’ 
(Husso 2011, p.60).  
 
In contrast, Korean handset manufacturers dedicated resources in support of their 
partnerships with US MNOs. They not only dispatched their engineers during handset 
development projects but also strategically set up branches and stationed groups of 
engineers adjacent to the headquarters of MNOs so that they could cope with technical 
problems as quickly as possible. For example, the locations of these branches of LG 
Mobile phones included Overland Park (near Kansas City) for Sprint, Newark (New 
Jersey) for Verizon, Atlanta for Cingular and Seattle for AT&T. Businessweek wrote 
about the efforts taken by LG in support of its US network carrier partner: 
 
                                           
123 Interview with a marketing manager in LG. 
124 Etnews, ‘LG’s Co-branding with Verizon: reinforcing North American market’, 16/10/2002. 
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LG flew 50 elite engineers, marketers, and product-development specialists to 
five sites across the U.S. to iron out glitches that inevitably pop up when 
synchronizing phones with new servers and networks. ‘We had noise and call 
cut-off problems at a Dallas test in March, and all of our hardware engineers in 
Korea worked day and night for four days to resolve the problem, ’ recalls Lim 
Joo Eung, the chief research engineer who led a 48-person-team for the 
VX6000. By applying that kind of manpower, LG was able to cut the time it 
normally takes to roll out a new service by 25%, to nine months125. 
 
In addition to neighbouring support, Samsung and LG began to provide customised 
handsets according to the needs of the US MNOs. In Korea with a small territory, each 
MNO ran a single band network with full national coverage. Two Korean cellular 
MNOs126 were assigned to only 800MHz – like US cellular MNOs – while three 
Korean PCS MNOs were assigned to 1.8 GHz. Therefore, Korean manufacturers did not 
need to develop multi-mode (analogue and digital) or/and multi-band (multi-frequency) 
handsets for Korean MNOs. On the other hand, as shown in Table 6.4, the US mobile 
network services were far more complex in terms of the diversity of technology 
standards and the size of coverage. It also took much longer to establish new digital 
networks in the countryside than in Korea. Simply, no MNO or single wireless standard 
could provide nationwide coverage in the US at the time. Therefore, US MNOs made 
efforts to expand their network coverage by roaming agreements and M&As with other 
MNOs. The US MNOs sometimes had to support both bands of 800 MHz and 1.9 GHz 
and networks of analogue and digital, including analogue AMPS, CDMA, TDMA, 
GSM and even iDEN127. Accordingly, handsets compatible with different networks 
became crucial. 
 
                                           
125 Businessweek, ‘Korea’s LG, Will it be the next Samsung?’, 12/05/2005, 
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/05_04/b3917018.htm, accessed 24/03/2011. 
126 SK Telecom was the only MNO running an analogue cellular network in 800 MHz. 
127 iDEN was mainly developed by Motorola. 
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Table 6.4 Difference between Korean and US networks and standards 
Country 
Korea United States 
Cellular PCS Cellular PCS 
Frequency 800 MHz 1.8 GHz 800 MHz 1.9 GHz 
Standards AMPS CDMA CDMA 
AMPS 
CDMA 
TDMA 
iDEN 
GSM 
CDMA 
TDMA 
Source: Author’s elaboration.  
 
In 1999, for instance, Sprint PCS with 13 million subscribers in the market developed 
its new strategy of dual-mode service by adding an 800 MHz analogue service to its 
existing 100% digital service of 1.9 GHz CDMA PCS. As Sprint was keen to promote 
its dual-mode service, LG developed its TP5200 model supporting Sprint’s digital and 
analogue networks. Sprint and LG introduced and marketed the model together from 
September 1999. Verizon Wireless, which at the time had 32 million subscribers, also 
ran both 800 MHz AMPS and 800 MHz CDMA cellular networks as well as 1.9 GHz 
CDMA PCS in April 2000. Therefore, it sought to maximise its network capacity and 
utility of customers by launching a Tri-mode service, which supported all three different 
network technologies. In tandem with the Tri-mode service, Verizon also introduced a 
new nationwide flat-rate plan128 called the ‘SingleRate’ plan, which allowed customers 
to place calls without roaming (using other networks) or incurring long-distance charges 
in return for the advance purchase of bulk of minutes. In response, LG promptly offered 
a Tri-Mode handset (TM510), exclusively for Verizon Wireless129.  
 
                                           
128 A flat-rate plan in the US market originated from the ‘digital-one-rate’ introduced by AT&T in May 
1998. The plan triggered the increase of minutes of use per month (Federal Communications Commission, 
Fourth Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions With Respect to Commercial 
Mobile Services, 2000). 
129 Hankookilbo, ‘Opening 2.5G market in the US’, 25/09/2001. 
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Since the commencement of mobile data services by the US MNOs, Korean 
manufacturers began to provide new handset models featuring carrier-specific services 
for them. Such successful instances between Verizon and LG include VX10, VX6000 
and VX8000. In October 2002, LG provided VX10 to Verizon so that it could promote 
its own wireless data service ‘Get It Now’, allowing customers to download a variety of 
games and ring tones and giving them access to Internet and e-mail. In July 2003, LG 
developed Verizon’s first built-in camera phone, VX6000. It incorporated with Verizon’s 
‘Get Pix’ service so that customers could take photos and save them to their phones, 
send them to an e-mail address, or upload them to an online photo album. In March 
2005, LG delivered VX8000 to Verizon featuring Verizon’s new video entertainment 
service, VCast, which offered video clips from the US news channels. All these 
handsets were exclusive to Verizon in terms of both handset design and Verizon-specific 
mobile data services. 
 
Brian Finnerty, Sprint’s senior director for new products, said, ‘When we want to put in 
certain browsers for text messages, they’re very fast to design a new handset for it. 
They’re the only ones who say: “We can do that. No problem.”’130 In this way, Korean 
handset manufacturers provided timely delivery of and dedicated support for new 
handset models featuring carrier-specific services for the US MNOs. Korean handset 
makers and US CDMA MNOs (especially Samsung with Sprint, and LG with Verizon) 
shared not only product release roadmaps but also marketing plans with each other. 
Korean handset makers described this form of close relationship between handset 
                                           
130 Businessweek, ‘Dialing for dominance in Korea’, 27/05/2001, 
http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2001-05-27/dialing-for-dominance-in-korea, accessed 27/12/2014. 
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manufacturers and MNOs as that of a ‘married couple’131. 
  
6.3.3 The role of co-branding for penetration by Korean handset manufacturers into 
foreign markets 
As presented above, CDMA handsets produced by Samsung and LG were not 
appreciated in the US market as much as they were in the domestic market. Even if 
Samsung and LG produced technologically competitive handsets, they were still 
regarded as ODM electronics makers in the US. They also did not have their own 
distribution channels for their products. In this sense, the two Korean makers lagged 
behind at stage 4 in the marketing domain while they reached stage 5 in the technology 
domain, according to the typology of Hobday (1995). In order to overcome this 
unevenness, they initially adopted their original export strategy132 (ODM) or an 
improved co-branding strategy with US MNOs. By relying on US MNOs’ marketing 
resources, they slowly increased the exposure of their brands to US customers at lower 
cost and began to establish brand presence and customer loyalties as they proved their 
technological competitiveness to both network carriers and final customers133. The 
strategy adopted by Korean handset manufacturers has worked even better since MNOs 
began to launch their new mobile data services. The Wall Street Journal wrote,  
 
Unlike some of its big-name rivals, LG also has allowed its own brand to be 
overshadowed by that of the service providers distributing its phones... LG’s 
strategy is to tailor its handsets tightly to a service provider’s requirements 
and then piggyback on the service provider’s own advertising... It’s been 
Verizon’s brand that has been carrying LG... An LG phone played a 
                                           
131 Edaily News, ‘Foray into the US handset market – Samsung Electronics: from handsets to network 
equipments’, 10/12/2003. 
132 During interview, a marketing manager in LG said, ‘That was how we had served foreign customers 
so far. It was nothing new for us.’ 
133 Prestigious retailer is one of cues that can compensate for the negative effect of country of origin of a 
product (Thorelli et al. 1989). 
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prominent role in the launch of Verizon’s picture-messaging service.134  
 
In this sense, the relationship between MNOs and handset manufacturers was mutually 
beneficial. The MNOs’ brand complemented the weak brand of Korean handset makers 
in the US handset market while the capabilities of Korean handset makers in delivering 
handsets featured with operator-specific services helped the US MNOs differentiate 
themselves from other MNOs by launching new features and wireless data services 
through customised Korean handsets. In this way, the ‘strategic dilemma’ (Hobday et al. 
2004) for Korean manufacturers’ transition from ODM to OBM could be overcome, 
although the unique structural characteristic of the mobile handset industry in terms of 
the very existence of MNOs as intermediary users should not be underestimated. By the 
first half of 2003, Samsung and LG were ranked first and second in the US CDMA 
market, occupying 49% of the market share between them135. 
 
The strengthened recognition of Korean brands in mobile handsets also had a synergetic 
effect on other consumer electronics businesses. For example, LG had tried to establish 
its ‘Goldstar’ brand in the US since 1978 but had not obtained much success. In order to 
overcome its weak brand, it decided to utilise a well-known local brand and acquired 
shares of Zenith, the US electronics brand, in 1995136. Nevertheless, this did not bring 
much success due to the cultural differences between LG and Zenith137. However, the 
success of co-branded mobile handsets turned the situation around, with these handsets 
                                           
134 Wall Street Journal, ‘LG Soars to Big League Among Handset Makers’, 06/11/2003, p.B.4. 
135 Strategy Analytics. 
136 Samsung also acquired the US computer manufacturer AST for the same reason in 1996 but filed for 
bankruptcy in 1999.  
137 Yonhapnews, ‘Considerations needed for FDI’, 19/11/1999. 
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functioning as ‘walking billboards’138 for Samsung and LG. From 2003, LG pursued a 
dual-brand strategy in the US electronics market based on the success in the mobile 
handset market, utilising its LG brand for the premium segment and its Zenith brand for 
the middle-range segment. 
 
The next section investigates in greater detail how this collaborative relationship created 
learning and market opportunities for Korean manufacturers in the introduction of new 
services by MNOs.  
 
6.4 Collaborating with an MNO in the introduction of a new mobile TV 
service139: a Teecean manufacturer–user relationship  
This section shows how handset manufacturers took the opportunity to supply 
customised handsets to an MNO when they launched a new service. Using the example 
of 3 Italia’s DVB-H based mobile TV service (the world’s first DVB-H commercial 
service), this section discusses the role of co-specialisation in the competition between 
Korean handset manufacturers and their giant competitor Nokia. 
 
6.4.1 3 Italia and its ambition to launch a mobile TV service in Italy 
Italy was a country with one of the most highly developed markets in the mobile 
services industry in Europe. The revenues from the industry overtook those from the 
fixed-line industry in 2002 and the market penetration reached 122.2% in 2005 (Baglieri 
                                           
138 Edaily, ‘The history of the US market penetration – LG Electronics’, 24/11/2003. 
139 The empirical data on the launch of the DVB-H in Italy generally derives from Baglieri et al. (2008) 
and two interviews with leaders in the development team and the marketing team in the LG’s DVB-H 3 
Italia project. While the former mainly presented 3 Italia’s position, the latter mainly reflected LG’s 
perspective. In addition, both were complemented for corroborating the facts. 
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et al. 2008). It was also the second biggest European market after Germany accounting 
for 17% of mobile handsets sales in Europe. More importantly, Italy was dominating 
other European countries with the 3G WCDMA services with more than ten million 
subscribers. The Italian mobile communication market had been highly oligopolistic, 
being led by four major MNOs, namely, Telecom Italia Mobile (TIM), Vodafone, Wind 
and 3 Italia. Their market shares in 2005 are presented in Table 6.5.  
 
Table 6.5 Market shares of Italian MNOs, based on number of subscribers (2005) 
Network operator TIM Vodafone Wind 3 Italia 
 Market share 40.0% 33.1% 19.1% 7.8%  
Source: retrieved from OECD Communications Outlook 2007. 
 
3 Italia, formerly known as the Andala 3G SpA, is one of six European 3G MNOs 
owned by Hutchison Wampoa based in Hong Kong. Founded by Tiscali and San Paolo 
in 1999, it acquired one of five 3G licences from the Italian government in 2000140 and 
became the first Italian 3G MNO in March 2003. Although Italy had the highest 3G 
penetration rate in Europe and 3 Italia had the biggest market share in terms of 3G 
subscribers in Italy, 3 Italia was still far behind its competitors with a market share of 
7.8%, as shown in Table 6.5. Therefore, 3 Italia was eager to introduce a new and 
difficult-to-imitate application/service which would enable it to dramatically increase 
the number of subscribers and its ARPU.  
 
In July 2005, Vincenzo Novari, the CEO of 3 Italia at the time, made the decision to 
launch a mobile TV service in Italy based on DVB-H technologies. As it became the 
                                           
140 Hutchison Wampoa became the major shareholder and renamed itself H3G Italia in 2000. 
  
first mobile TV service provider
World Cup in Germany that was scheduled to be held from June to July 2006. At the 
time, it was considered an
DVB-H project within 10 months to meet the deadline, while by general consensus such 
projects normally require two years for completion
 
Moreover, the project became far more complex when 3 Italia pursued an ambitious 
network operator-led business model, in which the MNO would organise all facets of 
the project. First, it needed to acquire a DVB
operate its own mobile broadcast networks. Second, 
providers, such as broadcasters
handset manufacturers 
it needed to construct a service portfolio and market it to end
it with other mobile services. Figure 6.
interrelationships in a typical MNO
 
Source: Pentinnen et al. (2009, p.21)
Figure 6.2 Mobile network operator
                                        
141 The CEO’s eventual ambition was far bigger than just taking 
transforming 3 Italia, an MNO
TV service (interview with a p
142 Also confirmed by a project leader of the LG DVB
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141, 3 Italia specifically targeted the FIFA Football 
 ambitious choice as 3 Italia was required to complete its 
 (Baglieri et al. 2008)
-H network licence and also build and 
it had to negotiate with content 
 (for attractive broadcast content) and with mobile 
(for new mobile handsets featuring a mobile TV service
-users, sometimes bundling 
2 summarises these tasks and shows their 
-led business model for a mobile TV service. 
. 
-led business model in a mobile TV servi
   
a higher market share. He envisaged 
, into a multimedia broadcasting company based on the success of a mobile 
roject leader of the LG DVB-H project). 
-H project during interview
142.  
). Lastly, 
 
 
ce 
. 
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6.4.2 3 Italia’s project management and the division of labour between participants 
The project required 3 Italia to collaborate with many external partners, which included 
broadcast content providers, mobile components suppliers, software solution suppliers 
and handset manufacturers. 
 
First, 3 Italia purchased Canale 7, the TV channel, and the licence to do the DVB-H 
broadcast. It then concluded a deal for content provision with the three main TV 
broadcasters, Rai, Mediaset and Sky. This allowed 3 Italia to acquire exclusive rights to 
broadcast popular sporting events like the MotoGP, the major league championship, the 
UEFA Champions League and Seria A football games (the most popular sports 
championships in Italy)143. 
 
In addition to broadcast content suppliers, many specialised hardware suppliers were 
needed to execute 3 Italia’s DVB-H mobile TV project. These included NagraVision for 
SIM cards and Conditional Access Systems and Reti Radiotelevisive Digitali for mobile 
broadcast network equipment. Software solution suppliers also participated in the 
project. For instance, Expway developed the Electronic Service Guide and Accenture 
provided the billing system. 
 
At the start of the project, 3 Italia contacted four handset manufacturers: Samsung, 
Motorola, Nokia and LG. At the time, each of them was in a different position in terms 
of readiness for DVB-H technologies and willingness to collaborate: Motorola was not 
                                           
143 Roland Jakab, Mobile TV market analysis, http://www.ims.co.hu/mobile_tv_market_analysis.pdf, 
accessed 26/09/2011. 
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ready for DVB-H technologies and was automatically excluded from the list of 
candidates; LG expressed a willingness to invest even though it did not have a prototype; 
and both Samsung and Nokia were prepared with a prototype and showed their 
willingness to invest. However, Nokia asked for some control of the project. Table 6.6 
denotes these manufacturers’ attitudes towards 3 Italia’s offer and the next subsections 
discuss in depth how Nokia failed to agree with 3 Italia while the two Korean makers 
participated in the project.  
 
Table 6.6 Candidates of handset manufacturers for DVB-H by 3 Italia 
 Samsung Motorola Nokia LG 
Technology DMB, DVB-H and MediaFlo DVB-H 
DVB-H with 
integrated CAS 
phone-based 
DMB 
Time to market 
Prototype 
available as of 
August 2005 
Prototype not 
available in 
August 2005 
Developing the 
security system 
for contents 
Prototype not 
available 
Willingness to 
invest 
Willing to create 
a task force  
Willing to invest, 
but some control 
on the choices 
Willing to create 
a task force 
Market 
position 
Growing market 
share, strong 
competition with 
LG 
Known to be 
slower than 
competitors in 
the adoption of 
new solutions 
Market leader, 
promoter of the 
DVB-H standard 
Previous partner 
of 3 Italia, strong 
competition with 
Samsung 
CAS, Conditional Access Systems. 
Source: modified by the author based on Baglieri et al. (2008), p.8. 
 
6.4.3 Decision on handset manufacturer participants and subsequent handset 
development 
The following explains the different approaches of Nokia, Samsung and LG towards 3 
Italia’s offer and the reasons behind 3 Italia’s decision over Samsung and LG. In 
addition, a short description of the handset development is provided. 
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Nokia’s reluctance to join in the project  
Nokia was the most important developer in pioneering DVB-H technologies. From 
November 2000, Nokia began to develop mobile TV technologies and announced its 
first DVB-H phone (N7700) in November 2003. Nokia developed not only a mobile 
handset featuring mobile TV based on DVB-H technologies but also mobile TV server 
solutions called ‘Mobile Broadcast Solutions’ (MBS), as presented in Figure 6.3. Its 
main functionality and the three major elements of the platform are given in Box B.  
 
 
Source: http://www.medianama.com/2009/04/223-wipro-nokia-mobile-broadcast-solutions/, accessed 
26/11/2011. 
Figure 6.3 The concept of the Nokia Mobile Broadcast Solution 
 
With MBS, Nokia explored a number of pilot-scale DVB-H services within European 
countries (e.g. Finland and the UK). MBS 2.1 was utilised in three pilot projects with 
the Nokia N7700 handset, MBS 2.2 was used in 15 pilots with the Nokia 7710 handset, 
and, by 2006, MBS 3.0 was used with N92 and N77144. Therefore, Nokia targeted both 
mobile broadcast operators and MNOs by marketing the DVB-H solution based on its 
                                           
144 Juha Lipiainen, DVB-H: Time to commercialize, http://ce.sharif.ir/courses/85-
86/2/ce342/resources/root/Lecture/2006-03-13_hongkong_lipiainen_juha.pdf, accessed in 26/11/2011. 
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own platform – MBS – and Nokia DVB-H handsets. It did not wish to be relegated to 
being a handset provider for either MNOs or mobile broadcast operators in the value 
chain of a DVB-H based mobile TV services. Instead, it had ambitions to become a 
solution provider in the value chain and take a central position in DVB-H services. 
 
 
Box B Functionalities and elements of Nokia Mobile Broadcast Solutions*  
 
□ Main functionalities in the solution 
(1) Streaming control: enables both network-wide and regional broadcasts 
from several content providers. 
(2) Electronic service guide: generates and broadcasts the service metadata so 
that consumers can browse available services, view service descriptions 
and purchase new services. 
(3) Service protection and purchase: controls stream encryption from end to 
end, generates decryption keys and delivers keys to consumers in a billing-
integrated manner. 
  
□ Major elements in the solution 
(1) The Broadcast Service Manager: controls the broadcast and end-to-end 
protection of streams and also generates the electronic service guide. 
(2) The Broadcast Encapsulator: enables (as a gateway) the broadcast delivery 
of intellectual property content over DVB-H. These intellectual property 
encapsulators also perform the encryption of paid services. 
(3) The Broadcast Account Manager: allows the user to buy rights for 
consumption of protected content, and produces charging data of the 
purchase transactions for billing purposes. 
 
*Nokia homepage, http://www.nokia.com/NOKIA_COM_1/Microsites/3GSM/pdf/DVB-
H_Press_Backgrounder.pdf, accessed 26/09/2011. 
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Nokia’s strategy created a conflict of interests with MNOs and this seems likely to have 
contributed to 3 Italia’s decision to source mobile TV handsets from the Korean 
manufacturers. The other issue was 3 Italia’s Conditional Access Systems (CAS) called 
the ‘Open Security Framework’, which permitted flexibility in implementing 
conditional access method by content providers145. Both Nokia and 3 Italia clung to their 
own CAS standards during negotiations and Nokia refused to develop a CAS 
customised for 3 Italia. Due to these reasons, even though Nokia was well equipped for 
an integrated solution for a DVB-H service, 3 Italia refused to share its value added 
from the service, and pursued the apparently higher risk and higher return strategy of 
developing its own DVB-H service. 
 
Successful launches of a DVB-H mobile TV service based on Nokia’s MBS occurred in 
Vietnam and Finland146. In December 2006, Nokia helped the Vietnam Multimedia 
Corporation, the leading national broadcaster and operator, launch the first live DVB-H 
service in Asia Pacific. Then in May 2007, it also collaborated with Digita, the owner of 
the DVB-H licence in Finland for the launch of a DVB-H service based on its MBS 
platform. After announcing a DVB-H partnership with Malaysian MiTV in June 2007, 
however, Nokia remained silent until announcing, in May 2009, a plan to sell its MBS 
unit employing 40 engineers to Wipro, the Indian IT service provider. The history of 
Nokia’s attempt to commercialise MBS provides significant support for the conclusion 
                                           
145 In fact, each provider has come up with a slightly different Conditional Access System. The flexibility 
in the Conditional Access System brought significant development burdens for handset manufacturers. 
They had to integrate and customise each Conditional Access System for each MNOs. This significantly 
prolonged DVB-H handset development cycles, which became a significant barrier to the success of 
DVB-H (Itzik Klein, Guidelines for a Conditional Access System that would serve the success of ATSC-
M/H market, http://www.siano-ms.com/CN/images/White_papers/Siano_wp_guidelines_for_ca.pdf, 
accessed in 26/09/2011). 
146 Contents of this paragraph is based on press releases in Nokia’s homepage.  
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that MNOs in many countries seek to retain control over the revenue streams associated 
with content-related services. Ironically, this position has been significantly eroded in 
the 3G era which offers Internet-based access to a number of content services, 
bypassing MNO control. 
 
Samsung and LG’s eagerness to join in the project 
By the time 3 Italia approached the handset manufacturers, Samsung had been preparing 
for DVB-H technologies for almost a year in collaboration with several Korean software 
suppliers and with in-house resources from its R&D centre in India. As 3 Italia and 
Samsung had no previous contracts147, Samsung regarded this project as a good 
opportunity to expand its customer base in the European WCDMA market. Equipped 
with a prototype, Samsung expressed its eagerness to join. 
 
In contrast, LG was not prepared for DVB-H technologies at all148 at the time, despite 
the successful commercialisation in 2005 of DMB, the Korean version of mobile TV 
service. LG made a counter-proposal in June, asking 3 Italia to utilise the successfully 
commercialised DMB technologies (rather than DVB-H technologies) for the service. 
However, this proposal was refused. In light of 3 Italia’s planned future as a multimedia 
broadcasting company, it needed to continue with DVB-H technologies so that it would 
be able to expand into the Digital Video Broadcasting–Terrestrial (DVB-T) service. It 
sent an ultimatum to LG asking for a decision by July 2005149. Hutchison Wampoa (3 
                                           
147 Instead, Samsung established good relationships with Vodafone and T-Mobile (interview with a 
marketing manager in LG). 
148 During interview, a project leader of the LG DVB-H project said, ‘We engineers [had] actually never 
heard of DVB-H before. We had to look it up to find out what it was.’ 
149 Interview with a project leader of the LG DVB-H project. 
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Italia’s owner) and LG had maintained a very good relationship since the 
commencement of Hutchison’s WCDMA service. The executives in LG were so 
concerned about losing Hutchison as their customer to Samsung that they ordered their 
engineers to accept 3 Italia’s offer under any terms and conditions. In the end, both 
Korean handset makers, Samsung and LG, showed the commitment, flexibility and 
willingness to invest in the project and thus 3 Italia decided to do parallel sourcing from 
both Samsung and LG150.  
 
Sealing a contract and DVB-H handset development 
3 Italia put together the same contract with Samsung and LG151 with the following 
terms and conditions: (a) Samsung and LG had to deliver their DVB-H handsets by 20 
May 2006 and (b) 3 Italia would purchase 300,000 units from each with a high-end 
price152. If either handset maker could not make the deadline the contract would 
automatically be considered void. 
 
After accepting their contract, Samsung and LG each set up a dedicated research centre 
in Rome with 30 handset engineers153 in collaboration with 3 Italia. 3 Italia 
purposefully made the two companies compete with each other by not allowing them to 
communicate with each other during the R&D phase. However, both companies were 
able to gauge their competitive position on the basis of attitudes of solution providers 
                                           
150 The content of this paragraph is based on the interview with a project leader of the LG DVB-H project. 
151 During interview, a project leader of the LG DVB-H project said that with the wisdom of hindsight, 
he considered the term of the contract as a misjudgement by 3 Italia. According to him, 3 Italia did not 
expect that LG would be able to meet the deadline and therefore it carried on the project with LG purely 
as an insurance in case of Samsung’s failure. He also believed that 3 Italia expected only 300,000 units 
(half of the contracted number) to be sold by the end of 2006.  
152 Interviews with a project leader of the LG DVB-H project and a marketing manager in LG. 
153 In the final stage of the project, the number of engineers went up to 100.  
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such as NagraVision154. This parallel sourcing clearly ushered in a development process 
that was accelerated by the competition between the two companies. In the end, both 
LG and Samsung developed their DVB-H featured handsets before the deadline (U900 
and P910 respectively). 
 
6.4.4 The commercial result of the project 
After nine months of the development project, the DVB-H mobile TV service by 3 Italia 
was successfully launched in May 2006; 12 TV channels including Sky Sport, Sky 
Cinema, Rai 1, 2 and 3 were provided. Customers were given options to subscribe to 
daily, weekly, monthly or six monthly unlimited access for € (euros) 3, €12, €29, €59 
respectively. Playboy and Penthouse channels were also available for an additional 
charge of €19 per month for each channel.  
 
3 Italia acquired 100,000 subscribers after just 58 days from the start of the service, 
indicating that the penetration speed was faster than that of 3G by 3 Italia, (which by 
comparison had acquired 100,000 subscribers in 91 days). Further increases in 
subscriber numbers came with 300,000 in January 2007, 400,000 in April 2007155 and 
770,000 (the latter being around a 9% increase in total subscribers156) in October 2007. 
More importantly for 3 Italia, 80% of new DVB-H subscribers were previous customers 
of Vodafone and TIM and these mobile TV customers also showed 60% more ARPU on 
                                           
154 If they were not cooperative with LG engineers over fixing a specific error, this would mean that 
Samsung had already solved the problem. 
155 Cellular News, ‘Eastern European Operators Turning to Mobile TV for New Revenue’,  
http://www.cellular-news.com/story/32350.php, accessed 20/10/2014. 
156 By the end of 2006, the numbers of subscribers to TIM, Vodafone and 3 Italia were 26, 20 and 6.8 
million respectively.  
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average157.  
 
Despite the initial success, the general consensus on the 3 Italia’s DVB-H service was 
that it had not been successful. Firstly, 3 Italia’s original target (500,000 subscribers by 
the end of 2006) was not met158 because two Italian market leaders TIM (with 
Samsung’s P920 and later P930) and Vodafone (with Samsung’s P940 and LG’s KU950) 
subsequently followed 3 Italia to launch their own DVB-H services in September 2006 
and December 2006 respectively159. Secondly, the majority of 3 Italia’s subscribers 
seemed to prefer the daily basis option at €3 rather than weekly or monthly plans160, and 
therefore the Italians’ acceptance of mobile TV did not meet the expectations of 3 Italia. 
Lastly, customer groups generally wanting a mobile TV service could not afford the 
price of the DVB-H handset at $400161, hindering the adoption of the service by the 
majority of users.  
 
For handset manufacturer participants, this project also brought contrasting economic 
performances. Samsung and LG both delivered 100,000 units to 3 Italia as first 
shipments although 300,000 units per company were agreed in the contract162. 
                                           
157 Nagravision, Maximizing mobile TV revenues, November 2007, p.12. 
http://www.actuonda.com/pdf/Nagravision_maximizing_mobile_TV_revenues_Broadcast_Madrid_2007.
pdf, accessed 26/09/2011. 
158 In case of TIM and Vodafone, Mediaset acquired network licences from Europa TV in December 
2005 for €186.8 million, established a DVB-H network, then leased 25% of the network’s capacity to 
TIM and another 25% to Vodafone (Strategy Analytics Insight, ‘DVB-H in Italy: 3 and TIM Head-to-
Head Analysis’, 16/11/2006, http://www.strategyanalytics.com/reports/4w6Je8b0wB/htframe.htm, 
accessed 20/01/2015). 
159 Faultline, ‘3 Italia DVB-H sales slump after flying start’, http://www.rethinkresearch.biz/articles/3-
italia-dvb-h-sales-slump-after-flying-start/, accessed 22/01/2015. 
160 Strategy Analytics Insight, ‘DVB-H in Italy: 3 and TIM Head-to-Head Analysis’, 16/11/2006, 
http://www.strategyanalytics.com/reports/4w6Je8b0wB/htframe.htm, accessed 20/01/2015. 
161 During my interview, a marketing manager in LG said, ‘Consider their social status. Customers 
affording $400 handset simply did not need to watch TV outdoors.’ 
162 The next section discusses how contract works in practice between MNOs and handset manufacturers. 
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Regarding U900 and P910, a marketing manager for 3 Italia at LG at the time recalled 
that U900 by LG was preferred by 3 Italia shops – and LG received subsequent orders 
in the second half of 2006 – while P910 by Samsung struggled to compete against U900. 
By May 2007, the number of sales of U900 had reached 400,000163 and LG’s success 
led 3 Italia to introduce its second generation DVB-H phone (U960). In the meantime, 
Samsung had sold 170,000 units with P910, P920 and P930164. During my interview, a 
marketing manager for 3 Italia at LG explained:  
 
If MNOs are 1st tier like Verizon and Hutchison, the contract is simply nominal. 
They [MNOs] do not guarantee the quantity written in the contract. Of course, 
they take the first shipments and handset manufacturers also prepare only that 
amount, generally for one month. But if sales are under the expectation, MNOs 
themselves prepare special promotions but also push us to come up with 
promotion measures to help sales in their shops. We [have to] provide subsidies 
for handsets to discount handset price or incentives for salesmen to promote 
sales. Considering what I heard from 3 Italia at the time, Samsung must have 
done those promotions at the time. 
 
6.4.5 Inter-firm collaboration, market opportunity and rule of competition in the 
mobile handset industry 
The case of the DVB-H mobile TV service by 3 Italia demonstrates that market 
opportunities are available to producers if they are equipped with the technological 
capacity to deliver products that MNOs and their customers demand; the case also 
shows that producers need to have organisational flexibility (capabilities) to invest 
resources and share the costs of, and profits from, a co-specialisation process with 
MNOs (Eisenhardt & Martin 2000; Teece et al. 1997). Even so, not all qualified 
                                           
163 Etnews, ‘LG taking mobile TV market in Europe’, 10/05/2007, 
http://www.etnews.com/200705100147, accessed 22/01/2015. 
164 Ibid. 
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producers were keen to participate in such partnerships, as exemplified by Nokia. Due 
to preceding investments in its mobile TV server platform (MBS), Nokia refused to 
support 3 Italia and pursued a leading role in a value chain in order to seize a larger 
share of profits. In its prospected business model, Nokia was not a customised handset 
supplier, but a solution provider with both a DVB-H handset and a service providing a 
platform for DVB-H service providers (these were mostly MNOs). This conflict of 
interests between MNOs and Nokia accordingly opened windows of opportunity for 
Samsung and LG who, in contrast to Nokia, were willing to invest their resources in 3 
Italia.  
 
When asked during an interview by Businessweek165 why Sprint had an affinity for 
Korean phone makers, Sprint’s president, Charles Levine, replied,  
 
We have focused on manufacturers that are willing to provide unique phones 
that customers say they want. Samsung, Kyocera, LG and Sanyo are some of 
our best suppliers. The European players [Nokia and Ericsson] are providing 
handsets along a similar line to as many carriers as possible. That’s 
commoditizing the phones. And that’s why you have not seen us work heavily 
with manufacturers that we feel are not producing handsets with the unique 
features and functions. 
 
The above case also showed that there is a fundamental difference in the nature of 
collaborations between MNOs and handset producers before and after the introduction 
of new mobile network services by MNOs. As presented in sections 6.2 and 6.3, the 
close interactions with MNOs in the early stage of the mobile handset industry provided 
handset producers with a variety of valuable data on customer demands such as 
                                           
165 Businessweek, ‘On the line with Sprint PCS’s president’, http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2002-
03-26/on-the-line-with-sprint-pcss-president, accessed 29/12/2014. 
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preferences on form factors, user interfaces and user-friendly functions. MNOs played 
an important role as sources of innovation while producers implemented these ideas as 
innovations to meet users’ requirements. In this context, the relationship between 
producers and users in the early stage can be described as a ‘von Hippelian producer–
user relationship’ (von Hippel 1998). With the emergence of mobile network services by 
MNOs on the basis of advanced network technologies, however, the dyadic relationship 
between producers and users significantly changed. In order for 3 Italia to launch a new 
DVB-H service, for instance, it needed to have concurrently organised solution 
providers and to have developed a service platform through which subscribing 
customers would be allowed to utilise digital contents. In doing so, it was MNOs that 
strategically selected the appropriate software modules and solutions from among those 
available from the market. Samsung and LG were then required to develop (customised) 
handsets that reflected hardware requirements and incorporated software modules 
designated by 3 Italia in order to enable handsets to deliver 3 Italia’s new (MNO-
specific) DVB-H service. 
 
The main logic behind this collaboration is that both producers and users invest their 
financial and human resources concurrently for a certain period, fully committing to a 
collaborative project. In this case, resource investments from both parties are highly 
relation-specific in the sense that handsets produced are only compatible with this 
specific mobile service, which is also able to be delivered only through these 
customised handsets. In other words, MNOs’ services and handset manufacturers’ 
handsets are highly co-specialised, as explained by Teece (1986). The development 
process is also highly interconnected, both sides being required to understand their 
complementarities and create and nurture inter-organisational routines and capabilities – 
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these capabilities are called ‘relation-specific skills’ by Asanuma (1989). Considering 
the need to reconfigure organisational routines to cope with the change from von 
Hippelian to Teecean collaboration, the dynamic capabilities are of essence (Eisenhardt 
& Martin 2000; Teece et al. 1997). In this way, the bilateral relationship between 
handset manufacturers and MNOs can produce a ‘joint competitive advantage’ (Jap 
2001) through this co-specialisation. Therefore, this bilateral relationship between 
producers and users can be described as a ‘Teecean producer–user relationship’ (Teece 
1986). 
 
In return for this co-specialisation, MNOs generally guarantee a financial return to 
handset producers by the guaranteed purchase of a certain quantity of shipments at a 
cheaper price than that of the market but one that is high enough for manufacturers to 
make profits166. In return, handset producers are obligated to deliver on time and if not, 
they are subjected to heavy contractual penalties. If the handset model becomes popular, 
users subsequently place a second order and manufacturers are able to make 
considerable profits based on economies of scale.  
 
The existence of such collaborative projects also seemed to change the rules of 
competition in the industry. Prior to new mobile network services by MNOs, the 
competition was mainly among handset manufacturers, e.g. Nokia vs Motorola or 
Ericsson. With new mobile network services, however, competition occurred between 
standardised handsets made by Nokia without (or with fewer) MNO-specific services on 
the one hand, and customised handsets made by handset manufacturers in support of 
MNO-specific services on the other. Nokia kept pursuing WAP in the early 2000s and 
                                           
166 As in the case of 3 Italia, however, the guarantee of 1st tier MNOs was nominal. 
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its own software platform ‘Symbian’, and even its application store ‘Ovi’ in the late 
2000s, as a means of promoting its globally compatible (not network-specific) handsets, 
leaving MNOs on the periphery as simple ‘network providers’. In this sense, 
competition in the industry occurred not between Nokia and other handset 
manufacturers but between Nokia and MNOs with the support of handset producers – 
the competition was about ‘who takes the lion’s share in the mobile telecommunication 
industry’. Nokia’s refusal to join in the 3 Italia’s DVB-H service was just one of a series 
of conflicts between Nokia and MNOs across borders. Therefore, attempts to 
understand the competition in the mobile handset industry without the consideration of 
MNOs seem destined to fail.  
 
Another theoretical consideration is needed in that this co-specialisation process 
examined theoretically by Teece (1986) seems to work in a different fashion in the 
mobile handset industry compared with other industries. This seems mainly due to the 
industry’s short product life cycle and highly segmented market structure.  
 
Short product life cycle is likely to entail two contrasting aspects that relate to 
opportunistic behaviour. In the mobile handset industry, both producers and users are 
committed to each other for a relatively short period (six to twelve months). These 
bilateral commitments are then renewed with a subsequent contract if the foregoing 
project has been completed to the satisfaction of both parties. In this case, the 
probability of opportunistic behaviour on the part of either partner seems to be higher 
between contracts because of the absence of an ongoing commitment that allows either 
side to depart if a better deal is available elsewhere. The probability of opportunistic 
behaviour within the contract period, however, seems lower because of the desire for 
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renewal (or at least the option of renewal) and the limited gains that can be made by 
opportunism within the period.  
 
Highly segmented market structure poses absence of exclusiveness in the international 
context and loose exclusiveness within the same local market owing to a short product 
life cycle. Since handset markets are highly segmented across each other’s borders, 
mobile services by one local MNO do not compete with those by foreign MNOs, and 
therefore handset producers are allowed to commit to similar contracts with foreign 
MNOs. Even if MNOs compete in the same local market, they do not mind as long as 
handsets with similar functions by their competitors arrive late (generally three to six 
months) in the market167. For example, Vodafone Italy launched a DVB-H service in 
December 2006 that was similar to that of 3 Italia, following the latter’s success, and its 
handset providers were identical to those for 3 Italia, namely Samsung (P940) and LG 
(KU950). Without hesitation, a project leader of the LG DVB-H project commented 
during interview, ‘This is possibly due to a short product life cycle of the industry. In 
three to six months, MNOs promote other user selling points (services) with different 
handsets.’ 
 
In this context, the co-specialisation between producers and users in the mobile handset 
industry is shallow compared to other industries where the bilateral relationship lasts a 
long time and opportunistic behaviours within the relationship may matter. The 
fundamental difference in the shallow type of co-specialisation is that producers serve 
multiple users not only across borders but also in the same market over time. 
Accordingly, the capabilities required of a producer to carry out this shallow co-
                                           
167 Interview with a marketing manager in LG. 
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specialisation may differ from those required to carry out a conventional (deep) co-
specialisation. Producers in the former have to be equipped with wider technical 
capacity than those in the latter to serve various sets of requirements from multiple 
users. Producers in the shallow co-specialisation will also have to promptly transfer 
relation-specific skills from one user to other users – these skills are called ‘interface 
capabilities’ by Yasumoto and Fujimoto (2006).  
 
The conventional argument within the literature on firm boundaries seems rather 
deterministic. If technical changes diminish with the stabilisation of product 
architectures, firms will align their boundaries as a means of competing in the most 
efficient way according to their capabilities. However, according to what is being 
presented in this thesis, research is still needed on perspectives that go beyond firm 
boundaries. As shown in the mobile phone industry, fierce competition exists on the 
issue of ‘who takes how much’ among industry participants like suppliers, producers, 
and especially intermediary users. Collisions between these actors each pursuing 
maximum profit may establish multiple ‘industry architectures’ (Jacobides et al. 2006) 
that exist concurrently and compete each other. The multiplicity of industry 
architectures creates a market opportunity for Korean emergent leading firms in the 
mobile handset industry. 
 
6.5 Influence of the MNO-oriented model on Korean handset manufacturers 
The previous section has described how the bilateral relationship between Korean 
emergent leading firms and MNOs shifted from a von Hippelian to a Teecean producer–
user relationship. This section considers positive and negative aspects of this dyadic 
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relationship and explores the influence of this relationship on Korean handset 
manufacturers in comparison with Nokia and Motorola. In addition, it presents how 
Korean handset manufacturers transformed their development structure to serve a 
variety of MNOs utilising diverse networks across borders.  
 
6.5.1 Two facets of the close relationship with MNOs 
From the Korean manufacturers’ perspective, a close relationship with MNOs entailed 
both positive and negative aspects, as discussed in Chapter 2 and 4. The advantages for 
manufacturers from co-specialisation include the role of MNOs as additional sources of 
innovation and access to the complementary resources and knowledge of MNOs. These 
advantages have successfully created joint competitive advantages which have helped 
Korean emergent leading firms to incrementally overcome uneven development 
between technical and marketing stages.  
 
On the other hand, the reliance on MNOs also brought several disadvantages for the 
manufacturers. First, MNOs demanded hardware and software customisations, resulting 
in additional R&D costs and difficulty in attaining economies of scale; Korean 
producers must have set their prices at lower profit margins to reflect the superior access 
of MNOs to the end-users of mobile telephones. Second, MNOs’ downstream resources 
enabled Korean handset manufacturers to save on investment in brand awareness in the 
near term. However, this largely deferred an investment that they would have to 
undertake later, unless they were willing to continue indefinitely to be disadvantaged in 
terms of their bargaining power against MNOs. Perhaps more importantly, the 
technology development trajectory might have been shaped for the benefits to MNOs at 
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the expense of the benefits to manufacturers and end-users as explained in Section 4.3.4. 
Last not the least, a misreading of the market demands by MNOs sometimes brought a 
heavy blow to manufacturers, since MNOs may substitute another supplier because of 
the limited duration of supply contracts.  
 
The marriage of Verizon Wireless and LG since the early 2000s provides a good 
example of both facets – the synergies and traps – of this type of business strategy. By 
reflecting Verizon’s demands and providing a new handset exclusively customised for 
Verizon, LG had enjoyed high market shares in the US handset market since the early 
2000s; LG had effectively piggybacked on Verizon’s brand. When Verizon misread 
market demands by overlooking the high preference of customers for smart phones, 
however, the tables were totally turned. Sales of LG in the market plummeted due to its 
feature phone-oriented development capacity while Verizon promptly switched its 
handset suppliers to other handset manufacturers like Samsung and High Tech 
Computer Corporation of Taiwan (HTC), both of whom had anticipated the rapid 
expansion of the smart phones market. 
 
6.5.2 Impacts of the close relationship with MNOs 
Table 6.7 shows the number of new handset models introduced, unit sales, handset 
shipments per model with market shares by major handset vendors in the 
GSM/WCDMA handset market168 from 2001 to 2009. The table shows that Korean 
handset manufacturers have been producing a greater diversity of handsets than Nokia 
                                           
168 Unlike GSM/WCDMA handsets, the certification process of CDMA handsets is mainly managed by 
each CDMA network operator, and therefore unfortunately there is no community or website available to 
provide the information on the number of CDMA handset models introduced in a specific year by each 
vendor. 
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and Motorola. For example, Samsung produced 28 different GSM/WCDMA models in 
2003 for a 9.8% market share and 119 in 2009 for a 19.2% market share. By contrast, 
Nokia introduced 26 and 44 models for market shares of 42.2% and 45.1% respectively 
in the same years169. This contrast becomes even greater if LG is compared to Nokia: the 
number of handset shipments per model from Nokia exceeded approximately ten 
million while that from Korean manufacturers was at best two million. Apart from 
Samsung in 2002, Korean handset manufacturers did not exceed two million units per 
model, as indicated in the Table 6.7. 
 
Table 6.7 Number of new handset models, sales, handset shipments per model and market 
shares by companies in GSM/WCDMA 
   (Rows: model numbers, million units, million units per model, market share) 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
LG 
1 11 12 22 36 36 33 50 54 
0.3 2.2 6.1 18.4 24.5 25.9 41.8 55.8 80.7 
0.30 0.20 0.51 0.84 0.68 0.72 1.27 1.12 1.49 
0.1% 0.8% 1.8% 3.8% 3.9% 3.2% 4.5% 5.6% 8.5% 
Samsung 
11 11 28 33 54 77 81 96 119 
14.2 22.8 33.8 58.0 76.2 88.1 130.4 161.9 181.6 
1.29 2.07 1.21 1.76 1.41 1.14 1.61 1.69 1.53 
5.6% 8.3% 9.8% 12.0% 12.0% 10.9% 14.1% 16.4% 19.2% 
Motorola 
8 14 32 32 27 14 27 29 25 
40.8 37.4 38.4 68.5 110.8 169.3 115.7 69.8 28.9 
5.10 2.67 1.20 2.14 4.10 12.09 4.29 2.41 1.16 
16.2% 13.5% 11.1% 14.1% 17.4% 20.9% 12.5% 7.1% 3.1% 
Nokia 
5 17 26 21 35 32 40 36 44 
98.2 117.2 146.0 178.7 244.2 329.4 427.8 463.6 426.1 
19.64 6.89 5.62 8.51 6.98 10.29 10.07 12.88 9.68 
39.0% 42.3% 42.2% 36.9% 38.4% 40.7% 46.2% 46.9% 45.1% 
Source: number of new GSM/WCDMA handset models counted by author from GSM Arena, 
www.gsmarena.com, and sales and market shares derived from Strategic Analytics. 
                                           
169 Considering the strong bargaining power by CDMA MNOs and corresponding low open market share 
in the CDMA handset market, the gap between the Korean and other foreign manufacturers is expected to 
be wider if figures from the CDMA market are also included. 
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The average number of handset shipments per model by major companies indicates the 
burden on Korean manufacturers from the development of more handset models in 
comparison to Motorola and Nokia; producing each model may have entailed additional 
R&D costs for Korean handset manufacturers. On the other hand, Nokia, having sold 
roughly ten million units per model, provided itself with the potential for greater profits 
originating from economies of scale.  
 
6.5.3 Contract-based development structure 
Increased involvement of MNOs in the mobile handset industry in the post 2G era led 
Korean emergent leading firms to transform their development structures, from a von 
Hippelian to a Teecean producer–user collaboration. This is similar to what Day (1994) 
described about the case of the Corning, Inc. division that manufactures fiber optic 
products. It had to cope with the transition of market demands from standard to more 
customised products. Accordingly, the main customer group for Korean emergent 
leading firms shifted from end-users to MNOs (intermediary users), and Korean 
emergent leading firms adopted contract-based development, which is fundamentally 
different from the mass-production structure that firms like Nokia had pursued.  
 
Under this contract-based development system, it is MNOs that decide which handsets 
with which functions will be introduced when in the market, and handset manufacturers 
develop these handsets accordingly. From the product planning stage onwards, both 
sides collaborate with each other. Handset manufacturers provide their product roadmap 
with concepts of new handset models and new deliverable functions, and MNOs may 
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request handset manufacturers to make proposals to serve their network service 
roadmap or may directly designate specifications of new handsets to handset 
manufacturers. However, not all MNOs have the power to dictate full customisations. 
MNOs are generally categorised according to their capacity of monthly shipments and 
only 1st tier MNOs are served under this logic. During my interview, a marketing 
manager at LG explained the criteria for 1st tier MNOs:  
 
A full customised (including hardware and software) handset model generally 
requires R&D costs of around $5 million. To attain break-even point, at least 
200,000 units should be guaranteed. But not many MNOs can afford this. 
MNOs such as SK Telecom (Korea) and Verizon (US) can do this. We call 
them 1st tier MNOs. Second tier MNOs like Movistar in Latin America have 
capacity to guarantee only 20,000 units and MNOs that we call ‘others’ 
normally order 5,000 to 10,000 units at best. Therefore, all the R&D resources 
and organisational structures are arranged to efficiently serve 1st tier big buyers 
in Korea, US, Japan and Europe. To keep a good relationship with 1st tier 
MNOs, we sometimes deliver handsets regardless of break-even point on 
numerous occasions. Or if we expect that they would not be able to purchase 
break-even point units for a new model, we may convene 2nd or others using 
similar networks of 1st tier MNOs and collectively receive orders from them 
ahead of development to fill the break-even point gap170. 
 
After serving these 1st tier MNOs, handset manufacturers then market these handsets to 
2nd tier or lower MNOs. These medium and small MNOs are generally allowed for 
limited hardware and software customisations, which would cost around $0.5 million 
(one tenth of full customisations). Using similar logic, the guarantee of around 20,000 
units would be needed for an order of country-adapted customised handsets. There are 
two main reasons behind limited customisations for 2nd and lower tier MNOs. Firstly, 
                                           
170 The characteristics of the MNO-oriented organisational structure in the Korean handset manufacturers 
were visible in their production lines as well. Two operator-exclusive lines were operating (four lines for 
AT&T and one line for NTT-Docomo, so that MNOs could exclusively supervise assembled handsets) 
when the author visited the Pyongtaek production line of LG on 03/03/2011. 
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these MNOs do not have enough market capacity to order full customisations. Secondly, 
these smaller MNOs do not have the same sophisticated technical capacity to designate 
new functions to handset manufacturers as the 1st tier MNOs. In fact, they rely on 1st tier 
MNOs’ knowledge and generally accept what 1st tier MNOs have already designated 
without much modification. However, a break-even point is not the only factor that 
Korean emergent leading firms consider when they deal with small MNOs, and there is 
flexibility within their MNO contracts. A marketing manager in LG said: 
 
We both [handset manufacturers and MNOs] are experts in the industry and 
understand each other’s situation well. If small MNOs cannot guarantee the 
break-even point units for ‘A’ handset, asking for a higher price would be 
reasonable. But in general, MNOs may offer package deal on buying a less 
promising ‘B’ handset together with us or provide considerable marketing 
subsidies to offset our country-adaptation costs. We know how to compromise 
and make deals for ourselves. 
 
He added the reasons why LG continues to do business with 2nd tier or lower MNOs:  
 
LG’s approach was that we make enough profits from big buyers like SK 
Telecom (Korea), Verizon (US) and Hutchison (Europe). In the meantime, we 
tried hard to establish a new relationship with other big buyers such as 
Vodafone and T-Mobile. One year, we developed five to ten models for just 
50,000 to 100,000 units for Vodafone. We did business prioritising on 1st tier 
MNOs. But, we still need 2nd tiers and others because their orders can [i.e. 
enable us to] share R&D costs and various other fixed costs. As long as they 
can meet the break-even point, we take their orders. 
 
Bargaining power and technological capacity of MNOs and handset manufacturers, and 
the degree of customisations, are interconnected factors in constructing the contract-
based development of Korean emergent leading firms.  
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6.6 Summary 
The chapter has mainly dealt with how Korean emergent leading firms overcame their 
uneven development between technology and marketing stages based on their 
collaboration with MNOs, and correspondingly how this has affected the development 
systems of Korean emergent leading firms. 
 
The first part of the chapter has shown that Korean handset makers first dominated the 
domestic CDMA handset market based on their first movers’ advantage, and they 
continued their successes in the global market, entering the US CDMA handset market. 
However, the chapter has also shown that they employed either an ODM or co-branding 
strategy, which is different from OBMs in the domestic market. Despite their 
technologically competitive handsets, their weak brand presence in the US handset 
market led Korean handset manufacturers to collaborate with US MNOs in return for 
market access, which was fundamentally different from the approach adopted by global 
players such as Nokia and Motorola. The chapter has demonstrated that Korean 
emergent leading firms stayed between stages 4 and 5 in terms of co-branding with 
MNOs while they kept at stage 5 in terms of technological leadership due to their 
collaborations with MNOs (Hobday 1995b).  
 
The chapter has further illustrated that the collaborations between Korean emergent 
leading firms and MNOs evolved from a von Hippelian to a version of the Teecean 
producer-user relationship with the case of the world’s first DVB-H mobile TV service 
launched by 3 Italia with the support of Samsung and LG. The example has shown that 
Korean emergent leading firms successfully obtained new market opportunities by fully 
dedicating their development resources to 3 Italia whereas Nokia adhered to its DVB-H 
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business model. The success of the project not only brought profits from the initial 
contract with 3 Italia to Samsung and LG but also enabled them to win subsequent 
DVB-H contracts with other Italian MNOs such as TIM and Vodafone. 
 
The chapter has also demonstrated that the co-specialisation studied by Teece (1986) 
operates in a different fashion in the mobile handset industry compared to other 
industries; this difference is due to the short product life cycle of mobile handsets and 
their highly fragmented markets, a phenomenon described in the thesis as shallow co-
specialisation. The chapter has also highlighted that an analysis of firm boundaries 
based on the capabilities view (firm level) cannot properly explain the dynamic 
competitions in the mobile handset industry mainly due to the existence of MNOs as 
intermediary users. 
 
The last part of the chapter has shown the downside of the co-specialisation between 
Korean emergent leading firms and MNOs. Although co-specialisation with foreign 
MNOs has helped the globalisation of the Korean emergent leading firms in that it has 
compensated for their lack of marketing resources, it has also brought about a heavy 
burden of customisations, leading to the loss of economies of scale. The chapter has 
explained how Korean emergent leading firms accordingly have transformed their 
market approach from customers (end-users) to MNOs (intermediary users) and 
implemented contract-based development.  
 
The next chapter discusses one of the organisational solutions that Korean emergent 
leading firms have adopted to overcome the strategic dilemma originating from their 
close relationships with MNOs.  
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7. UTILISATION OF CONTRACT DEVELOPER 
ORGANISATIONS171  
 
7.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter showed how Korean handset makers have grown as global players, 
and it emphasised their relationships with MNOs, starting from von Hippelian 
collaborations and evolving to Teecean co-specialisation. Based on early success in the 
domestic market, the Korean handset makers managed to penetrate the first foreign 
export market (US CDMA handset market). Due to the innate weak brand awareness of 
emergent leading firms, however, they heavily relied on sales through foreign MNOs 
under either ODM or co-branding arrangements. Although the strategy adopted by 
Korean emergent leading firms had advantages, it also had disadvantages. On the one 
hand, their strategy enabled them to secure a foothold in foreign markets with lower 
investment on the downstream side. On the other hand, however, their close relationship 
with MNOs called for relation-specific investments by Korean manufacturers in return 
for the use of their partners’ complementary assets. This also resulted in an increase in 
the number of handset models that Korean handset manufacturers had to develop for 
their customers and incurred the contract-based development structure that was shown 
in Chapter 6; the chapter showed that the uneven development between technological 
and marketing capacity drove Korean emergent leading firms to evolve in a different 
fashion from their leading competitors.  
  
This chapter investigates how Korean handset makers reconciled the upsurge in 
                                           
171 As far as the author is aware, the concept of a ‘contract developer’ (CD) is new to the literature. The 
content of most of this chapter, therefore, was obtained from interviews with LG and its CD employees. 
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development activities resulting from their collaborations with MNOs. Turning the 
focus of the analysis to the upstream side, it identifies a new form of outsourcing 
organisation which in this thesis is called the ‘contract developer’ (CD); the observation 
is put forward that while foreign competitors like Nokia tend to outsource the 
production (assembly) stage of low-end models to specialised assemblers (Anderson & 
Jonsson 2006; Porter & Paija 2011), Korean handset makers in fact tend to outsource 
the development stage of low-end models to their CDs. The chapter highlights the 
emergence of CDs for Korean OBMs and specifically exemplifies LG’s manoeuvring of 
its CDs through its global strategic model of the ‘Shine Phone’. By chronologically 
tracing the dynamics of the division of labour between LG and its CDs, this chapter 
infers that CDs for Korean handset makers on the upstream side played a significant 
role under the contract-based development structure of Korean emergent leading firms 
from the downstream-side co-specialisation.  
 
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 7.2 begins with the definition of CDs for 
handset manufacturers and their role in the value chain of the industry. Section 7.3 
provides a detailed history of the emergence of CDs in the Korean mobile handset 
industry, and the circumstantial factors that have promoted their emergence in terms of 
both demand and supply. It also shows examples of CDs and their development projects 
for Korean OBMs. Then, Section 7.4 examines how Korean handset OBMs search, 
supervise and nurture their CDs under their outsourcing strategy for handset 
developments.  
 
Section 7.5 sets out how the division of labour between LG and its CDs changed during 
the introduction of LG’s global strategic model, the Shine Phone, and its diverse 
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variations during the three years between October 2006 and October 2009. It also 
examines the main reasons behind outsourcing decisions for each model. Based on the 
findings from the previous sections, Section 7.6 discusses the role of CDs in the 
globalisation of Korean handset OBMs.  
 
7.2 Definition of a CD for Korean handset OBMs 
This section introduces the definition of a CD and identifies its distinct role in the value 
chain of the mobile handset industry. 
 
7.2.1 Contract manufacturer, design house and CD 
The utilisation of a contract manufacturer or electronics manufacturing service company 
has been very common in the electronics industry since the emergence of the global 
production network (Ernst 2002). The term ‘contract manufacturer’ refers to a company 
that specialises in manufacturing electronic components or assemblies for various 
OBMs, the latter providing the architectural designs or formulae and specifications for 
the former (Sturgeon 2001). Likewise, the utilisation of contract manufacturers in the 
mobile handset industry is also very common, especially by Western handset companies 
such as Nokia and Motorola. Leading contract manufacturers in the mobile handset 
industry include Foxconn and Flextronics, the annual company sales of which amounted 
to $139 billion and $25 billion respectively as of 2014172.  
 
In addition, a ‘design house’ is a firm that designs and develops its own products like an 
                                           
172 Manufacturing Market Insider, ‘Inside the contract manufacturing industry’, http://mfgmkt.com/wp-
content/uploads/2015/04/March-2015-revised.pdf, accessed 13/09/2015. 
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ODM but which does not have production facilities (Imai & Shih 2007). In this regard, 
design houses are to contract manufacturers in the mobile handset industry what fabless 
companies are to foundry companies in the semiconductor industry. Therefore, a design 
house possesses intellectual property from product development and has rights to 
designate vendors for components; in the mobile handset industry, a design house is a 
relatively small company compared to an OBM. 
  
Drawing on the concepts of contract manufacturer and design house in the electronics 
industry, we conceptualise a new type of organisation that provides specialised services 
for developing electronic products like a design house (which does not assemble like a 
contract manufacturer) but which is based on an OBM’s original design/blueprints like a 
contract manufacturer (which does not own design/blueprints like a design house). As 
the service provision from this new organisation pertains to development instead of only 
design or manufacturing (or assembly), in this thesis this new form of organisation is 
labelled a ‘contract developer’ (CD). Therefore, a CD is defined as a company that is 
specialised in providing electronic product-development services to one specific 
OBM173, which in turn provides architectural designs and specifications for a CD. 
 
7.2.2 Role of CDs in the value chain of handset manufacturing 
There are four different kinds of firm organisations in the mobile handset industry 
pertaining to the development of mobile handsets: design houses, CDs, ODMs and 
OBMs, as shown in Figure 7.1. The role of CDs in the value chain of the mobile handset 
                                           
173 Unlike the situation where one contract manufacturer generally serves multiple customers, it is 
assumed that each CD serves a single OBM customer due to the confidential and firm-specific nature of 
product development. 
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174 Interviews with engineers of CDs.
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175 Among 30 CDs for LG, only
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development work. The first task is for hardware engineers to decide the location of 
each component on a circuit board in a handset after the mechanism design is finished. 
The second task is to test wireless performance for voice quality, connectability and data 
transfer as well as the functions of the LCD display, performance of camera module, etc. 
after surface-mounting of all the hardware components on the main printed circuit board. 
Moreover, in order to acquire the desirable voice quality and data communication, the 
engineers must also adjust and stabilise the protocol stack which governs 
communication between their developing mobile handset and the base stations of a 
network operator. The third and last task is for software engineers to develop embedded 
software for operating systems, software modules and the user interface, and to integrate 
them. They also modify the original handset software of OBMs with country-specific 
menus and functions, a process which is commonly known as ‘country adaptation’176.  
 
7.3 Emergence of CDs for Korean handset OBMs 
This section explains what circumstantial factors led over time to the emergence of CDs 
for Korean handset makers from the perspectives of both demand and supply. Several 
interviews with employees in CDs disclosed that there are two distinct groups of CDs 
according to their company histories and, in fact, these two groups began their CD 
business at different times. The following two subsections describe these two waves of 
emergence of CDs for the Korean OBM makers, and the difference in origins and 
market circumstances behind them.  
 
                                           
176 Interview with an engineer of a CD. 
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7.3.1 First wave of the emergence of CDs for Korean OBMs: hike in software 
development activities, demand side (early 2000s) 
The early origins of CDs for Korean handset manufacturers can be found in firms that 
worked together with handset manufacturers on the development of software modules in 
a handset177. Initially, these companies participated in the co-development of diverse 
software modules for a handset system. In the early 2000s, Korean handset makers fell 
short of engineering manpower due to rapid growth of market share and a hike in the 
requests for customisations and diverse models by foreign MNOs. During my interview, 
a handset developer in LG recalled, ‘At the time, we were really successful. We were 
not surprised at the creation of a new development team in each week’. 
 
While they increased in-house resources as much as possible, they also sought the 
assistance of external firms. They were, however, highly concerned with the leakage of 
knowledge and information on new handset models during the development process. 
Given the short life cycle of the mobile handset industry, information regarding a 
company’s new handset model with new functions could inadvertently reveal the 
blueprint of its future R&D and market plans. As an alternative to entirely outsourcing 
the handset development process to unfamiliar ODM firms, the Korean handset makers 
recommended that their software module developers should plan to widen the scope of 
their business profiles and act as handset development outsourcing companies for their 
prime contractors. As they were already working closely with their handset makers, 
these software module developers seized this opportunity to diversify178.  
 
                                           
177 Ibid. 
178 Interview with a team leader at a CD. 
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Managerial issues for Korean OBMs with the first wave of CDs 
The first wave of the emergence of CDs called for collaborative efforts between CDs 
and OBMs, simply because outsourcing a development process was new to both 
organisations. It took a while for new CDs to learn, comprehend and assimilate the 
knowledge that OBM handset makers had accumulated so far regarding the entire 
handset development process. A team leader in LG in charge of outsourcings mentioned,  
 
Because we never had CDs before, we had to set up a new fostering system for 
CDs within our company, searching and evaluating candidates, mentoring CDs 
and supervising outsourcing projects. The fostering system was finally settled 
in early 2003, around a year and a half after the first agreement on contract 
development in late 2001.  
 
7.3.2 Second wave of the emergence of CDs for Korean OBMs: collapse of Korean 
ventures as design houses179, supply side (mid 2000s) 
In the mid 2000s, a group of Korean venture companies that had operated either as 
ODMs or as design houses approached the Korean handset OBMs to become their CDs. 
The question that arises here is: why did this group relinquish their independence and 
offer to become CDs for Korean OBMs? The following section explains the context in 
which Korean small ventures decided to take this step. 
 
Burden on Korean ventures to license protocol stack software and software 
solutions 
Handset makers were required to make an initial payment of $2 to 3 million for 
                                           
179 The collapse of small Korean handset ventures can be interpreted as an industry ‘shakeout’ in the 
mobile handset manufacturing industry. For a detailed discussion of shakeout, see Klepper and Simons 
(2005). 
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licensing protocol stacks and as annual software maintenance fees180. On top of that, 
handset makers also needed to invest considerable sums of money on application 
software modules incorporated into feature phones in conjunction with functional 
convergence and mobile data services. Such applications included WAP browser181, 
Graphic User Interface182, MP3, mobile TV and firmware update solutions183.  
 
Therefore, handset makers had to initially invest $5 to 6 million ($4 to 5 million for 
GSM) and an additional $100,000 to 200,000 annually for maintenance costs, in 
exchange for protocol stacks in the case of CDMA184. In addition, they paid running 
royalties for using software solutions. As large handset manufacturers normally opted to 
pay a discounted one-off fee for licensing based on their production scale, small-sized 
handset ventures struggled to compete against them due to the lack of economies of 
scale. The handset manufacturing business gradually became viable only for firms that 
could acquire economies of scale. 
 
Retreat of Korean ventures from the Chinese market due to fierce competition185 
Since the announcement of GSM as its 2G standard in 1994, the Chinese local handset 
market had been dominated by Motorola and Nokia with more than 70% of market 
share until the late 1990s. In order to curb imports and encourage local makers, the 
                                           
180 Cellular Monthly, ‘Adoption of flash technologies by handset makers’, 09/2005. 
181 Most of the value added services such as M-commerce, Video On Demand/Music On Demand, 
Location Based Service are provided through a WAP browser. Key browser developers include Nokia 
(Finland), Openwave (US), Teleca (Sweden) and Access (Japan). 
182 Portable Network Graphics and Flash are popular solutions used for graphic user interface. 
183 When software solutions embedded in a handset have software errors, firmware updates can be done 
over the air. These solutions are called Firmware Over-The-Air (FOTA). Key players include Innopath 
(US), Bitfone (US), Redbend (US) and Insignia (US). 
184 All the data for licensing fees and royalties here came from Inews24, ‘Handsets full of royalties’, 
http://news.inews24.com/php/news_view.php?g_serial=108238&g_menu=020300, accessed 26/12/2014. 
185 The history of the Chinese local handset market is generally based on Imai and Shih (2007). 
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Chinese government implemented a quota system for importation of finished handsets. 
Both foreign manufacturers set up joint ventures with state-owned telecommunication 
equipment makers Capitel and Eastcom. However, these joint ventures merely 
implemented the assembly process, which left no room for local makers to acquire 
handset development capabilities. 
 
In response, the Chinese government proclaimed in early 1999 ‘Decree No. 5’, which 
allowed only licensed makers to produce and market mobile handsets in China. All 
foreign major handset makers were unaffected by this policy as they had successfully 
acquired licences through joint ventures. However, in practice this policy had two 
significant impacts. Firstly, it restrained Korean and Taiwanese venture companies 
(either ODMs or design houses) from penetrating the Chinese market due to the 
limitation on licences. Secondly, Chinese local firms were given licences to enter the 
handset market, but the majority of them had diversified from parts of the electronics 
industry such as pagers and did not have the capabilities required for handset 
development. Therefore, the policy provided an incentive for Chinese local makers with 
licences to collaborate with foreign venture companies who had expertise in handset 
development.  
 
Through collaborations, Chinese local makers began to accumulate handset capabilities 
by sourcing designs, knock-down kits (semi-assembled kits), and sometimes finished 
handsets from various ODMs and design houses mainly from Korea and Taiwan. Rather 
than competing against dominant foreign giants, these firms marketed their handsets to 
areas such as small cities and the countryside, where people did not recognise foreign 
brands and did not have enough buying power to purchase high-end handsets. It proved 
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to be very successful and examples of these local firms include Bird and True China 
Lion (TCL). 
 
However, these local firms’ successes – based on the relationship between Chinese local 
makers and Korean design houses – did not last long and gradually deteriorated mainly 
due to the emergence of Taiwanese design houses and Chinese local design houses. 
Chinese local makers preferred Chinese local design houses to Korean design houses 
for three main reasons: the high cost of Korean engineers, insufficient adaptation of 
Korean design houses to local requirements, and a lack of trust on knowledge spillover. 
During my interview, a team leader in a CD also explained,  
 
During the development process of mobile handsets for Chinese MNOs, lots of 
knowhow got transferred to Chinese side. They [Chinese firms] easily acquired 
circuit board designs of our handsets and also recruited many Korean engineers. 
It did not take long for us to lose our competitive advantages. 
 
Therefore, Korean handset ventures were squeezed out of the Chinese market by 
Taiwanese design houses and Chinese local handset companies such as Ningbo Birds, 
TCL and Zhongxing Telecommunication Equipment (ZTE). As a result, most Korean 
ventures such as Telson, Sewon and Bellwave, had filed for bankruptcy by 2004186. 
 
Managerial issues for the Korean OBMs with the second wave of CDs 
The second wave of the emergence of CDs was quite different from the first. As shown 
in the previous subsection, most new CDs in the second wave had previous experience 
in handset development either as ODM handset makers or design houses. Once they had 
                                           
186 A former Korean design house engineer complained about their knowledge leaking to Chinese design 
houses via Chinese handset makers (Cellular Monthly, ‘Crisis for mobile handset ventures’, 01/2005). 
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decided to become CDs for Korean OBM handset makers, it did not take much effort 
for them to customise their capabilities to their OBMs187. By the time the second group 
of CDs had emerged in the mid 2000s, the Korean OBMs had established their 
management systems for CDs as well.  
 
7.3.3 Examples of CDs for LG (2001–2011) 
At the time of the research, LG-related CDs were generally situated either close to LG’s 
R&D Centre in Gasan Digital Complex or their assembly line in Pyongtaek. The 
number of employees varied from 30 to 50 and sometimes up to 140, depending on the 
size of company. For example, AM Telecom, the biggest CD for LG, employed 
around140 engineers (as of April 2011). Approximately five to six of LG’s CDs were 
equipped with more than 100 engineers. This section examines two example CDs for 
LG, one from the first wave of CDs and the other from the second wave. 
 
Teleworks: from a design house to a CD  
Teleworks was a typical case of a firm which became a CD for Korean OBM handset 
makers after failing to survive competition in the Chinese handset market. Teleworks 
was founded in May 2004 as a design house specialising in GSM handset development, 
with a workforce of 15 engineers, five hardware engineers and ten software engineers188.  
 
When it was founded in 2004, Teleworks, like other handset venture companies, 
targeted the Chinese handset market but failed to acquire a contract from the Chinese 
                                           
187 Interview with a manager of an outsourcing development team at LG. 
188 Interview with a team leader at Teleworks. 
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handset market. Seeking a viable option, Teleworks decided to become a CD for LG and 
asked to be put through LG’s verification process. It only took a month for LG to verify 
the technological capabilities and financial status of Teleworks. The verification process 
began in August 2004 and both companies agreed to a contract by September 2004. 
Ever since then, the workforce of Teleworks has gradually increased as LG has grown in 
the global handset market. Teleworks first increased its workforce to 30 in 2005 (15 
hardware and 15 software engineers) and by 2007 when LG had caught up with Sony 
Ericsson, it was increased to 50. Teleworks again expanded to 80 in 2008 when LG 
overtook Motorola, then to 100 in 2009, to 120 in 2010, finally to140 in March 2011. 
The increase of manpower at Teleworks coincided with LG’s financial performance. 
 
Infobank: from a multimedia messaging service–client programme provider to a 
CD  
Infobank was originally founded in 1995 as a software company specialising in mobile 
messaging services. Its other business areas included interactive media services, mobile 
payment systems and smart phone applications as well as contract development of a 
handset. Following the recommendation of LG, Infobank started its contract 
development work with three engineers in 2001 when the Korean MNOs 
commercialised the CDMA 1x network. At the time, Infobank was obtaining an order 
for embedding the multimedia messaging service client programme into a handset for 
LG, and it considered contract development work to be a good opportunity, as it was 
looking for new business189. 
 
                                           
189 Infobank’s annual reports between 2007 and 2010 for the Korean Financial Supervisory Service and 
an interview with a team leader of Infobank. 
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The main senior engineers in the handset contract development section of Infobank 
were recruited from Samsung’s handset business. At the time of the research, Infobank 
mainly undertook LG projects for 2nd tier CDMA MNOs in North America, Israel and 
some Latin American countries. The company participated in software integration 
activities only due to the CEO’s personal preference for software and it hired other CDs 
when needing hardware calibration activities in handset development projects190. 
 
7.3.4 Example of handset development projects given to a CD from LG  
The annual reports submitted to the Korean Financial Supervisory Service by Infobank 
provide some general characteristics of contracts carried out by CDs. Table 7.3 lists 
most of Infobank’s handset development contracts with LG between 2007 and 2009191.  
 
Some commonalities can be drawn from the table. All these MNOs operate CDMA 
networks and the same MNOs appear repetitively. Most projects carried out by Infobank 
were mainly for CDMA MNOs in Israel, Canada, the US, Mexico and Venezuela192. On 
the one hand, the size of budget and the length of the projects vary significantly. The 
budget shows a 20-fold difference from $56,000 to $1,112,000, and projects lasted from 
2.5 months to as long as 12 months. According to a team leader of a CD, these 
differences were mainly the result of different amounts of customisation that local 
MNOs had requested and the release schedules of the MNOs. He also added that the 
                                           
190 Interview with a team leader of a CD. 
191 From the interview with a team leader of a CD, it was confirmed that some of projects were omitted 
from the annual reports. 
192 During my interview, a team leader of a CD said that LG generally allotted projects in one country to 
two to three CDs (multiple sourcing). 
２０３ 
 
 
 
budget of a project was predetermined by forecasted man-month inputs based on an 
assumption over the level of difficulty and length of the project193. For example, a 
project was unlikely to require much engineering workforce if a 2nd tier MNO had 
wanted the same model that was released for Verizon because this type of project only 
needed simple software-based country-adaptation development. In this case, the budget 
of the project was comparatively low.  
 
Table 7.1 List of Infobank’s handset development contracts with LG (2007–2009) 
Project duration 
(year, month, day) 
Model and operators 
Budget 
($1,000) 
2007.09.01–2008.03.31 (7 months) CX8800 (Canada) 652 
2007.08.01–2008.01.31 (6 months) PX8350 (Israel) 465 
2007.03.01–2008.02.28 (12 months) UX275 and others (hardware) 403 
2007.10.01–2008.02.28 (5 months) PX8700 and others (hardware)  110 
2007.10.01–2008.04.15 (7.5 months) PX8700 (Israel) 380 
2007.12.01–2008.04.30 (5 months) MX8550 (Mexico) 470 
2008.01.01–2008.08.15 (7.5 months) CX9100 (Canada) 580 
2008.02.01–2008.06.15 (4.5 months) CX8700X (Canada) 106 
2008.03.01–2009.02.28 (12 months) CX10K and others (hardware) 670 
2008.03.01–2008.06.30 (4 months) CX260V (Canada) 366 
2008.03.01–2008.09.30 (7 months) CX9700 (Canada) 608 
2008.03.01–2008.10.15 (7.5 months) CX10000 (Canada) 1,112 
2008.04.07–2008.11.06 (8 months) CX8560 (Canada) 568 
2008.08.25–2009.1.24 (5 months) RD9700 (India) 300 
                                           
193 LG sometimes adjusted the budget according to real man-months invested by Infobank. In order to 
cross-check the input of man-months, LG sometimes checked Infobank’s engineers’ bank accounts 
(interview with an engineer of a CD). 
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2008.10.01–2009.03.15 (5.5 months) MX9700 (Mexico/Venezuela) 430 
2008.10.21–2009.01.31 (3 months) CX260PC (Canada, PC) 80 
2008.11.17–2009.02.15 (3 months) MD3500(Venezuela, Movistar) 56 
2008.11.17–2009.01.31 (2.5 months) AX840 (North America, Alltel) 85 
2008.12.16–2009.07.31 (7.5 months) CX9200 (Canada, Telus/Koodo) 590 
2008.07.01–2008.11.15 (4.5 months) CX9100X (Canada) 122 
2008.12.01–2009.07.31 (8 months) CX700 (Canada, Bell) 570 
2008.12.01–2009.09.15 (9.5 months) 220C (North America, Tracfone) 806 
2008.12.22–2009.03.15 (2.5 months) CX11000 (Canada, Telus) 610 
2009.02.01–2009.08.31 (7 months) 
LG100C (North America, 
Tracfone) 332 
2009.03.23–2009.10.31 (7 months) LGCX9600 (Canada, Telus) 498 
2009.07.13–2009.11.15 (4 months) LG9600 (North America, ACG) 285 
2009.09.01–2010.04..15 (7.5 months) LH8600S (Korea, LGT) 329 
2009.09.14–2010.04.15 (7 months) CX230 (USA, Virgin) 527 
2009.09.14–2010.06.15 (9 months) 
LG231C (North America, 
Tracfone) 461 
2009.11.01–2010.02.28 (4 months) SH860S (Korea, SK Telecom) 172 
2009.11.01–2010.08.31 (10 months) 
LG511C (North America 
Tracfone) 545 
2009.11.16–2010.04.30 (5.5 months) LG230 (North America, ACG) 250 
ACG (Associated Carrier Group) are a group of small network operators in Northern America sourcing 
mobile handsets together to pursue economies of scale. 
Source: retrieved from Infobank’s annual report 2009 and 2010 for the Korean Financial Supervisory 
Service, dart.fss.or.kr. 
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7.4 Management of CDs by LG: OBMs’ point of view194 
By 2004, three years after LG had first utilised a CD, LG collaborated with 24 different 
CDs to enable it to cope with the development of various new handsets. Although the 
number of CDs working for LG plummeted dramatically to 11 companies within a year 
due to LG’s poor performance in 2005, by 2011 the number had increased to more than 
30 companies as LG regained its global market share by overtaking Sony Ericsson and 
Motorola.  
 
7.4.1 LG’s management of CDs  
All of the CDs were managed by LG’s outsourced development group composed of 
eight engineers195. The main objectives of the group included the management of all 
outsourcing to software developing suppliers as well as contract handset developers. In 
particular, the group searched for new CDs, trained them and supervised projects 
outsourced to them. When the group needed to hire new CDs, it searched for 
appropriate candidates with the support of the headquarters’ procurement team, which 
was in charge of negotiating and sealing contracts with CDs. At the end of each year, 
they were evaluated by LG based on the projects that had been carried out in the 
previous year, and the contracts were renewed between LG and the CDs depending on 
LG’s level of satisfaction. 
 
In the mid 2000s when there were numerous candidates waiting to become CDs for 
                                           
194 The content of this section is mainly based on the results of interviews with a manager of outsourcing 
development in LG and a support manager of subcontractors in LG. 
195 Although Samsung utilised a similar number of CDs (20–30) to LG, Samsung’s counterpart to the LG 
group comprised around 20 personnel as it ran twice as many projects as LG. 
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Korean OBMs, LG and Samsung even assigned two different CDs the same project – 
generally low-end handset development – in order to confirm the CDs’ capabilities196. 
When the project was half completed, LG or Samsung selected the developer that 
demonstrated the better potential and allowed it to finish the project, while they let go of 
the less competent developer. However, the rule has since changed into a rule of sole 
developer for a project. 
 
There were project managers under each laboratory in LG and four to five project 
leaders under each project manager. The project leader administered the in-house 
models and the outsourced projects run by CDs. For example, an in-house team with 
one project leader developed a new handset for the European market while CDs did the 
same for the South American market. 
 
Hiring engineers for CDs was also controlled by OBM makers. LG annually notified the 
CDs of the approximate number of engineers required in each development area 
(hardware and software) for a subsequent year so that CDs could adjust their manpower 
accordingly. The CDs normally had a high turnover rate of employees – almost 30%197. 
In case LG wished to cut down on the workforce, the CDs reduced the number of 
employees by not re-hiring for vacant positions.  
 
Although the role of CDs was originally supposed to be turnkey-based handset 
development, Korean OBM handset makers started to utilise engineers from CDs in an 
ad hoc fashion. They sought to utilise such engineers as a buffer for their own engineers. 
                                           
196 This kind of forced competition by Korean handset OBMs also occurred to antennae supplier firms 
(Interview with an engineer of an antennae supplier firm). 
197 Interviews with engineers in Yujeong Systems and Teleworks. 
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For example, at times they wanted to develop a handset using in-house engineers for the 
hardware and CDs’ engineers for the software. At times, they even asked for a couple of 
software engineers to fill in-house vacancies. In addition, if there was a female engineer 
at LG requiring maternity leave, the position was temporarily filled by an engineer from 
one of the CDs198. In other words, on top of turnkey-based handset development projects, 
Korean OBM handset makers utilised the workforce of CDs, sometimes certain 
individuals, sometimes certain groups and sometimes entire development teams. This 
flexible workforce sourcing offered an opportunity for cost advantage and flexibility on 
managing human resources in OBM makers. This unique mode of sourcing engineers 
was only possible because the workforce of CDs were fully specialised in both 
hardware and software developments for each OBM handset maker. 
 
To enable CDs to fully support the shortage of LG’s development resources, the 
capabilities of CDs had to remain sophisticated and be improved constantly. LG 
provided engineers in CDs with ample opportunities to participate in LG-organised 
training programmes199 for in-house LG engineers200. Most training instructors were 
senior researchers at LG while a few were university professors. Training places were 
first allocated to LG’s own engineers, but if spaces remained, they were open to 
engineers from CDs. If there were insufficient spaces left for engineers from CDs, their 
senior engineers were invited to take part in programmes and they were then in turn 
required to train their juniors. 
 
                                           
198 Interview with a director at a CD. 
199 Some examples of internal education programmes include the Android software academy, the design-
of-radio-frequency module and software development for the Smart Phone. 
200 Similar instances were studied in terms of replication of organisational capabilities of suppliers by 
Sako (2004) based on the Japanese automakers. 
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7.4.2 Allotment and main criteria for handset development outsourcings  
When a product portfolio was confirmed for the next business year, all development 
projects were categorised into four different groups: premium, high-end, mass or very 
low-end tier, depending on the difficulty of projects, price and profit, and the 
importance of the ordering client/customer. Afterwards, handset manufacturers allotted 
the workload for internal engineering resources into projects and finally, they 
considered outsourcing options with their pool of CDs. The heads of each laboratory 
decided which project was to be allotted to which CD, in collaboration with the 
outsourcing management group. 
 
The main criteria used by handset manufacturers in deciding whether to develop in-
house or to outsource were the level of technologies involved in projects and the 
importance of their relationships with MNOs and distributors. If a new handset model 
was categorised into a premium or high-end category and required sophisticated and 
novel technologies, in-house development teams would generally be chosen. In addition, 
an in-house development team carried out the project if the new model was requested by 
a major 1st tier MNO such as Verizon and Vodafone. General sequential criteria201 for 
the decisions behind contract development for a handset model were as follows. 
 
(1) The handset should not be a strategic core model incorporating new 
technologies. 
(2) It only required slight modification such as country adaptations, scenario 
modifications and functional changes. 
                                           
201 There was a slight difference between LG and Samsung. LG tended to use CDs only for middle- and 
low-end handsets. On the other hand, Samsung sometimes utilised its CDs for some high-end handsets. 
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(3) It was to be categorised into middle or low-end segments and therefore low 
profits were expected. 
(4) It had been requested by major MNOs with Samsung’s or LG’s brand but low 
sales were expected. 
(5) It had been requested by small MNOs. 
(6) It was for the open market with MNO-specific functions removed.  
 
Until 2005, these principles had worked well. When LG struggled to compete in the 
global market, particularly due to the success of Motorola’s RAZR, LG decided to 
decrease the number of CDs instead of reducing the number of internal developers. The 
number of CDs utilised by LG plummeted to 11 in 2005, compared to 27 in 2004. As 
LG had to maintain internal engineering resources for the near future, it allocated 
internal resources to low-tier projects as it struggled to acquire orders from MNOs and 
distributors. In this case, CDs played the role of a buffer of development resources for 
LG, an outcome that was similar to what was expected to emerge from the decision to 
outsource; this is an example of ‘concurrent sourcing’ as explained by Parmigiani 
(2007).  
 
7.5 Platform models, their variations and the division of labour with CDs: 
the case of the Shine Phone by LG 
This section investigates how Korean handset manufacturers coped with managerial 
issues to develop various handset models for different MNOs globally within a 
relatively short period of time. It specifically focuses on the division of development 
labour of new handset development projects between an OBM’s internal development 
teams and its CDs, and the reasons and factors behind decisions to outsource when 
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handset producers introduce platform models and their variation models onto global 
handset markets. In order to do that, the second wave of LG’s ‘Black Label’ series, the 
case of the Shine Phone, is highlighted. 
 
7.5.1 Concept of the Shine Phone and in-house development of its first model202  
In November 2005, LG introduced onto the Korean domestic market its first global 
strategic model, the ‘Chocolate Phone’, under the brand of the ‘Black Label’ series. It 
was distinguished by a touch-sensitive illuminating control pad and sleek slider design 
with chocolate-coloured casings. It quickly became very popular in the domestic market 
and many global MNOs subsequently showed their interest. The sales of the Chocolate 
Phone reached 10 million units in April 2007 and surpassed 20 million units overall203. 
Encouraged by the early success of the Chocolate Phone and pushed by the short life 
cycle of the industry, LG started to prepare for the second strategic model of its ‘Black 
Label’ series in March 2006, targeting October 2006 for a launch of the new model onto 
the Korean domestic market.  
 
Amongst dozens of ideas proposed by the LG design centre, the concept of the Shine 
Phone was chosen by the director of the Mobile Communications R&D Centre. The 
Shine Phone design came with novel functions, colourful design and materials. 
However, the initial concept of the Shine Phone that came from top management was 
rejected by engineers, due to technical difficulties and their estimates of the required 
R&D time to implement the concept. From the engineers’ perspective, the concept of 
                                           
202 Unless otherwise indicated, most of this section is based on: Korean Economy Magazine, ‘5% of 
improvement is impossible but 30% of innovation is possible’, January 2007. 
203 Business Watch, ‘The hit story of Chocolate Phone’, 
http://www.bizwatch.co.kr/pages/view.php?uid=7607, accessed 8/8/2014. 
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the Shine Phone was unachievable with respect to all three important factors in 
developing a new handset: quality, cost and delivery. At the time, it was ‘common sense’ 
in the handset industry that metal was inappropriate as a casing material on the grounds 
that it obstructed the quality of radio frequency communication at internal antennae204. 
Moreover, it was obvious that the change of production line from plastic moulding to 
one for metal processing would cause an increase in production costs. Finally, the most 
important cause for apprehension was that only six months were given to the 
development team.  
 
Despite concerns from the engineers, the director of the Mobile Communications R&D 
Centre decided to proceed with the Shine Phone project, taking full responsibility 
himself205. General specifications of the first Shine Phone were confirmed. Unlike 
conventional handsets, it would reinforce notions of solidity and durability; by using 
stainless steel instead of plastic as a casing material, it was anticipated that it would 
capture customer popularity206. It would also adopt a mirror-effect LCD screen as a front 
display, which would reinforce the model-branding messages of being bright and 
reflective. In addition to a two-megapixel camera and an MP3 player with 1 GB 
memory, it would also first feature a vertical scrolling key on the bottom of the front 
screen. 
 
The main task for the development team other than the conventional handset 
development process was to find a metal processing firm which could handle a 
                                           
204 Internal antennae in modern phones were equivalent to extendible antennae in early analogue phones. 
205 This kind of ‘crisis construction’ has been very common in the Korean business context. See Kim 
(1998) for detailed explanation.  
206 The first mobile handset adopting a metal case was Motorola’s RAZR phone. 
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precision of 0.01 mm rather than the conventional 0.1 mm. Many companies that 
specialised in home appliances made metal casing for their products but 0.1 mm 
precision was sufficient for these applications. However, the handset industry demanded 
a higher-order precision. None of the plastic casing suppliers for LG at the time could 
join the project as they did not have previous experience in processing metal. LG 
decided to co-develop the metal casing with a casing supplier for its Home Appliances 
Division and designated Kwangsung Electronics207 as its partner, which supplied 
exterior aluminium mouldings to LG, Sony and Panasonic, amongst others. For three 
months, LG along with Kwangsung co-developed the metal processing technology 
required for a precision of 0.01 mm. Financial support from LG for Kwangsung reached 
$1 million. Finally, they were able to develop a new ‘press processing and laser 
welding/etching process’ for metal casing, an entirely different manufacturing process 
from the conventional injection moulding technology used for manufacturing plastic 
cases208. At the last stage, WS M&P209 also participated in the project to ensure 
commercial production of stainless steel casings guaranteeing an acceptable level of 
electro-magnetic shielding and radio sensitivity. 
 
Other technical barriers included the development of a scroll key and a camera module. 
To keep the upper deck in the slide type of Shine Phone within a slim 4.3 mm thickness, 
Panasonic in Japan developed a magnetic-type scroll key rather than a mechanical one 
and LG Innotek also came up with a thinner camera module. In the meantime, engineers 
                                           
207 This company later changed its name to Global Kwangsung (GK). 
208 Kyunghyang News, ‘Example of symbiotic cooperation: Shine phone’, 
http://ruliweb.daum.net/news/view/MD20061120182208634.daum, accessed 8/8/2014. 
209 Woosung Mouldings and Plastics Co., which used to produce a plastic casing for wired telephones 
and car/home audio systems, diversified into a handset casing business in1999. 
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in Lab 1210 of the Mobile Communications R&D Centre had almost resolved the issues 
of quality of radio communications and the stability of wireless signals stemming from 
the stainless casing through various improvements in the mobile handset system211. 
Eventually, after six months of an exhaustive development process, the design centre’s 
proposed concept was implemented as a new stylish handset by integrating all the new 
technologies.  
 
In October 2006, LG introduced the first Shine Phone, V420212, onto the Korean 
domestic market as originally planned. It was a CDMA Evolution-Data Optimized (EV-
DO) platform model based on Qualcomm’s MSM6500 chip. In addition, it was a slide-
type handset with dimensions 98.6 x 50.6 x 13.8 mm (119 g), as shown in Figure 7.3, 
and featured a 2.2-inch 262k colour mirror-effect LCD display, two-megapixel 
Complementary Metal-Oxide-Semiconductor (CMOS) camera and MP3 player with 
1GB internal memory, and 128 polyphonic chip. It soon became a very popular model 
selling 1,500 units a day within 15 days in the Korean market213. This first Shine Phone 
became a reference for various ensuing models. 
 
                                           
210 At the time, the Mobile Communication Division of LG comprised four handset development groups: 
Labs 1 to 4. Lab 1 was in charge of all handset models developed for the Korean domestic market; Lab 2 
took charge of GSM-based handsets for European, South American and Asian markets; Lab 3 was in 
charge of developing handsets for North American markets; Lab 4 was designated as a 3G (WCDMA) 
handset developer for the company (interview with an engineer at LG). 
211 One of the improvements was a new signal reception algorithm called ‘Tango’ (Inews24, ‘Review: 
LG-SV420’, http://m-talk.inews24.com/php/news_view_mtalk.php?g_menu=380200&g_serial=236361, 
accessed 8/8/2014).  
212 There were three MNOs in the Korean domestic handset market. Handset manufacturers normally 
provided three variation models for each MNO, which mainly differed in their MNO-customised user 
interfaces. The rule for naming a model was that LG added S for SK Telecom, K for Korea Telecom, and 
L for LG Telecom before V420 (which was the model number for the Shine Phone). For example, LG 
introduced SV420, KV4200 and LV4200 at the same time in October 2006 with user-interface 
customisation for three MNOs in the Korean market. However, this thesis refers to V420 only rather than 
SV420, KV4200 and LV4200. 
213 Hankyung Plus, ‘LG Shine Phone, popularised’, 
http://www.hankyung.com/news/app/newsview.php?aid=2006110210018, accessed 8/8/2014. 
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As described above, the R&D activities for the first Shine Phone were conducted by LG 
in-house engineers in collaboration with its component suppliers. Firstly, the quality of 
radio communications was achieved through the efforts of in-house engineers in Lab 1 
during the project. The processing technology for metal casing was successfully 
developed through cooperation between LG and its component suppliers from the Home 
Appliances Division. In addition, several components were successfully developed for 
LG by specialised handset component suppliers.  
 
 
Source: http://www.idknet.com/mobile/phones/1415.html, accessed 21/03/2011. 
Figure 7.3 The original Shine Phone 
 
There was no room for CDs in the first global strategic model of the second Black Label 
series Shine Phone. All the R&D activities were conducted by LG’s Mobile 
Communications R&D Centre and therefore new skills and knowledge derived from the 
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R&D activities in this project remained within this part of the company.  
 
7.5.2 Introduction of subsequent platform models onto the market without the CDs' 
involvement 
Since the introduction of the first Shine Phone, V420, three other platform models 
arrived on the global market: global GSM model KE970, 3G model KU970 for 
Vodafone, and the first clamshell-type model VX8700 for Verizon.  
 
The first CDMA platform model V420 was followed by the first GSM platform model 
KE970214 in January 2007, the latter model being compatible with the GSM network 
with GPRS and EDGE technology. Reflecting the characteristics of the European 
handset market, KE970 was introduced onto the European market, starting in the UK 
and eventually moving to mainland Europe, particularly France, Germany and the 
Netherlands. For the first GSM model of the Shine Phone, for reasons similar to V420, 
development was undertaken only by in-house engineers in LG’s Lab 2. Lab 2 had 
shared some previous experience with Lab 1 during the development of V420. However, 
the development of KE970 was considered as a totally separate project from V420 in 
the company215. This is because not only were the characteristics of radio 
communication for a GSM network different from those for a CDMA network but also 
KE970 was developed based on an Infineon baseband chip (PMB8876) and its software. 
Many interviewees at LG made it clear that handsets using different wireless networks 
can be declared as absolutely different handsets in terms of technical structure, even 
                                           
214 ME970 is identical to KE970 apart from supporting bands. The former supports tri-bands of 850, 
1800, 1900 MHz, three GSM bands in North America while the latter supports tri-bands of 900, 1800, 
1900 MHz, three GSM bands in Europe. The same applies to KE770 and ME770. 
215 Interview with a handset engineer at LG. 
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though they may appear to be the same to the customer. When asked about the 
collaboration between Lab 1 and Lab 2, a handset engineer at LG stated: 
 
Despite the same look from [the] customer’s perspective, a different network 
based on a different baseband platform simply means a different handset to 
engineers. We share some tips but they are miniscule.  
 
In the meantime, Lab 4 at LG created the first 3G version of the Shine Phone, KU970. 
As an exclusive version for Vodafone, one of the biggest global MNOs, KU970 was 
introduced onto the market in May 2007 across Asian countries (e.g. Singapore), 
Australia and Europe by Vodafone. While supporting the 2G GSM network, KU970 
could also utilise the 3G network High Speed Downlink Packet Access (HSDPA), which 
allowed KU970 to make video calls with an additional (front) video camera. Although 
KU970’s hardware features were similar to those of KE970, they were totally different 
in handset engineers’ perspective. Firstly, the user interface of KU970 was fully 
customised for Vodafone. ‘Vodafone Live!’, the 3G wireless data service promoted by 
Vodafone, was also embedded in the system. In terms of hardware, KU970 was 
integrated based on Qualcomm’s 3G chipset MSM6280 compatible with the GSM 
network. Likewise, Lab 4 at LG took charge of the development of the handset as it 
required in-depth knowledge and experience of 3G network and wireless 
communications.  
 
For the last global platform model, the first North American CDMA Shine Phone model, 
VX8700, arrived in the market in April 2007 through the biggest US network operator, 
Verizon Wireless. VX8700 was developed based on the CDMA EV-DO platform and 
using the same MSM chip from Qualcomm as in the original Shine model V420. 
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However, it was Lab 3 instead of Lab 1 that carried out the development project for two 
reasons. First of all, VX8700 entailed a form factor change from the original model, 
V420, transitioning from slide to clamshell type, which presented challenges for LG 
regarding hardware calibration activities. Moreover, as with KU970, VX8700 also had 
to encompass many new software features for Verizon, which resulted in a heavy 
workload for LG in terms of software customisation. As the first clamshell-type Shine 
Phone, VX8700 consisted of many exclusive features and services by Verizon. For 
example, it was equipped with Verizon’s regional services such as VZ Navigator and the 
Chapperone internal GPS module, and supported V CAST music and video services 
through Verizon’s EV-DO network. In addition, the ‘Get It Now’ feature, with which 
one could download alert sounds, ringtones, themes, background images and 
screensavers, was also embedded in the handset. Over and above the sophisticated 
capabilities required to develop VX8700 under the banner of Verizon, LG had to 
provide full resources for the handset development as Verizon was one of LG’s most 
important customers.  
 
These four different early models (V420 for Korean CDMA, KE970 for GSM, KU970 
for Vodafone WCDMA and VX8700 for Verizon) introduced by LG can be categorised 
as platform models from the perspective of product development resources invested. 
These handset models were later utilised as the basis for the development of variation 
models that followed. The important fact is that each original platform model was 
developed independently even within LG amongst Labs 1 to 4216. Under the 
circumstances, no task in the platform model projects was given to CDs. These projects 
were new to in-house engineers in LG’s Mobile Communications R&D Centre and LG 
                                           
216 Interview with a handset engineer at LG. 
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also needed to internalise all the experience and tacit knowledge originating from these 
new projects. In addition, all customers of these platform models belonged to the most 
important MNO group (1st tier) to LG. A handset engineer at LG argued: 
 
We [in-house engineers] always take on first, new, and difficult tasks so that we 
learn and accumulate knowhow.  
 
7.5.3 Evolution of variation models with little involvement of CDs 
Based on the above platform models, LG started to produce diverse models, modifying 
them in terms of form factor, features (mainly adding new features but sometimes 
downgrading them), and customisations for network operator services. 
 
Following the platform models, LG announced two bar-type variations of a Shine Phone, 
KE770 (from KE970) in April 2007 and LC3600 (from SV420)217 in August 2007. With 
the form factor modification from slide to bar type, several features had been 
downgraded in these models in order to lower the bill of materials (they were targeted at 
the mass-tier handset market). In addition, LG outsourced the development of both 
models to one of their CDs, AM Telecom218. With regard to two projects, LG 
incrementally increased the responsibility of AM Telecom. For the first bar-type project 
(KE770), LG let its in-house engineers get involved in the core development of a radio 
module while AM Telecom undertook software development activities. As the change of 
form factor normally requires some degree of calibration among hardware components 
in a radio module, which in turn heavily affects voice-call quality, LG did not delegate 
the job to its CDs. In the second bar-type project (LC3600), on the other hand, AM 
                                           
217 Exclusively for LG Telecom. 
218 As mentioned earlier, AM Telecom was capable of both hardware and software development. 
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Telecom took full responsibility for it as a turnkey project.  
 
By incorporating a terrestrial DMB, LG also released two Shine Phone models featuring 
a mobile TV, B630 in May 2007 and its form factor-changed model (clamshell-type) 
B250 in October 2007. Both variation projects of B630 and B250 were carried out by 
the in-house group (Lab 1) who developed V420 to execute a terrestrial DMB module 
addition and modify a form factor. When asked about why CDs were not utilised for 
those projects, an handset engineer replied: 
 
Both projects involved hardware-oriented development activities. Therefore, it 
would be more efficient for the same team to implement as the main task of 
those projects entailed calibrating radio modules to secure voice-call quality. 
 
Two other variation models served LG’s 1st tier MNO customers, AT&T and NTT-
Docomo. First, LG released CU720 in November 2007 for AT&T, the North American 
GSM/WCDMA network operator. Then, in March 2008, LG also introduced the 
Japanese version of the WCDMA Shine Phone, L705iX, exclusively for NTT-Docomo 
in an attempt to make headway in the Japanese market. These handset models, 
originating from the 3G platform model KU970, were heavily customised by Lab 4 for 
AT&T and NTT-Docomo from both hardware and software perspectives. Such 
customisation included a video call module, eMusic and Napster for AT&T, and 
Freedom of Mobile Multimedia Access (FOMA)219, and 1-seg, the Japanese version of 
mobile terrestrial TV, for NTT-Docomo220. By the release of L705iX, LG was able to 
take care of most of its 1st tier network carriers.  
                                           
219 FOMA is the brand name of NTT-Docomo’s 3G network services based on WCDMA technology. It 
was the first commercialized 3G service and was launched in October 2001.  
220 Reinado, ‘Pioneering of LG in Japanese handset market’, http://reinado.egloos.com/2455550, 
accessed 27/03/2011. 
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For 18 months, introduction of the original Shine Phone models and their variations by 
LG continued globally across various MNOs and markets. During this time, LG mainly 
utilised its internal development resources in the support of the development of platform 
models and their variation models incorporating functional and form factor changes 
while keeping the stylish and savvy image under one brand name, Shine Phone. 
However, two exceptions to the involvement of CDs for low-tier variation models were 
also observed, one being partly and the other fully outsourced. Those projects focused 
on form factor changes to bar type, which is generally considered a feature of the low-
end handset. AM Telecom, one of LG’s CDs joined in two bar-type Shine model 
projects, KE770 and LC3600, and mainly supported software development for LG.  
 
Until this phase, the role of CDs for handset OBMs seems to have been quite limited. 
Not only had CDs participated in a small number of projects but also their role in the 
development of Shine Phone models looks to have been highly peripheral to core R&D 
activities carried out by LG’s in-house engineers. However, CDs began to emerge and 
take a central role from late 2007, in serving the development of variation models for 
2nd tier MNOs and low-tier models with 1st tier MNOs. 
 
7.5.4 Variation models carried out mainly by CDs 
From autumn 2007, one year after the introduction of platform models, LG started to 
prepare for variation models serving 2nd tier MNOs and low-tier models for 1st tier 
MNOs.  
 
From April to August 2008, LG announced three variation models of the platform 
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model VX8700: PX8700, CX8700X and MX8700 for Israeli, Canadian and Latin 
American network operators respectively. These MNOs had been considered as 2nd tier 
MNOs for handset manufacturers as they were generally able to purchase one tenth of 
the quantity that 1st tier MNOs could. Infobank, one of LG’s CDs who had several years 
of experience in conducting a country adaptation for these MNOs, carried out all three 
projects under the supervision of LG’s model leader221. These projects took roughly six 
to eight months each and the team leader of the Infobank commented: 
 
As I recall, they were all very ordinary country-adaptation projects. The 
MNOs really loved the Shine Phone for Verizon (VX8700) and they wanted 
the model the way it was for Verizon. Therefore, customisations for those 
MNO models in both hardware and software perspectives were minimal. I do 
not remember a single major issue during those projects. 
 
In the meantime, LG provided two last variation models to 1st tier MNOs, SK Telecom 
in Korea and AT&T in the US. In the Korean market, SV570 (Shine II) was announced 
for SK Telecom in May 2008. At the time, SK Telecom specifically requested of LG a 
middle-priced 2G (CDMA EV-DO rather than 3G WCDMA), which should inherit 
features of the original Shine Phone. In order to meet SK Telecom’s request, LG 
adopted a cheaper polycarbonate plastic casing rather than a metal casing for SV570. 
LG was able to meet SK Telecom’s desired retail price of $319222 signifying a middle- 
to low-tier handset, by downgrading several hardware and software modules and 
outsourcing the development work as a turnkey project to Yujeong Systems223.  
                                           
221 The model leader in LG did not conduct R&D activities and only supervised projects carried out by 
CDs. 
222 The original Shine Phones for SK Telecom, KTF and LG Telecom were priced $451, $396 and $451 
respectively (http://review.cetizen.com/lg-sv420/view/1/1281/review, accessed 27/03/2011). 
223 As earlier mentioned, Yujeong Systems was equipped with both hardware and software development 
capabilities. 
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In October 2009, LG announced its final Shine variation, GD710, with the tag of Shine 
II. This model was requested by AT&T as middle- to low-tier handset while maintaining 
the stylish image associated with the Shine brand. While GD710 inherited most of the 
features of the original AT&T Shine Phone CU720, LG strategically decided to appoint 
one project leader to run this project using its in-house engineers to install radio 
functions and the Universal IC Card (UICC)224. However, the rest of the development 
activities were delegated to H Telecom, one of LG’s key CDs.  
 
At this stage, the level of the CDs’ involvement in variation models of the Shine Phone 
became much more salient than in the previous stage. While corresponding to 2nd tier 
MNOs and low-tier handsets for even 1st tier MNOs, most development tasks were 
allocated to CDs – rather than in-house engineer teams in LG – on the condition that the 
work was conducted under LG’s supervision.  
 
From October 2006, LG introduced a total of 15 different platform and variation Shine 
Phone models onto the global handset market, serving all technology platforms of 
CDMA, GSM and WCDMA for the next three years225. The Shine Phone also went 
through several form factor changes, transforming from slide to clamshell and bar type 
according to MNOs’ requests or LG’s own strategies. It lengthened its life with the 
Shine II variation models by targeting the middle- to low-tier market. Financially, the 
Shine Phone was also very successful in the global mobile handset market. The sales of 
                                           
224 UICC is a chip card ensuring the security of personal data used for mobile devices in GSM/WCDMA 
networks. 
225 Assuming one year as a normal handset’s life cycle in the market, the Shine Phone stayed on the 
market for four years. 
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the Shine Phone reached five million units in November 2007226 and ten million units in 
November 2008227, becoming LG’s second ten-million seller after the Chocolate Phone. 
The total sales are estimated at 13.5 million units228.  
 
Table 7.2 summarises all the original models based on the concept of the Shine Phone 
and its variation models. It presents release dates, original platforms and the division of 
labour between LG’s in-house teams and CDs, along with the reasons behind their 
decisions.  
 
Table 7.2 Original Shine Phone (V420) and its variation models 
Model 
number 
Release date 
(year.month) 
Platform/ 
variations 
In-house/ 
outsourcing* 
Reasons 
behind 
decisions 
Notes 
V420 2006.10 CDMA Platform In-house  (Lab 1) 
1st EV-DO 
model 
Slide, CDMA 
For Korean MNOs 
KE970 
(ME970) 2007.01 GSM Platform 
In-house  
(Lab 2) 
1st GSM 
model Slide, GSM 
KE770 
(ME770) 2007.04 
Form factor 
change from 
KE970 
Partly 
outsourced to 
AM Telecom 
Low price 
tier 
Bar, GSM 
with radio function 
in-house (Lab 2) 
VX8700 2007.04 
Form factor and 
UI change from 
V420 
In-house  
(Lab 3) 
1st clamshell 
model & for 
1st tier MNO 
Clamshell, CDMA 
For Verizon 
SV490 Cancelled 
Form factor 
change from 
KU970 
In-house 
(Lab 4) 
Form factor 
change only 
Clamshell, 
WCDMA 
B630 2007.04 Terrestrial DMB added to V420 
In-house  
(Lab 1) 
No software 
change from 
V420 
Clamshell, CDMA 
For Korean MNOs 
KU970 2007.05 3G Platform In-house  (Lab 4) 
1st WCDMA 
model 
Slide, WCDMA 
For Vodafone 
                                           
226 Hankookilbo, ‘LG Shine sold five million units’, 28/11/2007. 
227 Etnews, ‘LG handsets, Chocolate phones sold 20 million units, Shine phones sold 10 million units’, 
24/11/2008. 
228 LG Electronics homepage, LG Cookie phone becomes fifth ten million seller, 
http://www.lge.co.kr/brand/bestshop/product/FrontBoardDetailCmd.laf?actcode=BESTSHOP_PROD_N
EWS&mncode=NEWS&seq=10641, accessed 9/8/2014. 
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LC3600 2007.08 
Form factor 
change from 
V420 
Outsourced to 
AM Telecom 
Low price 
tier 
Bar, CDMA 
For LG Telecom 
B250 2007.10 Form factor change from B630 
In-house 
(Lab 1) 
Form factor 
change Clamshell, CDMA  
CU720 2007.11 
MNO 
customisation 
from KU970 
In-house 
(Lab 2) 
Model for 1st 
tier MNO 
Slide, WCDMA 
For AT&T 
L705iX 2008.03 
MNO 
customisation 
from KU970 
In-house 
(Lab3) 
Model for 1st 
tier MNO 
Slide, WCDMA 
For NTT-Docomo 
PX8700 2008.04 
Country 
adaptation from 
VX8700 
Outsourced to 
Infobank 
2nd tier 
MNO 
Clamshell, CDMA 
For Israel 
SV570 2008.05 
Shine II, fewer 
software functions 
and cheap 
hardware 
components  
Outsourced to 
Youjung 
System 
Low price 
tier 
Shine II 
Slide, CDMA 
For SK Telecom 
CX8700X 2008.06 
Country 
adaptation from 
VX8700 
Outsourced to 
Infobank 
2nd tier 
MNO 
Clamshell, CDMA 
For Canada 
MX8700 2008.08 
Country 
adaptation from 
VX8700 
Outsourced to 
Infobank 
2nd tier 
MNO 
Clamshell, CDMA 
For Latin America 
GD710 2009.10 
Shine II, similar 
to CU720 with 
plastic case 
Partly 
outsourced to H 
Telecom, LG as 
a project leader 
in charge of 
radio and UICC 
Low price 
tier 
Slide, WCDMA 
For AT&T  
* Lab1 was in charge of handset development for the Korean market (CDMA), Lab 2 for GSM models in 
European/South American and Asian markets, Lab 3 for North American market (CDMA), and Lab4 for 
3G handset development (WCDMA). 
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
 
7.6 CDs and their role in the globalisation of Korean handset manufacturers 
In order to cope with the surge of handset models emerging from the close relationship 
with MNOs, Korean handset manufacturers adopted a new outsourcing strategy, 
utilisation of CDs. The question here is: ‘What advantages did CDs bring to Korean 
handset OBMs?’  
 
The ostensible advantage was cost. Korean OBMs were able to utilise external 
engineers as if they were in-house personnel but with considerably lower labour costs. 
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During the interview, a manager of outsourcing development in LG said these costs 
were reduced to roughly 70%. In addition, the skills and experiences of engineers in 
CDs were highly tailored towards their Korean OBMs and specific MNO customers 
through multiple joint development projects. Therefore, the use of CDs provided 
Korean OBMs with the advantage of cost reduction coupled with high confidence in the 
skills of the CDs.  
 
If we also include MNOs in the picture, the existence of CDs plays a considerable role 
in the globalisation of Korean OBMs than just simple cost efficiency. For Korean 
OBMs, supplying customised handsets was not a key challenge as far as huge buyers 
are concerned, such as network operators in North America and Europe. These big 
operators were able to guarantee large volumes of initial handset purchase, which could 
offset their development costs. However, it seems it was not easy to serve small (2nd tier 
or below) MNOs asking for customised handsets. They lacked the scale in demand that 
was required to guarantee the volume with which handset manufacturers could reach 
break-even point. In this case, the cost advantage from CDs was vital for Korean firms 
to expand their globalisation and secure market shares, because they were then able to 
compete in small markets against manufacturers like Nokia (who do have the advantage 
of economies of scale).  
  
Some manufacturers addressed this issue with an ODM strategy. However, this sort of 
strategy for Korean emergent leading firms has its own set of challenges that need to be 
addressed. When asked about why LG did not utilise ODM as much as other foreign 
makers did, a manager of an outsourcing development group at LG confessed: 
２２６ 
 
 
 
 
I think we [LG] were not confident of our capacity to supervise ODM 
projects, especially with foreign ODM makers. We prefer to work with 
Korean counterparts. 
 
Under the MNO-oriented development structure of Korean emergent leading firms, time 
management in handset development project is critical. If OBMs fail to deliver 
customised handsets to an MNO in time, they have to pay hefty compensation as a 
penalty to the client. Unlike unlocked handsets, the development process of customised 
handsets also involves close collaboration between handset developers and network 
operators as they incorporate various operator-specific functions and services, a fact that 
has made Korean emergent leading firms prefer CDs to ODMs.  
 
Utilising CDs allowed Korean emergent leading firms to enter relatively small foreign 
markets based on the business model of co-specialisation with MNOs. Therefore, if co-
specialisation of the Korean handset OBMs with big foreign MNOs prompted their first 
globalisation mainly to big markets, forward specialisation of CDs to Korean OBMs 
helped the second globalisation to small markets. In conclusion, the existence of CDs 
for customisations gave Korean OBMs cost savings on development and a leverage for 
negotiating with non-1st tier MNOs, which helped the expansion of the coverage of 
Korean OBMs. 
 
7.7 Summary 
This chapter has been mainly concerned with how Korean emergent leading firms dealt 
with different cost structures in handset production from other foreign companies, and 
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has built upon the findings reported in Chapter 6 – that these firms’ successes were due 
to their close inter-firm relationships with MNOs. In order to break through the 
development burden arising from co-specialised assets for MNOs, the chapter has 
described how Korean handset manufacturers outsourced a development stage rather 
than a production stage (assembly) to so-called ‘contract developers’ (CDs) – a move 
that was contrary to outsourcing trends in foreign handset manufacturers. Table 7.3 
summarises the differences in outsourcing strategies and their implications for Korean 
and foreign handset manufacturers.  
 
Table 7.3 Different outsourcing approaches originating from the gap in brand power  
Companies Nokia  Samsung, LG  
Distribution Mainly through own distribution 
channels  
Reliant on network operators 
Strongholds* GSM oriented, ODM for CDMA 
market 
Starting from CDMA markets, 
expanding to GSM markets 
Outsourcing Outsourcing production 
(assembly) of low-end handsets 
to contract manufacturers  
Outsourcing development of low-end 
handsets to CDs 
Advantages  Cost advantages by platform, 
component sharing 
Production efficiency 
A variety of product portfolios 
Delivery of MNO-specific services 
Co-development, co-marketing and co-
branding with local MNOs 
Disadvantages Simple product portfolio 
Limited MNO-specific services 
Development burden due to handset 
customisations for local MNOs 
*CDMA – generally operator-market dominated; GSM – open-market dominated. 
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
 
First, the chapter has investigated why Korean OBMs decided on new strategies suitable 
for their production structure, i.e. the adoption of CDs. The chapter has also covered the 
definition and role of these CDs and outlined the generic divisions of labour between 
OBMs and these subcontractors.  
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Second, the chapter has delved into the two waves of emergence of CDs for Korean 
handset OBMs. The first wave was initiated in the early 2000s, when Korean OBMs 
rapidly expanded their presence in foreign markets, and the convergence in mobile 
handsets gave rise to massive workloads. The first group of CDs emerged mainly from 
firms that had already been working in collaboration with handset OBMs as software 
module suppliers at the time, and later diversified into the aforesaid business. The 
second wave, however, was mainly the ramifications of labour reallocation due to 
industry shakeouts. This second group of CDs came from small and medium ventures 
(originally ODMs or design houses) during the mid 2000s, after they failed to secure 
their intended market shares in both domestic and foreign markets due to pressure from 
both global and local Chinese players. Therefore, unlike the first group, they were very 
experienced in handset development.  
 
Third, the chapter has closely examined how Korean handset OBMs searched for and 
fostered new CDs, and managed and distributed subcontracts with them. The chapter 
has also shown how Korean OBMs practiced this outsourcing strategy by examining the 
case of LG and its series of Shine Phone models. Lastly, the chapter has concluded with 
the argument that these CDs – whose capabilities were highly specialised towards their 
clients’ resources – resulted in not just an advantage of low labour costs for Korean 
OBMs, but more importantly a means of lowering the break-even point for making 
customised handsets. Korean OBMs could therefore widen their market shares by 
accepting orders from small network operators who formerly had lacked the scale in 
demand for customised handsets. 
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 8. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This chapter recapitulates the main findings of the research and draws out theoretical 
and empirical contributions to knowledge regarding the transition process of emergent 
leading firms. In addition, in the last section, some of the limitations of the research are 
discussed and suggestions are then offered as to what further research might be useful to 
build upon the findings of this thesis. 
  
8.1 Research questions and main findings 
The principal aim of the thesis has been to contribute towards the knowledge of the 
transition processes in the emerging stage of new industries where emergent leading 
firms in late-industrialising economies seek to reach two frontiers, the first being to 
achieve technological leadership and the second to establish market autonomy. In this 
regard, this thesis addressed the following set of questions: 
 
(1) When emergent leading firms in latecomer economies pursue a ‘dual frontier’ of 
technology supremacy and market autonomy, how do they reconcile uneven 
development within technologies and between technology and marketing stages 
within an organisation? 
(2) How does the fact that emergent leading firms enter the newly emerging market 
rather than mature markets affect their pursuit of a dual frontier? In addition, 
what is the role of inter-firm collaboration in their pursuit of a dual frontier 
under these market conditions? 
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In order to answer these questions, the thesis has investigated the Korean mobile 
handset industry during the eras of 2G and 2.5G using case studies on two emergent 
leading firms: Samsung and LG. Based on theoretical guidelines from the literature on 
the catching-up process and the boundaries of a firm, the thesis presents the following 
three main findings as responses to the questions that have underpinned the research. 
  
(1) The thesis demonstrates that opportunities of ‘access to foreign technology’ can 
emerge not only for emergent leading firms that seek to compete directly with 
technology frontier firms but also for emergent leading firms entering the embryonic 
stage of new industries, albeit if some conditions are met. The Joint Development 
Project between Qualcomm and its Korean counterparts, described in Chapter 5, 
showed that although a technology frontier firm had not fully reaped the benefits from 
its nascent technologies, competition to achieve a dominant compatibility standard 
among its peers created an opportunity for emergent leading firms to acquire licences 
for cutting-edge, although not well-developed, technologies.  
 
However, whether or not the licensee firm could have commercialised the technologies 
and later survived in the market for the long term was entirely in the hands of the 
technology licensee. This was because the foreign technologies that were licensed were 
technically incomplete and commercially unproven at the time of technology licensing. 
Therefore, in similar circumstances, external sourcing and the subsequent pursuit of in-
house efforts of R&D for commercialisation of nascent cutting-edge technologies could 
be viable options for an emergent leading firm attempting to enter the top tier of 
international competition. In such a case, however, it should be stressed that the 
licensing process is not a substitute for, but is a complement to, the considerable amount 
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of in-house R&D effort that is still required to follow technology licensing, effort that 
poses high risk and uncertainty for the emergent leading firm. 
 
(2) The disengagement from either OEM or ODM contracts with previous partners need 
not be interpreted as requiring the acquisition of sophisticated marketing capabilities (i.e. 
OBM-level capacities) – an extension of the boundary of emergent leading firms. As 
shown in Chapter 6, some MNOs are able to play the role of previous OBM partners (as 
intermediary users) in advanced markets. In particular, these participants have played an 
important role with regard to market requirements in certain industry settings such as 
the mobile handset industry. In the cases examined here, the MNOs’ continuous 
collaborations with the Korean handset manufacturers have not only provided a 
consistent source of demand in each local market but also served as a guarantor of 
quality (Jacobides et al. 2006). Due to the inter-firm arrangements, the nature of 
competition in the mobile handset industry fundamentally changed from the Korean 
handset manufacturers vs foreign giants on the one hand, to allies of Korean handset 
manufacturers and MNOs vs foreign handset manufacturers on the other hand. In this 
new competitive structure, the co-specialisation of development efforts between the 
Korean handset manufacturers proved to be a successful substitute for the 
activities/procedures/strategies of earlier OEM/ODM contracts. 
 
(3) The utilisation of technology licensing and co-development during the emergent 
leading firms’ transition did not come without cost. While inter-firm collaborations 
between Korean handset manufacturers and foreign MNOs provided Korean firms with 
successful mechanisms for complementing their lack of brand recognition and 
distribution channels, they brought upon both sides a very large burden in terms of 
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customisation developments. The point here is that the needs of emergent leading firms 
for complementary assets drove them towards a different path for penetrating foreign 
markets, which in turn shaped the idiosyncratic cost structures in emergent leading 
firms’ handset production systems and led these firms to derive an indigenous 
organisational solution (i.e. contract development organisations), as shown in Chapter 7.  
 
Based on these main findings, the thesis addresses how emergent leading firms pursuing 
the dual frontiers of technology supremacy and market autonomy competed head to 
head with leading technology firms (i.e. directly confronting them), overcoming the 
innate characteristics of ‘uneven development’ not only in the scope of technical 
knowledge but also in filling the gaps between technology development and marketing 
stages.  
 
One important issue with respect to Nokia should be noted here. Throughout the thesis, 
Nokia has been shown continuously as being completely opposite to Korean producers. 
However, by no means does the thesis argue that the strategy of Nokia was wrong and 
the strategy of Korean manufacturers was right, or vice versa. In fact, both Nokia and 
Korean manufacturers have thrived in the world mobile handset industry over the time 
period considered in this thesis. Nokia remained the most prosperous handset 
manufacturer until the emergence of the iPhone by Apple229. The results of this thesis 
imply that the differences in marketing capabilities among companies have led to the 
                                           
229 Ironically, Apple’s strategy regarding the iPhone was similar to that of Nokia during the multi-
functional phone era in terms of customisations. Apple did not provide customisations to MNOs. Instead, 
Apple made its market entry to each country with signing an exclusive deal with non market-leading local 
MNOs (e.g. AT&T in the US in June 2007, SoftBank in Japan in July 2008, and Korea Telecom in Korea 
in November 2009). 
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different strategies for market entry and accordingly to different boundaries of the firm. 
This issue is discussed further below. 
 
8.2 Theoretical contributions 
This section considers to what extent the findings of this thesis augment current theories 
on the catching-up process and boundaries of the firm. 
 
8.2.1 Literature on catching-up and transition processes 
The thesis contributes to the literature on catching-up and transition processes of 
latecomer firms in two areas.  
 
(1) Building on Soete (1985) and Perez and Soete (1988), the thesis identifies the 
emergence of windows of opportunity for international technology transfer even at the 
emerging stage of a new industry. Because these technologies are technically 
incomplete and commercially unproven at the time of technology licensing, the thesis 
stresses that the capacity of technology licensee firms to recognise technical and market 
potentials of new technologies and to realise them also matters.  
 
(2) The thesis moves from the previous intra-firm perspectives to inter-firm perspectives 
in addressing the pursuit of a dual frontier. Focusing on the issue of overcoming uneven 
development between technology and marketing capabilities within emergent leading 
firms (Hobday 1995b), the thesis concludes that one channel for pursuing the dual 
frontier involves close inter-firm interactions in terms of development resources with 
upstream suppliers (the CDs) and in terms of downstream capabilities with intermediary 
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users (the MNOs). The thesis demonstrates that an extension of firm boundaries through 
inter-firm arrangements with upstream suppliers and downstream distributors can 
provide an alternative organisational solution to compensate for the lack of capabilities 
of firms seeking leadership positions.  
 
8.2.2 Literature on boundaries of the firm 
The thesis also contributes to knowledge on boundaries of the firm.  
 
(1) It adds to the theory of industry organisations a new form of an outsourcing 
organisation, namely contract developers (CDs). A CD is defined as a company that is 
specialised in providing electronic product development services to one specific OBM.  
 
(2) The thesis extends the theory of the boundaries of the firm in that inter-firm 
arrangements can create a ‘quasi’ extension of firm boundaries in terms of development 
resources (the CDs) and in terms of downstream capabilities (the MNOs) and can shore 
up the competitive advantages against a firm hierarchy or a market mechanism.  
 
(3) Building on Teece (1986), the thesis further deepens our understanding of a specific 
type of a co-specialisation process, so-called ‘shallow co-specialisation’, in the context 
of a short product life cycle and in the absence of exclusiveness in a market.  
 
(4) The results of the thesis indicate that the capabilities view of the boundaries of the 
firm should include marketing capabilities in the analysis, in addition to technological 
capabilities. The thesis shows that firm heterogeneity in marketing capabilities results in 
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different strategies for market entry which create different cost structures, and that 
resolving the resulting organisational tensions may lead to different boundaries of the 
firm.  
 
(5) The thesis suggests that the literature on boundaries of the firm based on a 
capabilities view needs to anticipate possibilities for extending the firm boundaries 
through virtual or contractual arrangements. This result complements the observations 
that competitions among industry participants with regard to the division of profits (who 
takes how much) sometimes dictate the division of innovative labour (firm boundaries) 
and create the multiplicity of industry architectures (Brusoni et al. 2009).  
 
8.3 Empirical contributions 
 
The thesis provides a detailed explanation of an emergent leading firm’s pursuit of a 
dual frontier within the evolution of the mobile handset industry that suggests how 
technologies, products and services of the industry have changed and how the industry 
participants correspondingly have responded in terms of their boundaries and 
competitions. It also provides a detailed project-level account of product development in 
the mobile phone industry that illustrates how innovations were introduced, how 
changing market relations created important tensions in the cost structures of 
development and how these were resolved within a firm organisation. Therefore, the 
thesis offers empirical contributions to the literature at a level which is not often 
examined despite its relevance for technological competition. These contributions have 
several implications for technology and innovation management. 
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(1) The thesis shows that windows of opportunity for international technology transfer 
can emerge at the embryonic stage of a new technology paradigm for emergent leading 
firms. However, technical and market potentials of these technologies are highly 
uncertain. In this regard, emergent leading firms should retain and nurture the capacity 
to evaluate potentials and carry out the commercialisation of the technologies if their 
aim is to reach the dual frontier of technology supremacy and market autonomy.  
 
(2) In addition, considering the nature of the uneven development within technological 
bases and between technology and marketing capabilities, emergent leading firms 
should explore opportunities to extend firm boundaries through inter-firm collaborations 
with both upstream suppliers and downstream distributors. Some of the conditions for 
the emergence of these opportunities are identified in this thesis; two key mechanisms 
utilised have been co-specialisation for developing handsets and co-branding for 
marketing handsets.  
 
(3) In the case of mobile handsets, the existence of MNOs as intermediary users has 
played a vitally important role in the pursuit of the dual frontier. MNOs lie between 
handset manufacturers and end-users and have played a variety of roles as innovation 
and financial intermediaries over the course of the industry’s evolution. In the 2G era, 
MNOs mainly were the source of innovations and guarantors of quality for mobile 
handset manufacturers, but from 2.5G onwards they began to take on a dominant role in 
delivering MNO-specific mobile data services to end-users. The thesis shows that 
MNOs strongly controlled the whole process from handset design and development 
through to marketing, deciding which handset designs with which functions were to be 
introduced when in the market. This fundamentally changed the rules of competition in 
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the mobile handset industry from one handset vs another handset to a handset with 
standardised services vs a handset with MNO-specific services. This created market 
opportunities only for producers that were willing to invest relation-specific assets and 
deliver customised handsets to MNOs’ requirements under the contract-based 
development system. These issues offer a variety of empirical insights that promote an 
understanding of the dynamic competition in the mobile handset industry. 
 
(4) Under this industry competition structure, the thesis further elucidates in detail how 
Korean handset manufacturers successfully resolved the cost structures of handset 
development created by changing market relations. It illustrates that Korean 
manufacturers concentrated their in-house development resources on projects that 
produced learning and knowledge while outsourcing projects that were run-of-the-mill 
to external CDs. The utilisation of CDs was a new organisational solution to resolve the 
contract-based development cost structures of Korean handset manufacturers. The thesis 
also shows that two waves of CDs emerged from the unique relationships between 
Korean chaebols and their suppliers and from labour reallocation due to the industry 
shakeouts. The division of development labour between Korean manufacturers and CDs 
presents new empirical insights to practitioners interested in outsourcing solutions.  
 
(5) The thesis also distinguishes between shallow co-specialisation and conventional 
(deep) co-specialisation in the context of the mobile handset industry where the product 
life cycle is comparatively short and exclusive inter-firm relationships are also short-
lived. Therefore, the conventional co-specialisation based on long-term contracts does 
not exist. In this type of industry, the thesis argues that firms have to serve multiple 
customers at the same time by co-specialising with local companies with knowledge of 
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end-users. They need to develop capabilities not only to recognise and fulfil local 
company demands but also to transform these relation-specific capabilities into more 
general capabilities that enable them to address other markets to avoid lock-in of 
capabilities to specific end-use markets (Yasumoto & Fujimoto 2006).  
 
8.4 Research limitations and further research issues 
 
From the viewpoint of generalisation, the research limitations of this thesis are primarily 
located in the methodology. The research design of the thesis is based on a study of a 
single industry with focused case studies of two particular firms. The use of this type of 
research methodology involves the ‘situated particularities’ of the specific case studies, 
and whilst these are helpful in explaining the outcomes that the thesis examines, they 
may restrict the extent to which the empirical findings can be applied more generally. 
Therefore, the specific attributes of the Korean mobile handset industry should be 
carefully taken into account if the insights of the thesis are to be applied and extended to 
other countries and industries; further research using cases from other countries and 
industries would enhance the extent to which any theoretical and empirical lessons 
drawn from this thesis could be applied more generally. 
 
In addition, it is acknowledged that the case studies carried out in the thesis are highly 
centred on the Korean market players. As motives of, and intentions of activity of, non-
Korean market players were validated mainly through indirect methods such as 
interviews with Korean competitors and secondary industry documents, the absence of 
‘symmetrical’ evidence from non-Korean market players needs to be borne in mind, and 
the use of interviewee opinion about important issues regarding costs and partner 
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intentions must be taken at ‘face value’ but may be re-examined if more complete 
evidence were to emerge. Thus, some of the evidence presented in this thesis must be 
considered with some reservation and qualification, particularly with regard to the 
motives and strategies of non-Korean actors (such as Qualcomm and foreign MNOs).  
 
Considering these limitations, some further lines of research are suggested. The first 
comes from the industry attributes of the mobile handset industry. One may argue that 
the industry setting of the mobile handset industry is idiosyncratic in terms of the 
existence of intermediary users like MNOs, and thus the results of the thesis may be 
industry-specific and difficult to draw upon when considering theoretical and empirical 
lessons that can be applied more generally to other industries. However, intermediary 
users are found in other industries as well. For instance, the digital set-top box industry 
has an industry structure similar to the mobile handset industry in that, in addition to an 
open market, it has a closed market where producers market their set-top box to local 
broadcasting companies (intermediary users). There exist two internationally 
competitive Korean companies in this industry: Humax and Samsung. Humax is a 
Korean set-top box producer with sales of $1 billion and 4.2% of the world market 
share, ranking fifth in the world (2009 data)230. Therefore, this industry would serve as a 
potentially useful research case to test the theoretical and empirical implications 
presented in this thesis.  
 
                                           
230 The set-top box industry is highly decentralised in comparison with the mobile handset industry. Top 
market sharer Pace took 8.4% while tenth-placed Coship took 3.0% of the world market share (Bizinfo, 
http://www.bizinfo.go.kr/download?path=/addfile/form/&filename=%B1%E2%C8%B9%BA%B8%B0%
ED%BC%AD_01.hwp&realfilenm=1303372496182.hwp, accessed 2/4/2015). 
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A second line of research could be formulated from extended discussions on the 
producer–intermediary-user collaborations. It would be instructive to consider why 
Japanese handset producers failed to take advantage of their close producer–
intermediary-user relationships to become globally competitive manufacturers in the 
same manner as their Korean counterparts (and as described in this thesis). Although 
Sony Ericsson maintained a ranking in the world market of around fourth and fifth 
between 2002 and 2009 (the dates within the scope of this thesis)231, the presence of 
other Japanese manufacturers in the world handset market had become almost invisible. 
These manufacturers have had similar local market settings characterised by strong 
operator dominance. In fact, the level of MNO dominance and the adoption of 
sophistication in handset functions far exceeded those of Korean handsets in Japan. 
Whang and Hobday (2011) attributed the isolation of the Japanese market from the 
world market to the local 2G standard (PDC) and other peculiar local demands, which 
in turn led to the capabilities of Japanese producers being highly specific to Japanese 
MNOs.  
 
However, efforts to internationalise by both Japanese MNOs and handset manufacturers 
were highly visible. Several Japanese MNOs (which later merged to become KDDI) 
indeed adopted CDMA as a second domestic 2G standard, and NTT-Docomo also 
quickly adopted WCDMA as its 3G standard to avoid the so-called ‘Galapagos’ 
phenomenon, a reference to an isolated ecosystem. In addition, Sanyo and Kyocera have 
been two CDMA handset manufacturers actively engaged in the US CDMA handset 
market, and Sharp and NEC were the first handset vendors of global MNOs’ WCDMA 
mobile data for Vodafone and Hutchison respectively. It is therefore puzzling how a 
                                           
231 Most of the market share was the inheritance of Ericsson, not of Sony. 
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similar framework of inter-firm producer–intermediary-user relationships in Korea was 
(luckily) able to evade the partner-specific capability building trap that seems to have 
limited these Japanese companies. Further research on the case of the Japanese handset 
industry aimed at providing clearer insights into our knowledge of mechanisms and 
consequences of inter-firm producer–intermediary-user relationships would be very 
helpful. 
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